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Abstract
ISDS is a relatively young and dynamic regime. It faces challenges for which other adjudicative systems,
after centuries of development, have found solutions. In ISDS, fair rules and procedures are essential since
ISDS is an adjudicative regime said to be based on the rule of law. The importance of complex and carefully
crafted rules and procedural safeguards is underscored by the impact of ISDS on a wide array of parties and
interests and by its encroachment on the powers of sovereign states affecting their populations. Yet ISDS
is criticized as unfair and open to unacceptable appearances of bias due to a lack of institutional safeguards.

In this thesis, I assess whether these criticisms are compelling. Considering their prevalence in the debates
about ISDS, I focus on issues of neutrality and fairness and, in particular, on two core values: (1)
adjudicative independence and impartiality; and (2) the right of standing. I do so by examining institutional
measures adopted to safeguard these values. These include: a) methods of appointment and case
assignment; b) protections of the independence of individual adjudicators in the form of tenure and financial
security; and c) guaranteed standing for parties with a legal interest.

The goal of the thesis is to evaluate institutional safeguards of these values in ISDS through the method of
a comparative study of adjudicative bodies in various contexts and to map the spectrum of safeguards used
by other forums based on their common comparisons and similarities with ISDS.

The results of the research highlight that, although ISDS has been lauded for its perceived neutrality and as
a system superior to domestic courts, it is the regime with the weakest safeguards among all comparators,
while domestic courts employ the strongest institutional safeguards.

The central conclusion is that ISDS has systemic flaws and failures because it lacks mechanisms to
safeguard the examined values, thus substantiating the relevant concerns about the institutional design of
ISDS. To safeguard these essential values, it appears unavoidable that ISDS must be rejected in its current
form.
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Chapter 1: Introduction*

My interest in international investment law has developed through a series of unrelated events. I
heard about international investment arbitration for the first time when my home country sought
to defend two controversial arbitral lawsuits, Lauder1 and CME.2 These two cases are controversial
because they effectively involved the same parties and dealt with the same facts. Troublingly, the
two tribunals reached opposite conclusions. In one case the claim by the foreign investor was
dismissed, whereas in the other the investor was awarded damages of $270 million plus 10%
interest. Thus, the state lost after being sued twice for the same issue and after winning the first
case. At that time, the whole world of international investment arbitration remained a mystery to
me. In my quest for more understanding, I found that not only these two cases but all of
international investment law and its investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism are
subject to intensive debate. Yet these two cases remained the key motivation for me to study
international investment law. One feature that struck me most clearly in my studies was the fact
that, in comparison to other legal regimes, this was the only one that appeared to be somewhat
incomplete. This feature appeared to explain many of its controversies and in turn promised a rich
space for discovery and potential development. Around this time, the scholarly debates and public
outcry about ISDS in then-proposed treaties were flourishing.3

*

Excerpts of this thesis were submitted to the UNCITRAL Working Group III process in Gus Van Harten & Pavla
Křístková, “Comments on Judicial Independence and Impartiality in ISDS: A Paper Prepared for the UNCITRAL
Working Group III” (2018), online: SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3323010>.
1

Ronald S Lauder v The Czech Republic, Final Award (2001), 9 ICSID 62 [Lauder].
CME Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic (2001), Partial Award, 9 ICSID 121 (ICSID)
[CME]; Ibid, (2003), Final Award, 9 ICSID 264 (ICSID).
3
For example, see debates surrounding inclusion of ISDS in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) Between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the Other Part, 14
September 2016 [CETA]; and the later discontinued negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) between 2013 and 2016; See: “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) - Trade European Commission” (14 July 2016), online: European Commission <ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/>.
2

1

The issues of neutrality and fairness have been heavily debated with respect to ISDS. Proponents
of ISDS frequently present it as neutral, free from bias, apolitical, protected by institutional
safeguards found in systems like US courts4 and thus a better option in comparison to domestic
courts.5 Considering institutional safeguards, they point to the parties’ right to challenge arbitrators
if they are concerned that their independence or impartiality has been compromised as well as the
“multiple control mechanisms to police the procedural fairness of the award rendered.” 6 Yet none
of the control mechanisms they enlist - annulment mechanisms and awards being subject to review
and enforcement under the New York Convention - is related to initial stages of the proceedings,
where the appointing and case assigning powers operate. In contrast, critics of ISDS argue that
public courts, domestic and international, use richer protections than those ISDS can offer. They
maintain that ISDS is inherently unfair, even absurd,7 and for some a regime that should be
removed in its entirety.8 In fact, over one hundred US academics claim that “ISDS proceedings
lack many of the basic protections and procedures of the justice system normally available in a

“An open letter about investor-state dispute settlement (April 2015)” (7 April 2015), online: McGill
<www.mcgill.ca/fortier-chair/isds-open-letter> at 3.
5
The Honorable Charles N Brower & Sadie Blanchard, “What’s in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State
Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States” (2014) 52:3 Colum J Transnat’l L 689 at
695–696; “Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Some facts and figures” (12 March 2015), online: European
Commission <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf> at 3; “ISDS: Important Questions
and Answers” (March 2015), online (blog): Tradewinds: The Official Blog of the United States Trade
Representative <ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/2015/march/isds-important-questions-andanswers-0>; Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from injustice: how law firms, arbitrators and financiers are
fueling an investment arbitration boom (Brussels: Corporate Europe Observatory: Transnational Institute, 2012) at
36, 45–46.
6
Supra note 4 at 3–4.
7
Phil Levy, “Critique Of NAFTA Provision Highlights Team Trump’s Misconceptions On Investment Abroad” (23
October 2017), online: Forbes <www.forbes.com/sites/phillevy/2017/10/23/should-team-trump-encourageinvestment-in-mexico/> quoting U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.
8
Ji-hye Shin, “Revised FTA to curb overuse of legal dispute by foreign investors” (4 September 2018), online: The
Korea Herald <www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180904000761>.
4
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court of law”9 while at the same time over one hundred EU academics claim that ISDS lacks rule
of law safeguards and is systemically biased in favor of investors.10

These debates contributed to reform initiatives. For instance, some states have withdrawn from the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),11 while others have
renegotiated their old international investment agreements (IIAs) and negotiated new ones with
revised terms.12 Recently, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)13 has been
renegotiated and partially replaced with the new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA),14 where ISDS will be phased out between the United States and Canada.15 Further, the
US and South Korea, in their free trade agreement (FTA), added clauses to strengthen the right to
regulate and protect legitimate public welfare objectives.16 Other examples of major changes to

9

Letter from over 100 US academics (11 March 2015), online: Alliance for Justice <www.afj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/ISDS-Letter-3.11.pdf>.
10
“Law professors say ISDS is incompatible with EU law” (17 October 2016), online: ClientEarth
<www.clientearth.org/101-law-professors-say-isds-is-incompatible-with-eu-law/>; “Legality of investor-state
dispute settlement (ISDS) under EU law” (22 October 2015), online: ClientEarth
<www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2015-10-15-legality-of-isds-under-eu-law-ce-en.pdf>;
Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, supra note 5 at 8, 35–37.
11
List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of April 12, 2019) (ICSID/3), online:
ICSID <icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/List-of-Member-States.aspx>.
12
I do not cover these reforms in depth since IIAs reforms thus far have hardly touched the procedures I examine,
making them outside of the scope of my thesis. Instead of concentrating on IIAs and their reform, therefore, I
predominantly review various adjudicative bodies, their institutional design, and how they formulate procedures for
dispute settlement.
13
North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico and the
Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, art 1122 (2)(a) (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
14
Executive Office of the President, “United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement” (30 November 2018), online:
Office of the United States Trade Representative </trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexicocanada-agreement>.
15
Alison Ross, “New NAFTA curbs ISDS” (30 September 2018), online: Global Arbitration Review
<globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1175101/new-nafta-curbs-isds>; “NAFTA 2.0 finalized, announced as
USMCA: Mexico, United States agree to limit ISDS clause; Canada to pull out of ISDS after a three-year window”
(17 October 2018), online: International Institute for Sustainable Development <www.iisd.org/itn/2018/10/17/nafta2-0-finalized-announced-as-usmca-mexico-united-states-agree-to-limit-isds-clause-canada-to-pull-out-of-isds-aftera-three-year-window/>.
16
Executive Office of the President, Press Release, “Protocol Between the Government of the Republic of Korea
and the Government of the United States of America Amending the February 10, 2011 Exchange of Letters” (3
September 2018), online: Office of the United States Trade Representative <ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2018/september/ustr-publishes-agreed-outcomes-us> para 4 (a) and (d).

3

ISDS can be found in recent negotiations by the EU with various other countries. Since 2015, the
EU has concluded IIAs that include a permanent Investment Court System (ICS) with Canada,
Singapore and Vietnam17 and has reached an agreement in principle that includes the ICS with
Mexico.18 In contrast, the Japan–European Union Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA)
leaves ISDS out.19 Interestingly, in response to public outcry, the EU’s original proposals for the
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and EU-Vietnam FTA both
also had provisions protecting third parties’ rights, but these provisions were later removed.20 In
2017, the EU opened negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the

“The EU and Vietnam finalise landmark trade deal” (2 December 2015), online: European Commission
<trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1409>; “EU-Vietnam trade and investment agreements” (24
September 2018), online: European Commission <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437>: See Trade
Agreement, art 15.23 and Investment Protection Agreement, art 3.23; “EU-Singapore trade and investment
agreements” (last modified March 2019), online: European Commission
<trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961>: See Free Trade Agreement, art 14.20; CETA, supra note 3, art
29.8; “EU-Canada trade agreement: Council adopts decision to sign CETA - Consilium” (28 October 2016), online:
European Council | Council of the European Union <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2016/10/28/eu-canada-trade-agreement/>.
18
“Key features of the EU-Mexico trade agreement” (21 April 2018), online: European Commission
<trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1831> at para 7; “New EU-Mexico agreement: The Agreement in
Principle and its texts” (26 April 2018), online: European Commission
<trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1833>: see Dispute Settlement, art X.6.
19
“Update on EU trade and investment negotiations: Japan, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico – Investment
Treaty News” (30 July 2018), online: International Institute for Sustainable Development
<www.iisd.org/itn/2018/07/30/update-on-eu-trade-and-investment-negotiations-japan-vietnam-australia-newzealand-mexico/>.
20
Draft Consolidated Text: Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, 13 January 2010, art
X.28, online: Bilaterals.org <www.bilaterals.org/?eu-canada-fta-draft-consolidated>; European Union’s proposal in
the stopped negotiation of: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 12 November 2015 [TTIP] s 3, arts 22–
23, online: European Commission <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf>. See also
“EU-Vietnam trade and investment agreements” (24 September 2018), online: European Commission
<trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437>: EU-Vitnam FTA (1 February 2016), Chapter 8: Trade in
Services, Investment and E-Commerce, art 25 online: European Commission
<trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154210.pdf> [perma.cc/S8TG-UWG4]: While the EUVietnam FTA does not contain provisions related to third parties’ amicus and non-disputing parties, the EU-Vietnam
Investment Partnership Agreement (IPA) arts 3.51(2) and 3.8(6), and Annex 7, rs 40–42 does. The reason for the
removal of these provisions is an issue of inter-state negotiations that has not been discussed publicly by relevant
officials. See also EU-Singapore FTA and IPA: They both contain provisions related to third parties’ amicus and
non-disputing parties; See “EU-Singapore trade and investment agreements” (last modified March 2019), online:
European Commission <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961>: EU–Singapore FTA, art 14.17, and
Annex 14–A, rs 42–44; EU–Singapore IPA, arts 3.17 and 3.41, and Annex 8, arts 1 and 3.
17
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settlement of investment disputes.21 Similarly, ICSID, the PCA-UNCITRAL, and the ICC have
introduced various changes to incorporate some public concerns - transparency, inclusion of the
rules governing the non-party participation, etc. Moreover, to reform ISDS,22 the UNCITRAL has
set up a working group that concentrates on various issues including values of independence and
impartiality.

Despite the serious considerations reflected in these various initiatives ISDS remains substantially
unchanged. This is because these initiatives have a limited effect since most of them only reform
individual agreements out of over 3000 existing IIAs. Even initiatives that aim to reach a broader
audience - multilateral treaties, the ICS - reach only a portion of all potential disputes. Similarly,
reforms of ISDS by arbitral administering forums have been too modest to dispel concerns related
to its fairness and neutrality. As such, it is no surprise that several years on those initiatives and
these raging debates are still present. In fact, due to the large number of old IIAs in force, ISDS
will most likely continue to be fiercely debated for the foreseeable future, unless a more substantial
reform of ISDS is undertaken by its administering bodies.

The wide-ranging ISDS crisis, and in some instances the lack of in-depth study into aspects of the
crisis, led me to give ISDS a thorough academic evaluation in the form of a comparative study of
key issues. Considering their prevalence in the debates, I decided to focus on two core values that
are closely related to neutrality and fairness of adjudication: (1) adjudicative independence and
“Multilateral investment court: Council gives mandate to the Commission to open negotiations - Consilium” (20
March 2018), online: European Council | Council of the European Union
<www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/20/multilateral-investment-court-council-givesmandate-to-the-commission-to-open-negotiations/>; “A future multilateral investment court” (13 December 2016),
online: European Commission <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4350_en.htm>.
22
UNCITRAL, 50th Sess, Possible future work in the field of dispute settlement: Reforms of investor-State dispute
settlement (ISDS) A/CN.9/917 (2017) at paras 11 and 16.
21

5

impartiality and (2) right of standing. Since my focus is not on substantive outcomes of IIAs but
on procedures that safeguard these core values (IIAs mostly do not deal with either), I decided to
assess rules of procedures designed by ISDS administering houses.

For my comparative analysis, I sought a range of adjudicative bodies in various contexts in order
to compare major ISDS administering organizations with their institutional safeguards. I compared
procedural rules of the major international arbitral organizations - the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) – to adjudicative bodies in the following four groups.
With these four characteristics in mind I selected: (1) domestic courts - the Senior Courts of
England and Wales and the US Supreme Court; (2) European courts - the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); (3) international
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies - the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO); (4) domestic and international arbitral tribunals - the Financial Industry
Regulatory Agency (FINRA) in the US and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
Within each group, I examined individual bodies and analyzed their protections and compared
such findings with the findings for the ISDS administering bodies.

Treaty-based ISDS has four main characteristics: (1) it is arbitration (instead of litigation), (2)
based on treaties (as opposed to contractual agreements), (3) with functions similar to judicial
review, and (4) parties with a vertical relationship. Each forum reflects an adjudicative regime that
is comparable to ISDS. Critically, no perfect comparators exist due to ISDS’ unique adjudicative
features. Accordingly, I did not seek perfect ones but rather a sample of comparators found within
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a variety of public and private regulatory systems of adjudication with close connections and/ or
similarities. It is impossible to say which group is further afield from ISDS as it depends on the
point of reference. Interestingly, it appears that FINRA and WIPO have the least similarities and
that European courts have the most, although it obviously depends on what aspects are compared.

Considering neutrality and so the values of adjudicative independence and impartiality, I examined
separation of powers and its checks and balances. I proceeded by examining safeguards of these
values, Table 1, in two distinct steps. First, I examined appointment and methods of case
assignment, Chapter 4. In examination of these two processes, I focused on the separation of the
adjudicative branch from external influence (other branches of government, parties’ freedom to
choose their adjudicator, etc.), separation of powers to appoint to various steps (nomination,
selection, and appointment) with a variety of decision-makers, and separation of the two processes
(appointment from case assignment) as well as on freedom of individual adjudicators from
coercion from within the adjudicative branch (objective methods of case assignment). Second, I
analyzed elements of the personal security of adjudicators - security of tenure and methods of
remuneration that provide freedom from external pressure and financial repercussions and
uncertainties23 (a set of stable and repetitive incomes that does not turn on the peculiarities of
individual cases over the term of tenure), Chapter 5.

Considering the right of standing, in Chapter 6, I examined whether these parties have been
provided right of standing to the extent of their interest, Table 2. I mapped the spectrum of standing
rights of several adjudicative bodies with a special focus on the rights of non-disputing parties.

23

Ibid at paras 78–80.
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Once I collected all data, I analyzed them and compared findings of individual forums with the
findings for the ISDS administering bodies and concluded the article by commenting and analyzing
all findings.

Table 1: Safeguards of Adjudicative Independence & Impartiality

Default
procedures versus
parties’ choice

Standing

Comparator
Security
of
tenure

Financial
security

Selection

Yes
Courts

Default

Yes

Yes
Default

Set of
monthly
salaries +
Pension
Yes
Retainer

WTO AB

From
tenured
members

From
tenured
members

Separation
of process of
appointment
from case
assignment

Separation of
powers to
appoint

Parties’
choice

No

Ad hoc
income

Yes

Yes
E.g.
algorithms,
rotation, etc.

Yes

Default

No

Parties’
choice

No
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WIPO

No

Default**

No

Parties’
choice

No

Ad hoc
income
No
Ad hoc
income
No
Ad hoc
income
No
Ad hoc
income
No

ISDS bodies
No

Yes

External
influence

No

Yes

Separate stages:
nomination,
selection and
appointment

Yes

No

Yes

No

Rotation

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Parties involved
Yes
ad hoc

An elaborate
mechanism of
appointment

ad hoc

No

Yes
Yes

No

Parties’
choice

Default**

Ad hoc
income

Yes

Evenly
assigned*

No
ad hoc

No

FINRA

Objective
case
assignment

Separate stages:
nomination,
selection and
appointment
Yes

No
WTO panels

Case
assignment
within
adjudicative
branch

Yes

Yes
No

Parties’
preferences

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Parties’
preferences

No

Yes

Neutral
selection

No
No
Parties involved
No
ad hoc

No

No
Parties involved

Yes
ad hoc

Yes

ad hoc

No

Yes

Yes

Listprocedure

Yes

No
No

No
Parties involved
Yes

ad hoc

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
No

Ad hoc
ListParties’
income
procedure
preferences
*No possibility that some adjudicators are never assigned a case. Whether workload is evenly distributed or not typically Depends on whether parties have ability to choose or not. **Default
applies when parties cannot agree or failed to appoint - WIPO Arbitration Rules, Article 19.
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FINRA, Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (2007), rs 12401, 12402, and 12800 [Customer
Code]; Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes (2007), rs 13401, 13402, 13406(c), and 13800 [Industry
Code].
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Standing

Table 2: Fairness of the System - Right of Standing

Full right of standing
to those who satisfy

Intervention
with the same rights as parties

Comparator
UK courts

US Supreme Court

As of right

Discretionary*

Cases of public interest
Granted by a federal statute or having
with an interest in the subject matter of
the action

CJEU
Non-privileged

ICJ

WTO
AB

WTO
panels

FINRA

Reserved to states
only e.g. member
states of the UN et
al.

Appeals from
panels

Granted by a federal statute
or having a claim or
defense that shares with the
main action a common
question of law or fact.

Consensual****

WIPO

Consensual****

ICSID

ISDS reserved to
qualified investors
and a host
state****

PCA

ISDS reserved to
qualified investors
and a host
state*****

To support existing parties

Yes
To support existing parties

(Standing not required)
Yes

Yes

State Parties, The Council of
Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights

Any person concerned

The member states, etc.
The Court of Auditors,
etc.
An addressee of an act
The act is of direct and
individual concern
Directly concerned by a
regulatory act that does
not entail implementing
measures
Having an injury to
direct or indirect
interests
No special interest
required in erga omnes
partes

Yes
Anyone who was not heard, and the
judgment is prejudicial to the
applicant’s rights

Member states,
Institution of the EU***

Joinder

All parties must agree

All parties must agree

Parties in multilateral treaties of
which construction is questioned

Having the right to
initiate diplomatic
protections e.g. to
protect own nationals

Reserved to only to
disputing member states

Member states only

FINRA members and
associated persons
FINRA members and
their customers

Yes
Anyone with an interest in
the case - private or public

Yes
Initiate new ordinary compulsory
proceedings

Parties that participated at the
panel stage

Become cocomplainants
Violations of the
WTO Agreement,
no need to have a
“legal interest”

Granted by a federal statute or
having with an interest in the
subject matter of the action

(Standing not required)
(Must satisfy the
“substantial” interest test)

A person with a sufficient interest may
pursue the claim on behalf of a deceased

A “victim” of a
violating measure
test
Privileged

Discretionary**

Anyone directly affected

A “substantial”
interest test

Semi-privileged

As of right

Yes

A “sufficient”
interest test

(Must satisfy the “substantial” interest
test)

ECHR

Limited participation
known as amicus

Directly
affected
states can

Have a
substantial
interest in the
matter or

Indirectly
affected
states must

Initiate lawsuits against
a respondent regarding
matters already decided
at panel stage before the
original panel.

Invoke a
systemic
interest

Yes
A party must have an
interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by
the decision in the case

States that did not
participate in panel
proceedings, NGOs, trade
associations and interested
individuals

Panels may accept nonrequested briefs from
NGOs, trade associations
and interested individuals

Joinder
No

Only on request of one of
the parties
Joinder

No

Only on request of one of
the parties

No

Yes

No

Yes
Yes

No joinder but tribunals’
have broad discretionary
powers

No

Joinder
Only parties to an
arbitration agreement - Not
applicable in ISDS

No

No

Must have a significant
interest. No parties’
consent needed, but
parties may object

No
However, under the PCA
Arbitration Rules, contemplated
under the Hague Convention in
disputes related to the
interpretation of multilateral
treaties.

Yes
After consulting parties

Joinder
Yes
Only parties to an
No
arbitration agreement - Not
After consulting parties
applicable in ISDS
*At the discretion of the adjudicative body, with parties’ consent or on one of the party’s request. **At discretion of the adjudicative body or with the parties’ consent. ***Intervention should be typically allowed by the decision of the
President, except where parties identified confidential information of which revelation to the intervenor could be prejudicial to these parties. ****Between two or more private parties with an agreement to arbitrate. *****Treaty-based
- governed by individual IIAs.
ICC

ISDS reserved to
qualified investors
and a host
state*****

No
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The central conclusion of this evaluation is that the institutional design of ISDS lacks mechanisms
to safeguard both of these values. This conclusion arises from a comparative study of how these
shared values are safeguarded in other adjudicative contexts. It was found that ISDS has the
weakest safeguards. Not only does ISDS lack the institutional safeguards; it appears to be unique
in this respect. Compared to domestic courts, which ISDS proponents frequently criticize as
potentially biased, ISDS not only has far weaker safeguards; in fact, it sits on the opposite end of
the spectrum of institutional safeguards. In other words, while ISDS has the weakest institutional
safeguards, the purportedly inadequate domestic courts are among those with the most robust.

With respect to independence and impartiality, ISDS lacks mechanisms for the separation of
powers as well as personal protections for adjudicators. Separation of powers is crucial to ensure
adjudicative independence and impartiality, yet ISDS allows some private parties to circumvent
domestic courts and challenge the regulatory space of the state with only a fraction of the
safeguards that are typically present in courts. For example, ISDS administering bodies have no
permanent adjudicators but rather indicative lists of untenured individuals. Appointments to these
lists may proceed through distinct stages of nomination to the list, selection for the list, and
appointment to specific cases, yet the method for assigning an arbitrator to a case allows parties to
skip the list entirely by choosing their own arbitrator from wherever they wish, thus leaving a
possibility for a direct link between a disputing party and the adjudicator. This arrangement is
problematic not only because case assignment is subjective - in that a party may choose an
adjudicator with favourable views of the party’s position - but it gives the party a chance to
influence the adjudicator’s financial position. Since ISDS is based on unevenly-spread
appointments, workload, and remuneration, the arbitrators, unlike judges, are under pressure to
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protect their reputation in order to get appointed. What kind of reputation is desirable in this respect
and from what point of view? In fact, the practice of ISDS appears to have divided arbitrators into
an “elite” and the rest. Similarly, the availability of income based on appointments creates financial
insecurity, incentives to get appointed, and undesirable competitive pressure among adjudicators.

In terms of its fairness, ISDS lacks provisions to guarantee the right of standing for all parties with
a legal interest. Indeed, it sits again at the least fair end of the spectrum. Thus, IIAs limit the range
of possible complainants because citizens and domestic investors are not allowed to bring claims.
Moreover, the ISDS rules further restrict any other possibility for other parties to join or intervene
in the lawsuit. In fact, although an ISDS lawsuit might be prejudicial to other parties’ rights, they
have no way to protect their interests in the proceedings. Instead, their rights are left effectively to
the priorities of the disputing parties and how they argue their own case. How can tribunals
exercise fair judgment if they base their decisions on representation that is inadequate or even
completely absent and so leading to insufficient facts and evidence? Other interested parties can
thus be harmed by the original disputed conduct of an investor or government and then again by
the dispute settlement process itself. It should be said in this respect that, although all ISDS arbitral
bodies follow similar rules, there are important distinctions. Interestingly, ICSID, which
specializes in ISDS, is the only body that does not provide for joinder. All of the others - FINRA,
WIPO, the PCA-UNCITRAL and the ICC - allow joinder at the request of one of the original
parties. However, because such joinder is in disputes based on consensual agreements, unlike IIAs,
the arbitration rules of these other bodies typically require the joining party to be a party to an
arbitration agreement. While this requirement might be acceptable or even desired in purely
commercial and so consensual disputes - FINRA and WIPO - it is worrisome in the treaty-based
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arbitration (the core focus of my research) administered by ICSID, the PCA-UNCITRAL and the
ICC.

The years that I have spent studying ISDS helped me to develop a clearer and more extensive
understanding of this regime. Similarly, my thesis may inform others and contribute to the
discussion of how to strengthen the methods for protecting fundamental values in ISDS by
understanding how other adjudicative regimes achieve this goal. Since I examine shared values
across many contexts, various decision-makers – such as reformers, IIAs negotiators, and the
designers of the ICS and multilateral treaties – can benefit from the compiled dataset by learning
from other time-tested systems. My work may be helpful to open minds, inspire, and encourage
thinking, to provide examples to copy or avoid, to help adjust existing processes, or to contribute
entirely new projects. In other words, the thesis shows where ISDS contrasts with other forums
and may help to explain why there are the sometimes “odd” outcomes in ISDS.

After this initial overview, I proceed with the basic structure of my thesis. In chapter 2, I discuss
the theoretical insight about values shared universally - independence and impartiality separately
from fairness in terms of participation or fair representation (I use them interchangeably) and
illustrate their shared nature. In this undertaking, I review the party autonomy principle, its limits,
and its relation to sovereign powers and these shared values. Next, I describe my methodology and
the analytical framework in chapter 3, where I introduce the significance of institutional design
and processes in achieving procedural fairness. Further, I cite the theory behind a comparative
study to enlighten the reasons for my research and introduce the scope, individual comparators and
grounds for their selection, structure, and framework of this thesis. I cover the substantive
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comparison in chapters 4-6. In each chapter, I introduce the value discussed, then examine the
safeguards of each comparator and conclude by assessing all comparators. Then, in chapters 4 and
5, I explore adjudicative independence and impartiality: respectively, I investigate mechanisms of
adjudicative appointment and methods of case assignment; I deal with personal protection, security
of tenure and remuneration as forms of financial security. Next, in chapter 6, I concentrate on
fairness from the point of view of fair representation with a special focus on the right to standing
by third parties with a legal interest. I conclude my comparative study by evaluating all the findings
in chapter 7.
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Chapter 2: ISDS and Shared Values

Introduction
ISDS has been a subject of debate for its lack of neutrality and fairness. Considering these concerns
and in fairness to ISDS, I decided to explore its safeguards of fairness and adjudicative
independence and impartiality - as widely shared values of the rule of law. Debates about values
in adjudication tend to focus on whether the adjudicative system has a public or private function.
In ISDS, the public/ private dichotomy, and the question of its appropriate label, has been
extensively discussed.25 Some commentators, however, question the utility of this public/ private
divide and argue that it is more constructive to focus on values that are common to both legal
regimes rather than on their differences. Since the values that I examine are widely-shared or
universal, for the question of their role in ISDS I find this public/ private debate distracting (I do
not question this debate in general) because it turns our focus away from the shared values ISDS
ought to safeguard regardless of the label it receives. Therefore, as it is not essential for my project,
I do not dwell on this public/ private divide and focus instead on these shared values of the rule of
law that are relevant to both public law and private law.

For the private view see, for example: Barton Legum, “Investment Treaty Arbitration’s Contribution to
International Commercial Arbitration” (2005) 60:3 Disp Resol J 70 at 73; Jan Paulsson, “International Arbitration Is
Not Arbitration” (2009) 2008:2 SIAR 1 at 4; Charles N Brower, “W(h)ither International Commercial Arbitration?:
The Goff Lecture 2007” (2008) 24:2 Arb Intl 181 at 190; Anne van Aaken, “International Investment Law Between
Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis” (2009) 12:2 J Intl Econ L 507 (analysis of investment
law regime through the lens of private contract law); For the public law view see: Gus Van Harten, Investment
Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 59; Stephan W Schill, “Enhancing
International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law
Approach” (2011) 52:1 Va J Intl L 57 at 67; David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization:
Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 3; Andreas
Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2012) at 94–95; Chester Brown, “Procedure in Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Relevance of Comparative
Public Law” in Stephan W Schill, ed, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford; Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 2010) 659 at 659; Valentina Vadi, Public Health in International Investment Law and
Arbitration, 1st ed (New York: Routledge, 2013) at 23.
25
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As a starting point, I draw on Oliver’s argument that control of the use of power and protection of
essential individual and public interests are values of public and private law.26 Private law is not
strictly private but, like public law, it frequently regulates legal relationships beyond the parties to
the dispute and it protects a variety of vital interests, such as public policies, third parties’ rights,
community values and norms, the right to a fair trial, etc. To support this argument, I discuss
insights by scholars who acknowledge that various public values are not limited to public law but
are similarly applied in the private law domestically and at the international level.

Equally, ISDS, whatever label is given to it, has implications and effects for a wide array of parties
and interests reaching beyond the two immediate parties to the dispute: the host state and a foreign
investor. In practice, the interests of various other parties - individuals, local communities and even
the entire host state population - are frequently affected in potentially adverse ways. Arbitral
bodies, by the administration of ISDS, exercise extensive powers. They control the use of state
powers, preclude their abuse, and protect individual and public rights and interests. These powers
come with duties to resolve disputes fairly and in doing so to consider the competing interests of
all affected parties. Yet fairness can only be achieved if all stakeholders have the right to fair
representation (also known as the right to standing) to the extent of their interest before an
independent and impartial adjudicator - these values are recognized as attributes of a fair
proceeding.27

26

Dawn Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (London: Butterworths, 1999).
Austl, Commonwealth, Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms - Encroachments
by Laws: Final Report (ALRC Report 129) (Sydney: Australian Law Reform Commission, 2015) at para 8.20.
27
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Proponents of the view of ISDS as private law argue for the supremacy of the principle of party
autonomy over other values. Yet party autonomy is not an unfettered principle. There are other
values, and rights of other parties, that need to be considered and that justify limits to party
autonomy. I analyze party autonomy and its limitations in the context of social goals, the source
of ISDS authority, and the shared values. On the basis that no party can override or disregard
principles like public policy, mandatory rules, rights guaranteed by a higher source of law, state
sovereignty, etc., I argue that party autonomy is not an overriding principle that trumps the role of
other values in ISDS.

States in their sovereign capacities have negotiated terms of international investment agreements
(IIAs) and chosen arbitration as the applicable means of dispute settlement. There could be a
consequent inference that states, by agreeing to this unique regulatory system, intended to override
or even discard judicially-cultivated fundamental values. Yet there is no supporting evidence that
states chose to do so. Most obviously, the treaties are silent on this point. In the absence of other
evidence, mere silence cannot be construed as an intention to override fundamental values and
establish party autonomy as a supreme principle.

1. Values
The word “values” has several closely related meanings. For example: “[p]rinciples or standards
of behaviour” or “[t]he regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth.” 28 Since
values are part of the “background” in which judges operate,29 they help us to understand the
meaning of values in adjudication. Legal systems need to abide by fundamental values as they are

28
29

“Values” (last visited 17 June 2019), online: Lexico <www.lexico.com/en/definition/value>.
Oliver, supra note 26 at 59.
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“important” for them to function fairly. Values form a foundation or, in other words, standards on
which legal systems are based.

Values are often regarded as public or private: openness, fairness, and impartiality are commonly
viewed as public values, whereas trust, confidence, reliability, and good faith tend to be private
law alternatives.30 However, some scholars explore values transcending this public/ private
division.31 For instance, Oliver maintains that it is more constructive to concentrate on values that
public and private legal regimes have in common.32 Along similar lines, Shetreet argues that
values, such as procedural fairness, public confidence in the courts, efficiency, access to justice,
and judicial independence are fundamental to the judicial system in general.33 In his evaluation of
fundamental values, he does not distinguish between public and private justice systems but
maintains that “[a] proper legal system is one which advances each of these values.” 34 These
viewpoints suggest that there are values that are shared by both legal regimes, though their number
is limited.

The public/ private labels may help to navigate legal concepts in some contexts, but my focus in
the present study makes them less useful. My goal is not to question or contribute to a debate about
whether ISDS reflects a predominantly public law, private law, or hybrid arrangement. Instead,
following from Oliver and Shetreet, I focus on a limited number of values that public and private
law both share. As a result, it is not essential for my research to determine whether ISDS is best

30

Ibid at 55.
Duncan Kennedy, “The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction” (1982) 130:6 U Pa L Rev 1349;
Oliver, supra note 26.
32
Oliver, supra note 26 at 11.
33
Shimon Shetreet, “Fundamental Values of the Justice System” (2012) 23:1 Eur Bus L Rev 61 at 61.
34
Ibid at 62.
31
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regarded as public or private law. I have touched on this distinction merely because of the ongoing
debate, which I now put aside to focus on shared values and ISDS.

a) Shared Values
According to Oliver, shared values are substantive as well as procedural and they are concerned
with the “control of power” and with protecting “certain vital interests of individuals and public
interests” “against abuses of power” from the public as well as private bodies. She argues that
“similar theories of government, democracy, and citizenship underpin these roles of the courts in
controlling power and protecting individual and public interest.”35 In other words, common values
touch on the role of public and private law courts to control powers exercised by the state or a
private entity and to protect vital interests. Oliver’s examples of parallels between public and
private law arise in trusts, contracts, employment law, and family relationships.36

By implication, courts and tribunals are empowered to control the use of power by other entities
and to protect the vital interests of individuals and the public. In the exercise of their authority,
adjudicative bodies should not only protect these values against other institutions, but also employ
mechanisms themselves which guarantee the protections internally. Mechanisms safeguarding
these values promote public confidence in systemic fairness to check potential misuse of
adjudicative powers. These mechanisms are related to the institutional design of adjudicative
bodies, an issue discussed in Chapter 3.

35

Oliver, supra note 26 at 1, 11.
Ibid at 2; Also, Uglješa Grušić, The International Employment Contract (PhD thesis, The London School of
Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2012) [unpublished] at II argues that public/ private distinction has faded
away. To support his claim, he uses European Private International Employment law.
36
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There are various values to be found under Oliver’s overarching powers, yet there is no need to
dwell on those that are peripheral to the present study. My focus is on values linked to procedural
fairness,37 also known as due process of law,38 a vital interest that needs protection. Procedural
fairness embodies rules and values, such as notice, disclosure, the opportunity to present one’s
case, the opportunity to respond, the duty to consider all the evidence, the right to counsel, the
right to an interpreter, legitimate expectations, the right to an impartial decision-maker and
freedom from bias, institutional independence the requirement that the person who hears the case
must decide, concerns related to delay, and the right to reasons.39 I concentrate on two core aspects
of these procedural fairness values: the right to participate when one’s rights or interests are
affected and adjudicative independence and impartiality.40

Even if not all public values are present in private law, public and private law nevertheless share
a fundamental respect for the right of participation and adjudicative independence and impartiality.
The significance of these values lies in the ability of adversely affected parties to be heard by nonpartisan adjudicators. In private law, participation as an element of procedural fairness has
instrumental value.41 The ability to participate enables adjudicators to conduct informed decision-

According to the Government of Canada, [“Citizenship: Natural justice and procedural fairness” (3 July 2015),
online: Government of Canada <www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/tools/cit/admin/decision/natural.asp>] “[t]he
principles of natural justice and procedural fairness are based on the theory that the substance of a decision is more
likely to be fair if the procedure through which that decision was made has been just.”
38
Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps, “Due Process of Law” in West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, 2nd ed
(Detroit: Thomson/Gale, 2005): In the US “[a] fundamental, constitutional guarantee that all legal proceedings will
be fair and that one will be given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard before the government
acts to take away one's life, liberty, or property. Also, a constitutional guarantee that a law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious.”; Frederick F Shauer, “English Natural Justice and American Due Process: An Analytical
Comparison” (1976) 18:1 Wm & Mary L Rev 47 at 48: In England known as natural justice consisting of two
concepts “[t]he first, audi alteram partem, relates to the right to be heard; the second, nemo debet esse judex in
propria sua causa or nemo judex in re sua, establishes the right to an unbiased tribunal.”
39
Government of Canada, supra note 37.
40
Shauer, supra note 38 at 48: He sees these values as the most fundamental values of natural justice and as an
equivalent of procedural process.
41
Oliver, supra note 26 at 96.
37
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making based on relevant facts. Adjudicators, judges and arbitrators, play a key role as guardians
of these values and regulators of the stakeholders’ interplay. They must be impartial and
independent to fulfill guardian duties, while the public needs to have confidence that adjudicators
are acting in this manner. Upholding impartiality and independence in practice is insufficient if the
public does not perceive it to be so. Traditionally, organizations seeking to achieve public
confidence use institutional mechanisms that safeguard these shared values.

Adjudication is an exercise of the power to decide the fate of another person who is, in Oliver’s
words, a “victim” of the decision.42 Participation in proceedings enables adjudicators to reach a
fair outcome since it provides an ability to the affected party to influence the decision that directly
affects this party.43 In turn, the lack of participation is unfair for those to whom the decision relates
but who could not argue their case. This participation may take various forms, ranging from the
full and guaranteed legal right of standing44 to limited modes of intervention granted at the
discretion of the court. The exercise of the courts’ powers includes their ability to grant or refuse
participation. Adjudication is fair only if its processes ensure that the right to participate is
guaranteed to all affected stakeholders to the extent of their interest and is assessed by objective
tools. Procedural fairness thus falls squarely under the rubric of controls on the use of power,
preclusion of its abuse, and protection of vital interests.

42

Ibid.
Ibid.
44
Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps, “Standing” in West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, 2nd ed (Detroit:
Thomson/Gale, 2005): the right of standing is “[t]he legally protectible stake or interest that an individual has in a
dispute that entitles him to bring the controversy before the court to obtain judicial relief.”; Legal Information
Institute (LII), “Standing” (6 August 2007), online: Cornell Law School < www.law.cornell.edu/wex/standing>:
“Standing, or locus standi, is capacity of a party to bring suit in court.”
43
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Procedural fairness leads to openness that is in turn linked to the value of accountability.45 This
openness as the mechanism of accountability also serves as a protection for individuals against illconceived decisions.46 The underlying rationale of procedural fairness is to give protection to a
broad range of interests. According to Oliver, safeguarding this protection sometimes requires
“altruism or disinterestedness on the part of the decision-maker.”47 This contention implies the
need for an independent and impartial adjudicator. In domestic legal settings where courts are the
ultimate decision-makers, requirements of adjudicative independence and impartiality are applied
to all judges regardless of whether they decide private or public law disputes. 48 Generally, there
are no different criteria that public, as opposed to private, law judges must satisfy since they are
all appointed through the same procedures and governed by the same provisions. In other words,
adjudicative independence and impartiality both operate as underlying values in private as well as
public law.49

It is therefore fair to say that these public values are embedded in private law even though the ways
in which the values are recognized and implemented vary. There is a spectrum of approaches.
Despite differences in methods and approaches, though, the values remain indispensable for
achieving fairness in any legal system including ISDS. Yet some commentators claim that in ISDS
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party autonomy is a supreme or overriding principle.50 This view creates controversy as it implies
that even fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed values can be overridden by parties based
on party autonomy. Considering the gravity of this issue, the interaction between party autonomy
and the shared values of the rule of law requires a close assessment, which I provide later in this
chapter.

b) Values and the Not so Strictly Private Law
How is it that public and private law share values? The sharing stems from the fact that both are
anchored in the same overarching social goals and values. In this section, I provide several
examples of how private law, while balancing other competing needs and interests, still delivers
shared values.

Private law is embedded in overarching social values. As Sweet and Grisel argue, no private law
is strictly “private” because it was substantiated by state actors exercising public authority.51
Similarly, Collins in his elaboration of contract law characterizes private law as an instrument of
governance having the ability to achieve “the social goals of the community.”52 Private law
promotes the state’s values and for that it cannot be independent of the state.53 In countries, like
Canada and Germany, the relationship between the state’s constitutional values and private law
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requires that no rule of the latter conflicts with the former values.54 As Sternlight puts it, “due
process protections are a matter of constitutional right.”55 With respect to binding arbitration, he
points out that a lack of adequate procedural protections may make arbitration unconstitutional.56
Constitutional values define the conduct of the state and influence private law in general. Along
similar lines, Dagan argues that many so-called public values should and in fact do inform private
law.57 He contends that private law is somewhere in between two opposing theories:
instrumentalist - private law as a form of regulation, and autonomist - no social purpose or social
value can legitimately inform private law.58 He maintains that private law values are born from
and influenced by public values and thus should be responsive to them.59 Therefore, there are limits
to private dealings as measured by social and political goals and higher laws.

Regulatory Function
Private domestic law, according to Hedley, is used by public authorities like courts as a technique
or instrument of government.60 Collins likewise points out that private law “is perceived
increasingly as another arm of the regulatory state” instead of being “guided exclusively by the
standards of corrective justice”61 and argues that “the general law of contract should be regarded
as a governance mechanism and a part of the state’s regulatory structure.”62 Along similar lines,
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Harlow argues that “[b]y presenting administrative law principles as constitutional values to which
the private law system is also subject, control over privatized entities could be maintained.”63
According to Wai, contract law has a regulatory function since it does not solely govern the
contractual relationship between the parties but goes beyond them.64 This private law regulation is
reflected, for instance, in the protection of social and political goals as well as weaker parties:
consumers in contract law, employees in employment law, and third parties in tort law.65 Wai
argues further that this traditional regulatory role of private law has been, due to globalization,
shifted to private international law.66

Freeman describes this regulatory development in private law settings in terms of a
“publicization”.67 She argues that the government in this way expands its reach. 68 In the process
of “publicization”, private actors exercise goals that are traditionally public through budgeting,
regulation, and contract.69 In doing so, she explains that “[t]he state can exact concessions - in the
form of adherence to public norms - in exchange for contracting out its work.”70 Hodges similarly
describes publicization as a mechanism by which private actors deliver public functions.71
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The protection of third parties’ interests is another example of private law’s regulatory function.
Oliver comments that “courts do impose duties and obligations of consideration towards others in
private law.”72 For instance, Lord Denning in various cases imposed administrative law duties that
relate to a third party’s protection, fairness and reasonableness, on private parties. 73 In doing so,
he applied administrative duties to private bodies and decision-makers on both a contractual and a
non-contractual basis.74 The duties effectively limited the activities and autonomy of private
parties.

Another aspect of private law’s protections of third parties’ interests is the common law concept
of “collectivity” described, according to Collins, as “public policy”, “the public interest” or moral
principles.75 Along these lines, Collins notes that national private law judges generally respond to
social concerns by seeking to integrate collective voices in private law proceedings76 even though
this “collectivity” has no formal legal personality and does not acquire private law rights.77 In turn,
these collective voices enable the courts to control the exercise of private law rights.78 He maintains
that the use of this proceduralism in private law may mirror public law.79
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Rule of Law
The rule of law, according to Dyzenhaus, applies to public as well as private law.80 Similarly, Lucy
contends that “the rule of law and private law are not strangers” since “they protect against the
same ill—arbitrariness—maintain the same conditions, and serve the same values.”81 Values of
the rule of law, despite the fuzziness of the term, are generality, clarity, publicity, stability,
predictability, an independent judiciary, a right to participate, etc.82 According to Harlow, every
Western administrative system including the European Union is founded on the rule of law,83
which in summary depends on fairness, legality, consistency, rationality, and impartiality as well
as participation and openness.84 Aronson, Dyer, and Groves add the values of access to judicial
and non-judicial grievance procedures, legality, and consistency.85 Despite some variation, most
of these commentators also list participation before an independent adjudicator as a rule of law
value; otherwise, it may be said to be implicit in other values, such as fairness.

For instance, European law is based on the rule of law despite different historical developments
and understandings of the law in individual European states, which represent both the common
law tradition in the United Kingdom, Ireland, etc. and the civil law tradition in France, Germany,
Poland, etc. Yet all EU states and all signatories to the European Human Rights Convention
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recognize the underlying values of fairness, participation, independence, and impartiality.86 For
private regulation within the EU, Micklitz, for instance, states that “it seems … necessary to
underline that the principles of transparency, participation, accountability and judicial review
should apply equally to all forms of private regulation, whatever the subject matter might be.”87
This conclusion supports further the view that these values are not exclusive to public law and
have a place in private law too.

c) Summary
Private law thus emerges as a tool that delivers public values and goals and that balances the need
for other competing values along a spectrum of means. States use private law to regulate social
affairs and interactions reaching well beyond the agreements of private parties. Likewise,
international private law, where ISDS operates to some degree, also recognizes and delivers such
values. The function of private law cannot be reduced to mere facilitation of a contractual
relationship between two parties. While some commentators argue for the supremacy of party
autonomy over other values in ISDS, the embeddedness of private law in shared values and its
regulatory function means that party autonomy has important limits.
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2. Party Autonomy
The debates about the supremacy of party autonomy in ISDS raise important questions. Is party
autonomy a competing or even an overriding principle in comparison to shared and fundamental
values of the rule of law including procedural fairness in terms of standing and adjudicative
independence and impartiality? Are parties free to opt out of these fundamental values? In this
section, I seek to find answers to these questions and to explore the meaning of this principle, how
it interacts with the values of the rule of law, and whether it has supremacy over these values.

Party autonomy, also framed as freedom of contract, is a principle of private law recognized at the
domestic and international level.88 According to this principle, parties are free to choose the forum
(any particular jurisdiction, court or arbitration)89 and the law applicable to the substance of the
dispute.90 Choice of law is recognized, for instance, in the US under § 187(2)(b) of the Restatement
(second) of Conflict of Laws. In Canada, following Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co
Ltd,91 parties can decide which law will govern their contract. In the European Union, the choice
of law is permitted under the Rome I and Rome II Regulations governing contractual and non-
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contractual obligations respectively.92 In arbitration agreements, party autonomy is recognized
under the New York Convention.93

If parties may choose their laws, are they also free to decide the procedures that will govern the
proceedings? Courts, in general, use their own procedural rules. In domestic contexts, these rules
are subject to constitutional norms and values and any relevant national laws.94 The court’s internal
procedures are, in the hierarchy, subsidiary to the latter two.95 Courts ordinarily prescribe the sets
of permissible actions from which private parties can choose and thus limit parties’ freedom of
contract.96 Likewise, international courts and arbitral organizations have their own procedural rules
but are subject to treaties.97 Speaking of ISDS, international investment treaties (IIAs) generally
define the venues and set of rules from which foreign investors can select to bring a claim, thus
allowing venue shopping.98 Similarly, ISDS administering organizations define the sets of rules
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from which parties - here, again, usually the investor when bringing the claim - can elect.99 Further,
some IIAs allow the disputing parties to draft their procedures100 but this ad hoc option seems
rare.101 Despite having the ability to choose the forum and procedural rules, 102 parties have their
freedom restricted by the limits imposed by conventions and procedural rules to ensure, among
other things, fairness in the conduct of these proceedings.103

For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)104 limits parties’ autonomy by
giving third parties the right to intervene without the parties’ consent as long as the intervening
party informs the disputing parties and as long as its intervention concerns interpretation of the
NAFTA.105 Additionally, confidentiality, a closely related principle to party autonomy, in ISDS
under the NAFTA has its limits; for example, it needs to be balanced against the public interest in
disclosure.106 In Methanex Corporation v United States of America, the tribunal, while considering
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the submission for amici briefs, noted that “the [NAFTA] Chapter 11 arbitral process could benefit
from being perceived as more open or transparent; or conversely be harmed if seen as unduly
secretive.”107 Along similar lines, in 2014, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) enhanced the transparency of ISDS by adopting new Rules on Transparency
in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration. These new rules, narrow the scope of the principle of
confidentiality by facilitating public access to ISDS cases and acknowledging the need to balance
public and private interests,108 yet since they are mainly applicable to new treaties rather than new
cases under existing ones - a condition imposed to limit the degree of transparency in ISDS, its
reach remains very limited. These examples are reminders that party autonomy must sometimes
be reconciled with other values.

In summary, the view of party autonomy as a supreme principle clashes with procedural rules of
domestic and international courts, where private parties cannot draft their own procedural rules or
select their judges. Outside of the courts, party autonomy can overcome some requirements and
principles traditionally applied within the court system, but this ability also has its limits. In the
following sections, I discuss party autonomy and its limitations in the context of domestic law, the
source of ISDS authority, and the shared values.
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a) Limits to Party Autonomy
Party autonomy itself stems from social values that it ought to represent.109 There are various social
goals and fundamental values, like autonomy, dignity and respect, status, and security, and since
no value trumps the others in all circumstances they “need to be balanced against one another”.110
This balancing corresponds with the notion that one person’s freedom should not interfere with
another person’s freedom. This notion of non-interference, together with a requirement to respect
the general welfare, has been recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR):
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.111
The general welfare, according to Collins, requires the demands of private autonomy to “be
reconciled with the need to support social solidarity”112 and to illustrate this point he notes the
protection of weaker parties in contract law.113 Other goals connected to broad public values may
include protection of the environment, public health and safety, and the rights and interests of third
parties.

To balance competing values, social norms and interests, domestic laws ordinarily limit the
validity and enforceability of party autonomy. Generally, parties cannot derogate from various
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mandatory rules or agree to contracts that are illegal114 or contrary to public policy.115 The purpose
of these rules and public policy is to protect the public interest of the state.116 It is natural, as Fry
notes, that “social norms of a state shift over time, so too will a State’s notion of public policy.”117
The prerogatives of a state define what constitutes its public policy and limit the range of rules
from which parties can derogate. For illustration, under the EU Rome I and II Regulations, parties
cannot derogate from provisions related to the protection of weaker parties118 and the rights of
third parties.119 Considering the legality of agreements, an English court, for instance, refused to
enforce an illegal contract in Soleimany v Soleimany where the parties, a father and son, breached
Iranian law by smuggling carpets out of Iran.120 By refusing to enforce this contract to engage in
illegal activity, the court sought to “preserve the integrity of its process, and to see that it is not
abused.”121 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)122 found as contrary to public
policy a non-compliance with the EU competition law. Also, the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards123 recognizes domestic mandatory rules
and public policy as legal limits on parties’ freedom to contract. Thus, being contrary to public
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policy is a reason for invalidating and declining to enforce the agreement under the New York
Convention.124

Likewise, in international transactions the most important limit to party autonomy, according to
the tribunal in Niko v Bangladesh,125 is international public policy.126 Arbitrators cannot give effect
to contracts that conflict with it. This international public policy, a term lacking precise
definition,127 is in fact a domestic public policy applied to foreign awards.128 Thus, international
arbitration is not independent of, but has its ties to, national laws and public policies.

A “truly” international public policy, also called “transnational public policy” is, in contrast,
“quasi-universal in nature” and thus goes beyond domestic public policy.129 Lalive conceptualized
this transnational public policy as a set of general principles that prevail over all other domestic
and international norms.130Among these principles are, for example, “the prohibition of corruption,
slavery, drug trade, terrorism, genocide, the regulation of the trade of organs and weapons.”131
Also, the tribunal in World Duty Free v Kenya distinguished international public policy from
transnational public policy132 and defined the latter as “signifying an international consensus as to
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universal standards and accepted norms of conduct that must be applied in all fora.”133 For Sweet
and Grisel this transnational public policy is a result of “judicialization” of international
arbitration, both commercial and treaty-based, with signs of “constitutionalization”.134 They
describe this judicialization as a form of governance by tribunals “in the name of a larger,
transnational community” and not just dyadic disputes.135 Thus, in their decision-making,
arbitrators, instead of focusing solely on the interests of the disputing parties, are obliged to take
into account the interests of the wider society.136 Under the next constitutionalization model, the
arbitrator is “an Agent of a wider international legal order”, 137 meaning the norms and practices
that are shared among national, treaty-based and transnational legal systems and that are binding
on all international judges as well as arbitrators.138

In sum, parties to a dispute can make choices but they must be bona fide, legal, and subject to the
domestic mandatory rules and to domestic, international, and transnational public policy. Party
autonomy is not an unrestricted principle and is always limited by higher laws and norms, social
values, and goals.139

133

World Duty Free, supra note 128 at para 139.
Alec Stone Sweet & Florian Grisel, supra note 51 at 42.
135
Ibid at para 2.2.
136
Ibid.
137
Ibid at 34.
138
Ibid at 24.
139
Blackaby et al, supra note 90 at paras 3.101–3.103, and 11.104; Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, “Constitutional
Aspects of Party Autonomy and Its Limits – The Perspective of Law” in Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber &
Stephen Weatherill, eds, Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market (Walter de Gruyter,
2001) 41 at 42.
134

35

b) Party Autonomy versus Sovereignty
Proponents of party autonomy as the supreme principle in ISDS deem the disputing parties to be
the source of the authority to arbitrate. Unquestionably, states like foreign investors can and
frequently do act in a commercial capacity. However, treaty-based ISDS is not founded on
agreements of two commercial parties seeking to achieve their business interests. On the contrary,
ISDS stems from IIAs that are negotiated by states in their sovereign capacities.140 Thus, ISDS
derives its authority from the state and deals with acts or inaction of the state in its sovereign
capacity.141 Moreover, in ISDS, parties act in asymmetric roles unlike in commercial relations. In
practice, this asymmetry means that the investor as a private party enjoys the right to sue the host
state with generally no attached duties, whereas the state acts as a sovereign entity that has
obligations toward the investor but cannot initiate the lawsuit.142

Along these lines, Bjorklund maintains that in the context of ISDS “states have voluntarily given
more rights to individuals, including the ability, in some instances, to press their own claims.”143
Her assertion goes further by claiming that ISDS includes some abrogation of states’
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sovereignty.144 Yet states have by no means, by signing their treaties, given up their sovereign
rights or duties and there is more to sovereignty than Bjorklund’s position suggests.

Sovereignty has been cultivated for centuries and is a defining characteristic of the state. 145
According to Raustiala, “[s]overeignty is often defined as supreme and independent power or
authority in government as possessed or claimed by a state or community in a defined territory.”146
Takeshita, in his analysis, notes Zitelmann’s assertion “that rights are derived only from the
sovereign power of states and that only a state can formulate, change or make extinct a right
through a legal order.”147 Equally, in the investor-state relations, it is the host state that in its
sovereign capacity grants foreign investors the right to sue. Correspondingly, it is the sovereign
that negotiates the treaty’s terms, its subsequent changes, and its potential termination. Thus, in
the same capacity in which the state grants rights to be sued, it can also revoke, terminate or
constrain these rights, both explicitly and implicitly. In the context of IIAs, Alvarez states that
some states “are re-asserting their sovereign rights vis-à-vis foreign investors.”148 He notes that
many states exercise “some of their exit and voice options.”149 Further, he claims that some other
states employ more updated model treaties, like the 2004 US Model BIT, that grant foreign
investors fewer rights and at the same time afford the host state more room to maneuver.150 These
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observations reflect the fact, that when states decide to re-assert their sovereign rights, they can do
so.

Further, party autonomy itself can only derive a supreme quality from a sovereign that has the
authority and intention to grant it. The asserted supremacy thus implies that states intended this
result. By implication, it suggests that states chose to move away from their established judicial
practice and all of the corresponding values by enabling parties to override fundamental rights and
values that are guaranteed constitutionally and recognized as human rights. In a situation like this,
foreign investors could disregard other parties’ rights, whereas host states could potentially opt out
of some of their responsibilities to their citizens. This assertion is dubious.

If sovereign states intended to give party autonomy a supreme status and thus radically override
established judicial practice, one could rightly anticipate that they would make their intentions
clear. Yet IIAs are silent on the point. In the absence of evidence of explicit intention, the question
arises whether the intention may be implied. For it to be so, IIAs’ interpretation should follow the
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rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)151 that codifies the general rules
of the international law of treaty interpretation and reflects customary international law.152

According to the VCLT, textual silence warrants recourse to the treaty context, purpose, objective,
any relevant rules of international law,153 and to supplementary means of interpretation like the
preparatory work.154 Thus, adjudicators in interpreting IIAs should observe the context in which
they were signed,155 respect their purpose and objective, and consider any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the signatory parties.156 Concerning the IIAs’
overarching purpose and goals, IIAs were created to protect foreign investors and level the playing
field with domestic investors through provisions like National Treatment. The alleged supremacy
of party autonomy, and with it the ability to disregard higher laws instead of leveling the playing
field (given that domestic investors do not have these ISDS powers), favors foreign investors over
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domestic ones. The claim that parties have these supreme powers, thus, refutes the purpose of IIAs
since these powers hinder any prospect of equal footing. For other relevant rules, values of
adjudicative independence, impartiality, and fairness are all recognized in public and private law
domestically as well as in international law and in commercial arbitration. They are generally
applicable in the relations between the treaty signatories. Moreover, IIAs, by giving foreign
investors the right to choose from sets of laws and rules, show the intent to restrict parties’ freedom.
Further, it is questionable whether discarding these fundamental values, explicitly or implicitly,
could ever be a legitimate act. The context, objective, and purpose of IIAs, though a bit simplified
here, make it difficult to infer that states intended that fundamental values should give way to party
autonomy.

If an act that overrides fundamental values is likely illegitimate, why would states intend to do it?
Poulsen considers the reasons why developing countries signed “largely identical treaties, which
significantly constrained their sovereignty” and concludes that treaty drafters often acted
irrationally.157 According to him, “many treaty drafters did not appreciate BITs’ far-reaching
repercussions and overestimated their benefits.”158 He describes this poor awareness as part of the
“political realities of the treaty-making process”159 and claims that, as developing countries lacked
expertise and experience in negotiation, they relied on templates of other states. 160 Although
Poulsen did not focus on developed states, one could assume that these political realities are not
limited to developing nations.
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In the absence of other evidence from the text or negotiations, silence seems to suggest that drafters
did not consider that there is an issue or that they ignored it. In turn, ignorance points to poor
preparation or a possibility that negotiators did not require any changes to proposed treaty models.
While ignorance may not be a legitimate defense, it can help, when an express text is missing, to
discern the intentions of these states.161 Since there is no other compelling evidence that states
intended to give parties’ the power to override shared values, it seems that some commentators
assign properties to IIAs that were never intended or expected. In other words, interpretative
techniques that construe the party autonomy as the supreme principle bring unintended but farreaching consequences.

It is also contentious whether the interpretation of states’ intentions that attributes to party
autonomy this sweeping supremacy could ever be a legitimate act. Sovereign powers are
intertwined with duties to citizens. As Held puts it, “states remain of the utmost importance to the
protection and maintenance of the security and welfare of their citizens.”162 Along these lines, Held
claims that “[l]egitimate authority has become linked, in moral and legal terms, with the
maintenance of human rights values and democratic standards.”163 Since the right to a fair trial,
including all its associated values, belongs among these rights, it is the role of the state to protect
that right.164 Thus, Bjorklund’s contention of state abrogation of some of its sovereign rights
implies that the state has also given up some of its duties to protect its citizens. Although the state
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can delegate some of its rights and duties, the state retains the ultimate responsibility for their
application. These actions of the state, including delegation, remain subject to judicial review.
While investors do not possess sovereign powers, rights, or duties, the state does and cannot
abandon or abrogate them. Correspondingly, without sovereign power to do so, individuals
exercising party autonomy cannot override state rights or duties to citizens.

It is also problematic that, by abandoning these values, states would breach not only their moral
duties to their citizens but also some of their domestic and international obligations. Considering
the former, Dunning in his analysis of Bodin’s work maintains that “[t]here are laws in the state
which the sovereign cannot touch.”165 Although he notes that Bodin’s “allusions to these superior
rules are far from clear”, he claims that “they seem to indicate a somewhat vague notion in the
writer’s mind of what we call a constitution.”166 States have international obligations which they
cannot unilaterally dispose of and they must abide by their constitutional laws. They all generally
respect the values of fairness, independence, and impartiality as indivisible parts of the right to fair
trial. Consequently, party autonomy seems unlikely to be the supreme principle in ISDS.

c) Party Autonomy and Shared Values
As noted, shared values of procedural fairness, in terms of standing and independence and
impartiality, are recognized in domestic and international law, including commercial arbitration.167
In the case of independence and impartiality, Fuller, in his assessment of forms and limits of
adjudication, examines adjudication in the broadest sense – judicial and arbitral adjudication at the
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domestic and international level – and stresses the importance of impartial adjudicators in the rule
of law order.168 In the case of fairness and the right to be heard, Fellmeth and Horwitz stipulate
that audi alteram partem - all parties must have an opportunity to be heard - applies to international
tribunals.169 In this subsection, I discuss these values in relation to party autonomy.

Independence and Impartiality
The requirements that a court must be independent and impartial are attributes of procedural
fairness. Both attributes are fundamental to the rule of law. The right to an unbiased tribunal has
been established by the principle of Natural Justice - nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa
or nemo judex in re sua - meaning that “no one should be judge of his or her own cause.”170
Independence refers to freedom from improper influence, whereas impartiality relates to freedom
from bias or favoritism. The same principles of adjudicative independence and impartiality, though
all typically related to criminal law, can be found, for example, in the bills of rights and human
rights statutes in the United Kingdom,171 Canada,172 New Zealand,173 and Australia.174 Although
corporations can typically invoke only some charter rights and freedoms and not others, they may
demonstrate that a law breaching charter rights is unconstitutional.175 According to the Australian
Law Reform Commission, “[t]he elements of a fair trial appear to be related to the defining or
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essential characteristics of a court.”176 These elements include “the reality and appearance of the
court’s independence and its impartiality [and] the application of procedural fairness.” 177 In
Cojocaru v BC British Columbia Women’s Hospital & Health Center,178 the Supreme Court of
Canada was asked to decide whether the process by which the trial judge reached his decision was
procedurally fair. The court stated that “[a] fair process requires not only that the parties be allowed
to submit evidence and arguments to the judge, but that the judge decide the issues independently
and impartially as the judge is sworn to do.”179 In sum, judicial independence and impartiality are
fundamental values for the process by which a fair decision is reached. It is of such importance
that restraints are placed on judges to maintain public confidence in their integrity. In this vein, the
Canadian Judicial Council, while considering whether judges can publicly participate in
controversial political discussions, maintains that “the office of judge imposes restraints that are
necessary to maintain public confidence in the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.”180

As noted, Fuller takes the position that restraints that go with judicial office are also applicable to
arbitrators.181 Similarly, Sheppard argues that principles of independence and impartiality are both
“fundamental to due process and confidence in investment treaty arbitration.”182 Sheppard
examines the requirements of these two principles in a range of sources: the ICSID Rules, the PCA
Rules, the IBA Guidelines, the Statute of the ICJ, national arbitral laws (including Dutch law,
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Swiss law, English law, and United States law), and the European Convention of Human Rights
(ECHR) art 6(1) in civil rights and criminal cases. Considering the ECHR, Sheppard notes that,
although the Convention is “not directly applicable to private arbitration, national courts have
sought to apply a test for arbitrator bias which is consistent with Article 6(1).”183 He notes that the
principles of independence and impartiality are required by “the UNCITRAL, the SCC, and other
procedural rules, national laws and good practice.”184 Although under the Swiss Private
International Law Act185 parties may only challenge the independence of the adjudicator, the Swiss
Constitution guarantees the right to an impartial judge.186 In contrast, the ICSID Convention187
requires the arbitrator to exercise only independent judgment,188 whereas the English Arbitration
Act 1996 requires only impartiality.189 In the U.S., the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)190 is silent
on this point and leaves the issue to individual states, where only the State of California expressly
provides for challenges of arbitrators for justifiable doubts of their independence and impartiality.
Thus, the fact that most of the forums that Sheppard examined provide a right to challenge an
arbitrator for the lack of these two principles signifies their importance.

In the context of ISDS, domestic courts are often claimed to be biased in favor of their state.191 In
contrast, ISDS is frequently promoted as neutral and bias-free.192 Accordingly, one may reasonably
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expect that ISDS provides a means of fair dispute resolution that even sophisticated domestic legal
systems with multiple appellate mechanisms cannot achieve. As noted, for fair and unbiased
adjudication, the principle of independence and impartiality is of the essence. Yet ISDS faces
accusations of systemic bias and its protection of these values is a subject of concern and debate.193
These claims are linked to a lack of institutional tools safeguarding these values and to perceived
pro-investor bias since arbitrators appear to be financially interested in the outcome of the cases
as well as in the “boom” of the industry.194

On the lack of institutional safeguards, the special concern is, for illustration, with the lack of
security of tenure, an objective method of case assignment, and prohibitions on outside
remuneration.195 These concerns are linked with the fact that arbitrators can act in different
capacities (as arbitrators and as counsel)196 and are selected typically by parties on a case-by-case
basis. Further, critics argue that there is a possibility that arbitrators may behave in a pro-investor
manner not only to support the boom of the industry but also to secure future appointments.197 All
these concerns have been regarded as at least problematic.
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The financial interest debate stems from the systemic design of ISDS arbitrators’ ad hoc
remuneration, generally with no set monthly salaries or caps on remuneration.198 Thus, it is of
concern that the motives of ISDS arbitrators in their decision-making may be compromised
because they have a direct financial interest in the frequency and duration of claims.199 Regarding
the industry’s “boom”, some ISDS opponents argue that adjudicators may themselves support its
growth by favoring investors. Along these lines, Bolivia accused ICSID of “favoring multinational
companies in its rulings”200 and Venezuela saw an arbitration as biased in favor of corporations.201
In 2007, Bolivia denounced the ICSID Convention, followed in 2010 and 2012 by Ecuador and
Venezuela respectively.202 This kind of profiting, although indirect, is against the principle of nemo
judex in parte sua, i.e. that the judge of a case should have no personal interest in its outcome.203

Commentators opposing claims of bias in ISDS maintain that they are not substantiated, as it is
difficult empirically to prove or disprove the existence of actual bias in the mind of any
adjudicator.204 However, even if there is no actual bias, the mere suspicion or appearance of bias
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is problematic if it undermines public confidence in the adjudication. 205 This appearance of
systemic fairness (includes impartial and unbiased adjudication) is important to preserve due
process.206 Adjudicative impartiality and independence, while being upheld, thus also need to be
seen to be upheld for the public to make an informed opinion and build trust in the fairness of the
adjudicative processes.207 According to Neudorf, measures of judicial independence create the
necessary space between the judiciary and sources of undue influence to ensure confidence in
impartial adjudication.208 What matters is whether the adjudicative system appears fair or not.

Additionally, if party autonomy is the supreme principle, one would assume that ISDS tribunals
will respect its supremacy. However, tribunals take approaches that are far from unified since there
are instances where they appear to use their interpretative powers to disregard the parties’ choices.
For illustration, in CME v Czech Republic209 the tribunal, in delivering its Partial Award, rejected
the use of domestic law of the host state as the applicable law even though the Bilateral Investment
Agreement so specified.210 Moreover, this rejection is in striking contrast to the tribunal’s
application of the host state’s domestic law in the Final Award. In this vein, Van Harten maintains
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that tribunals in numerous cases declined “to yield to contractually-agreed dispute settlement
provisions.”211 For example, he observes that in Sempra v Argentina case,212 “the tribunal deemphasized … principles of party autonomy and sanctity of contract in situation where these
principles supported restraint”.213 These approaches indicate that various ISDS tribunals do not
regard party autonomy as the highest principle, a fact that suggests that respect for party autonomy
is qualified and has limits.

Once again, principles of independence and impartiality have been recognized as values of a fair
adjudication shared by private and public law. Although ISDS is often presented as superior to
domestic courts, it appears to have its own issues with bias as it lacks systemic safeguards that
guarantee adjudicative independence and impartiality and ensure the appearance of fairness in
adjudication. Above all, the system creates opportunities for actual bias by its inadequate
mechanisms of appointment and remuneration, leaving arbitrators financially interested in the
outcomes of cases and dependent on future re-appointments. This practice undermines public trust
in the system and its fairness. Thus, it is questionable how much respect the design of ISDS shows
to these shared values.

Fair representation
Proponents of party autonomy as a supreme principle characterize ISDS as a binary dispute
between a foreign investor and the host state, both acting in a private capacity. This view implies
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that no interest of other parties is at stake and that there is a limited or no place for public objectives
unless the parties provide their consent. Yet ISDS is not a binary dispute resolution forum - ISDS
deals with the host state’s actions and inactions, and it is not uncommon for other adversely
affected stakeholders to be involved and the forum influences, directly or indirectly, the welfare
of the host state’s citizens, making its decisions of public concern.

In domestic civil adjudication, the interests of other affected parties, as well as non-parties, have
been commonly considered and protected. According to Fuller, participation is “the very core of
adjudication.”214 This principle of participation requires that civil law procedures are structured in
such a way that they provide “each interested party with a right to adequate participation.” 215 Since
fair procedures are in the interest of the entire society,216 states do not confine this recognition, that
another party may have an interest in other parties’ lawsuit, to administrative cases but apply it
also in private disputes. Thus, in the court setting, the procedural law generally authorizes persons
directly or indirectly affected by a lawsuit “to intervene in the pending lawsuit if their own claim
has a sufficiently close connection in law or fact.”217 Thus, adequate participation can be
understood as a fundamental principle.

Despite its fundamental importance, there may be instances when participation can be found
problematic.218 According to Fuller, some issues are unsuitable for adjudication due to their
unpredictable and far-reaching effects on a large and unknown number of affected persons like in
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polycentric (many centered) disputes.219 In polycentric disputes, a fundamental issue is “that each
of the various forms that award might take … would have a different set of repercussions and
might require in each instance a redefinition of the “parties affected”.”220 In other words, it is
impossible with any precision to identify the persons affected. He explains this issue as a spider’s
web where a pull on one strand distributes tensions throughout the whole web and, thus, affects
other parts of the web.221 He notes that doubling the original pull “will rather create a different
complicated pattern of tensions” instead of doubling the original tension.222 The number of
affected participants is typically large and unknown and, thus, these disputes suffer from
inadequate participation that leads to an inadequately informed adjudicator and, hence, a decision
based on insufficient facts. Since participation by those affected is limited, the court is unable to
know the extent of potential or actual repercussions.223 For all these issues, instead of adjudication,
he suggests “managerial direction” or “contract” as better solutions to these polycentric disputes.224

ISDS itself displays features of polycentric dispute resolution. Its awards have far-reaching and
unpredictable effects typically on many stakeholders. Yet no party other than the disputing ones
can participate; ISDS has no procedures enabling these other affected parties to protect their
interests as of right. Further, while the number of other affected parties is often large, these
individuals typically are unknown. Based on their lack of participation, ISDS tribunals are
inadequately equipped to reach fair decisions. Hence, it is questionable whether ISDS in its current
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form is suitable to resolve investor-state disputes, even if, finding the best solution for investorstate dispute resolution is beyond the scope of the present research.

Despite the traditional rule that persons, to be bound by a judgment, should have their “day in
court”, there are limits to the right to participate.225 For instance, parties may be precluded from
participating in class actions or may be restricted by res judicata.226 In turn, courts devised various
solutions, like representation, to overcome these preclusions in the aim to protect those who cannot
participate.227 In the US, for instance, the requirements of due process that are linked to other
parties are set in Hansberry v Lee.228 The other parties must be given “notice and [an] opportunity
to be heard.”229 Hence, procedures must fairly ensure they protect the interests of absent parties230
and, if other parties are represented, this representation must be adequate “by parties who are
present.”231 These requirements generally mean that non-parties are not bound when the
representation of their interests is inadequate.232

The right to participate is a mechanism that enables affected parties to be heard. In the context of
ISDS, states recognize that other parties may have an interest in the lawsuit, yet their participation
generally is not guaranteed. In IIAs, states cover other parties’ interests in provisions related to socalled “non-disputing parties” (the other signatory states to a treaty) and “non-parties” (all other
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persons or entities).233 Treaties commonly limit participation to parties having a significant interest
and to submissions in the written or oral form, called amicus curiae briefs, so long as they do not
disrupt the proceedings or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice the disputing parties.

The purpose of amicus curiae - translated as “friend of the court” - is to assist the court by
supporting a claim of one of the disputing parties.234 Its role is ancillary in that the parties that
intervene as amici do not pursue their own claims. Accordingly, amicus briefs serve well parties
like NGOs that want to support some underlying concepts of the dispute, but not other affected
parties that want to protect their direct and legally protectable stake in the resolution of the claim.
Further, amicus is typically not guaranteed as of right and other parties therefore can only file their
submissions if the tribunal so allows.

An exemplary case of the significance of participatory rights and its inadequate protection in ISDS
is Chevron v Ecuador.235 In a separate and unrelated dispute, Ecuadorian citizens obtained a legal
decision against Chevron that obliged Chevron to pay US$ 18 billion for environmental and other
harms. Chevron used the ISDS arbitral tribunal to seek to escape this obligation by stripping that

233

For example, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada, of the One Part, and the
European Union and its Member States, of the Other Part, 14 September 2016, art 29 (entered into force 1 October
2014) [CETA]; Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of
China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 9 September 2012, art 29 (entered into force 1
October 2014) [Canada-China FIPA]; Agreement Between Canada and the Czech Republic for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, 6 May 2009, Annex B s b(2) (entered into force 22 January 2012) [Canada-Czech
Republic BIT]; Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic
of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 19 February 2008, art 28
(entered into force 1 January 2012) [USA-Rwanda BIT]; 2012 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art 28(3).
234
Yeazell et al, supra note 217.
235
Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador (___), Case No 2009-23
(PCA) (UNCITRAL (1976)) [Chevron v Ecuador].

53

award from the Ecuadorians.236 Hence, the ISDS action posed a serious threat to the direct interest
of Ecuadorian plaintiffs.237 In February 2012, Chevron succeeded and the arbitral tribunal made a
non-monetary order requiring the Ecuadorian government “to take all measures necessary to
suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement and recognition … of any judgments”
pronounced in favor of the Ecuadorians and against Chevron.238 Notably, despite that, this order
denied the Ecuadorian plaintiffs standing (they were “non-parties”) and also denied them the right
to defend their legal interests.

Bernhard von Pezold and others v Zimbabwe239 is another example of an ISDS case where the
rights of other parties were affected. The tribunal made a non-monetary order for restitution of title
to an expropriated land. Yet the land was occupied by four indigenous Chimanimani communities,
the Chikukwa, Ngorima, Chinyai, and Nyaruwa peoples,240 the leaders of which submitted a joint
petition.241 Even though these parties were recognized as potentially adversely affected, they did
not have the right to participate in the dispute. Similarly, in Border Timbers Limited and others v
Republic of Zimbabwe,242 an issue related to other parties’ rights was discussed. In both cases, the
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tribunal refused to hear the amici curiae briefs from indigenous communities, even though the
tribunal acknowledged that the proceedings could impact their rights.243

Another example of a case of the interest of a local community is Clayton/ Bilcon v Canada,244
where the foreign investor’s business had an impact on the local environment and community
values, but the local community had no guaranteed participation in this dispute. A similar issue
arose in a case scheduled for an arbitral hearing in 2019245 involving a mining project run by
Gabriel Resources. The mining company sought a license to mine gold in Romania in a place
called Rosia Montana. The mining project would uproot Rosia Montana’s population and override
property owners’ interests. After public protests, the Romanian government withdrew its support
for the mining project and Gabriel Resources, the company, brought a claim to an ISDS arbitral
tribunal, claiming $4.4 billion in damages. Facing this threat of arbitration, the Romanian
government withdrew Rosia Montana from an application to list it as a UNESCO World Heritage
site and seems to want to settle with the company.246 If the project goes ahead, Rosia Montana’s
population and property owners will be ousted. If the government goes to arbitration, the owners,
like in all other ISDS cases, will have no right of standing to defend their rights.
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These examples show the importance of guaranteed participation. Alongside the interests of
individuals, there are broad societal needs that require protection, but amici are seen as too
restrictive. For instance, the European Commission, due to the need to protect consistency of EU
law, has been seeking a “more effective legal recourse” than amici.247 Although amicus is from its
very nature a highly restricted form of participation, arbitrators frequently reject amici submissions
even when the applicants are directly affected.248 For their inability to influence the outcome of a
case that directly affects them, the rejected petitioners become the real victims of a decision. Thus,
it is questionable whether this limited recognition of other parties’ rights is sustainable and whether
amici can ever be considered a suitable mechanism to protect rights of adversely affected
stakeholders.

Although amicus is an insufficient tool to guarantee participation to other affected parties,
proponents of party autonomy in ISDS still regard it as an unacceptable interference with the
parties’ freedom of contract. One argument, for instance, suggests that amici briefs restrain party
autonomy and undermine parties’ arbitral strategies.249 Ishikawa rebuts this argument by
maintaining that the need to respect these strategies “is not a legitimate reason to oppose the
acceptance of amicus curiae submissions.”250 The rights of other parties to protect their interests
deserve to be respected even in private disputes. On another note, Viñuales argues that introducing
a public aspect in the form of amici may “erode the traditional basis of arbitral proceedings” 251
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since parties did not provide their consent to the third parties to intervene as required under the
party autonomy principle. Yet in the treaty-based ISDS, a non-binary form of dispute resolution,
there is no reason that parties’ consent should be required.

The right to a fair trial is a fundamental right in domestic and international law, recognized as a
human right and guaranteed by all general universal and regional human rights instruments as well
as in various national constitutions.252 Attributes of a fair trial can be found, for example, in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).253 In Europe, the European
Convention of Human Rights stipulates that parties should be given adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard.254 Other examples are the UK Human Rights Act 1998 and the US Due
Process clause in the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution. The lack of this right of
participation violates the principle of natural justice - audi alteram partem255 - as a fundamental
rule of fairness that requires allowing other parties to be heard.256 According to Solum, the “right
to be notified and given an opportunity to be heard are prerequisites for a procedure to be
considered fair.”257 The right to a fair hearing applies to all affected parties despite being branded
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as “non-parties” since the failure to facilitate their meaningful participation poses a threat to their
rights to a fair hearing.

One of the purposes of IIAs was to treat foreign investors fairly and equally to domestic ones by
creating a level playing field.258 Now, foreign investors can sue their host states directly under an
IIA instead of using diplomatic avenues.259 More, the system gives them rights that none of the
domestic investors or ordinary citizens in any other field of law can enjoy, whereas other affected
stakeholders are discriminated against since the system does not provide suitable mechanisms by
which to protect their interests. Instead of leveling the playing field, this system provides
preferential treatment to foreign investors at the expense of other stakeholders, resulting in another
form of unfairness.

To sum up, a guaranteed right of standing is a mechanism by which parties can influence the
outcome of the dispute. Participants submit relevant facts to enable adjudicators to exercise fair
decision-making. It is inadequate to use amicus curiae as the only avenue in ISDS for other
affected stakeholders to influence adjudicators’ decision-making because amicus falls short of the
right of standing to protect one’s legal rights and interests. This inbuilt unfairness from the
systemic failure to balance interests among all directly affected stakeholders is pushed further by
the claim that party autonomy is a supreme principle in ISDS. Party autonomy thus underscores
the preferential treatment enjoyed by a limited group of individuals over other stakeholders.
Accordingly, the lacuna of participatory rights undermines public trust in the procedural fairness
of ISDS.
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3. Conclusion
Private and public laws are both anchored in the same underlying social values and goals and thus
both share some values, interests, and principles. I based my analysis on this view and used it as
the overarching theme to evaluate mechanisms that safeguard a range of shared values in a range
of adjudicative forums. Even if not all values are shared, procedural fairness surely is. Since
procedural fairness encompasses a long list of important rights, I selected values linked to the right
to a fair hearing: participation (with a special focus on third parties) and adjudicative independence
and impartiality. Considering their shared nature, these values have a place in ISDS. While some
commentators argue that, among all values, party autonomy should prevail, I argue that party
autonomy must yield to “higher laws” and is not an unfettered principle. Private parties cannot
agree to override important values emerging from public policy, mandatory rules, fairness, rights
guaranteed by a higher source of law, etc. The range of these limits depends on underlying social
goals and values that the law is set to promote. Since these limits apply in domestic and
international private law and in commercial arbitration, there is no sound reason why they should
not apply in ISDS. Party autonomy must be reconciled and balanced with other competing interests
where the essence of these shared values implies that party autonomy is not the prevailing one.

Moreover, party autonomy could only obtain supremacy from a source that has authority to grant
it; typically, a sovereign entity. Thus, states as signatories of IIAs must have intended to confer
this status. Yet IIAs are silent on this point and there is no compelling evidence that the intention
can be implied. Further, since some values are fundamental and guaranteed constitutionally or as
human rights, it is questionable whether states could ever grant parties the power to discard all
other values. States, as sovereigns, also have duties they cannot ignore. They must abide by their
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constitutions, protect and represent their citizens, and respect domestic and international
obligations. Having evaluated shared values in the light of party autonomy principle, I concluded
that all of the shared values are generally recognized and protected as fundamental.

From the perspective of fundamental values, ISDS has been a subject of concern and debate.
Because of these concerns, the institutional design of ISDS warrants in-depth scrutiny to assess
whether its administration of international investment disputes is fair. This scrutiny calls for a
comparative study that gathers empirical data on the ways that ISDS safeguards the shared values
in comparison to other public, private, and quasi-adjudicative systems. The purpose of this study
is to generate material for ongoing efforts to ensure that ISDS is held to standards commensurate
with its power. The collected material enables a more careful assessment of the adequacy of
measures applied in ISDS and serves as a reference for potential redesign. I discuss the theory
behind the comparative study, its framework, and methodology in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: Analytical Framework and Methodology - Comparative Study

Introduction
In the preceding chapter, I introduced adjudicative independence, impartiality, and fairness as
values shared by public and private law, all indispensable in a democratic society and in the
administration of law. In this chapter, I discuss the critical role of institutional design and
procedural rules to protect these values, a viewpoint that warrants a comparative study of different
adjudicative fora. This comparative study is inspired and guided by the assumption that public and
private law share these values of the rule of law. There are two core questions. First, what is ISDS’s
approach to these values? Second, is this approach appropriate in comparison to regimes in other
contexts? My core argument is that ISDS forums, out of all comparators, are at the end of the
examined spectrum because they use the weakest and most insufficient safeguards of these values.
I discuss the reasons for this conclusion in chapters 4 to 6. Here I explain the significance of
institutional design and procedures and I introduce the theory of comparative study and its
specifics to this research. I provide my methodology, discuss the aim and scope of the comparison,
and outline my document survey.

1. Institutional Design and Procedures
What purposes do institutional design and procedural rules serve? Adjudicative independence and
impartiality and the right to fair representation are values that are shared universally. 260 They
matter since they all support fair adjudication. In turn, the push for fair adjudication is the force
behind the design of adjudicative institutions with procedures that safeguard these values.
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According to Arthurs, institutional design should “reflect the special qualities of the specific
activity being addressed.”261 ISDS has its origin in commercial arbitration that, from a historical
perspective, was designed to serve the needs of private parties.262 Since ISDS, unlike commercial
arbitration, is frequently concerned with issues of public interest, it is important to examine
whether its procedures have evolved to capture its unique qualities.

There are substantive and procedural laws. Substantive law deals with the legal relationship
between parties - between individuals or between an individual and a state entity - and defines
rights and duties of each, whereas procedural law lays down the rules that govern the process by
which such rights and duties are enforced.263 However, in various instances, the division between
substantive and procedural may be blurred. Both types of laws determine the level of powers vested
in adjudicators. Procedural rules relate to boundaries within which courts and tribunals operate as
they lay out the values that adjudicators should pursue and as they provide methods by which to
safeguard these accepted values. The role of tribunals, like the courts, is to control the use of power,
preclude its abuses and protect vital interests. Equally, the ISDS arbitrators empowered to exercise
these functions can be compared to judges. Procedural rules, as an inseparable part of the
institutional design, can be described as the rules of a “game”.264 The bodies with powers to
prescribe these rules can therefore influence or control the game. Generally, IIAs are vague and
deal primarily with substantive law, touching only a limited number of procedures and usually
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only providing a list of the sets of rules from which one or more parties may choose. Due to these
limitations, the treaties are silent in general about vital values and their protections, such as fair
representation and adjudicative independence and impartiality. The ultimate power to decide
whether and how to safeguard these values rests on individual ISDS administering organizations
(like ICSID, the PCA, and the ICC) that conduct proceedings according to procedural rules which
they themselves design. Generally, each arbitral organization administers ISDS according to its
procedural rules unless the disputing parties agree otherwise. Except for ICSID, these
organizations specialize in private law disputes. The system is decentralized, having no single
supervising body, and is fragmented. Yet by forming their own procedures, ISDS administering
organizations shape the whole ISDS industry and thus exercise far-reaching powers.

Procedural rules play an important role in exercising and administrating law. They provide tools
and a framework within which all stakeholders - adjudicators, appointing authority, parties, other
affected parties, etc. - operate. This role also relates to the fact that “[a]ll legal process both reflects
and advances claims to legitimacy, fairness, and accountability.”265 Procedural rules prescribe
norms and requirements to follow as well as limits and boundaries. Procedural law lays the path
for safeguarding shared values and for identifying the individuals and entities that have guaranteed
access to justice and therefore a right to participate in a given dispute. Procedures can secure access
to justice before an independent and impartial adjudicator but also hinder it. In this regard, Bix
claims that “[c]ertain kinds of evil are arguably less likely when proper procedures are followed”
and, as an example, he notes that since judges must give public reasons they more likely deliver
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just decisions.266 Since proper procedures must be fit for the purposes of the industry and reflect
the underlying values of the rule of law, they cannot be selected arbitrarily or designed to serve
the interests of some while disregarding the interests of others.

The institutional design of the ISDS arbitral organizations should also reflect the purpose behind
ISDS - to create a neutral and fair adjudication that is free of bias - and thus adhere to procedures
and mechanisms that respect and safeguard the shared values of the rule of law. Fairness in the
administration of proceedings depends on their governing rules. Bix notes that not only “playing
by the rules of the game” but also “playing the game fairly, is itself an integral part of justice.”267
ISDS administering houses, by drafting and applying procedural rules, may succeed or fail to
administer disputes fairly.

With the power to lay down their own procedural rules, ISDS administering houses bear the
responsibility to find the right balance between competing interests. However, ISDS faces calls
for reforms by critics as well as proponents for the concerns of lack of fairness and therefore of
the legitimacy of its systemic design and the adequacy of the form that ISDS takes to safeguard
these values. In particular, critics claim that ISDS is biased in favor of investors268 and its
“proceedings lack many of the basic protections and procedures ... normally available in a court of
law.”269 In response, Schill argues that these problems of ISDS should not be treated in isolation
since solutions and helpful concepts can be drawn from public law regimes. He maintains that
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comparing ISDS with public law systems can help to approach its problems by learning from
“solutions that are tested and accepted in more mature systems of public law and public law dispute
resolution.”270 He argues that “drawing on the experience of more advanced and sophisticated
systems of public law, provide[s] a perspective ... that is more objective and predictable than solely
relying on the judgment of party-appointed arbitrators.”271 To strengthen its legitimacy, ISDS must
be responsive to criticism and balance the core values in consideration of demands of the industry
and the need for public protection.

Wälde proposes to use international inter-state concepts and advocates for the use of comparative
public law as represented at European Union courts, the European Court of Human Rights,
administrative law, and the WTO.272 In doing so, he warns that the context and the purpose of
public international law and ISDS are different (ISDS aims to protect investors against State’s
abuse of power while the former deals with state-state disputes) and that this comparison therefore
needs to “be treated with caution.”273 Similarly, Vadi, while noting that it is a frequent practice for
arbitrators and scholars to “borrow from the experience of other courts and tribunals,” warns to be
cautious in ISDS in the use of the comparative law.274 Despite his views of comparative public law
as more appropriate, Wälde also uses concepts of comparative contract law since ISDS, although
a species of transnational administrative law, has traits of private law. 275 Along these lines, Watt
contends that “one of the most spectacular effects of globalization is to blur the distinction between
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the public and private spheres.”276 In sum, Wälde, Vadi and Schill are advocates of complex and
cautious ISDS comparative analysis. In the words of Park and Walsh, a comparative study can
help arbitral bodies to be “more aware of the spectrum of solutions available to address problems
common to several legal systems”277 and as such might help to tackle these issues.

Influenced by these views and by concerns about whether ISDS safeguards shared values, and out
of fairness to ISDS, I decided to compare ISDS to a range of other adjudicative systems. I do not
limit my study to one area of law but, for its frequent comparison to both private and public law, I
include examples from both. The primary concern of my research is the procedural requirements
of adjudicative organizations outside of IIAs. This comparison seeks to show variations of existing
procedures and uncover if ISDS is truly unique in its lack of institutional safeguards and, if so,
whether there is a justification for this absence. This understanding of the mechanisms used by
other systems may prove vital in addressing concerns in ISDS. This information should be
available before making reforming decisions to understand the kind of reform that is needed. In
other words, ISDS can learn from other systems.

I expect the implementation of institutional safeguards to vary across comparators, due to their
individual peculiarities. The purpose of this analysis, in fact, is to capture some of these variations.
To get a wide spectrum of perspectives, one needs to consider a broad variety of adjudicative
contexts. For this reason, I designed a comparative study that would include a variety of

Horatia Muir Watt, “Globalization and Comparative Law” in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds,
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adjudicative systems, even if that choice comes at the cost of in-depth comparison between two or
three comparators. I discuss the purpose of the comparative study in the following section and the
scope, comparators, and framework in later sections.

2. A Comparative Study
All legal systems, including the most sophisticated ones, should reflect on the needs of the societies
from which they stem and whose values they ought to represent. Legal systems can learn from
each other, especially when young and rapidly evolving as in the case of ISDS. A cautiously
tailored comparative study - described as a method to compare and assess specific legal problems,
legal institutions, and entire legal systems at the international and domestic level - can help to
achieve this goal. In general, a comparative study provides a basis for empirical observations and
insights. The potential types of comparative inquiries, due to the range of viewpoints about
comparative legal study and the available approaches, is practically unlimited.278

In designing my comparative framework, I turned to scholarly studies on comparative law. For a
start, I drew from Lasser who “urges comparatists to adopt a situation-specific approach that
fosters detailed, generous, challenging and responsible engagement with the subjects and objects
of their comparative analysis.”279 There are many facets - political, social, historical, international,
etc. - that influence a given national law. Likewise, international law is a complex expression of

Mitchel de S-O-l’E Lasser, “The Question of Understanding” in Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday, eds,
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 197 at 221, noting “the
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Differences?” in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 384 at 401, noting “[t]here can be as many purposes of comparative legal
enquiries as there are comparative lawyers, or objects of enquiry.”
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an “interdependent transnational legal-pluralist order.”280 Considering this complexity of internal
and global factors, Riles argues that a simple comparative study of foreign laws is inadequate.281
Zumbansen in his elaboration on transnational comparisons notes that we face “hybrid, forms of
regulation that can no longer be easily associated with one particular country or, for that matter,
one officially mandated rule making authority.”282 ISDS as a species of a transnational legal order
is an example of a legal system where a study of foreign laws alone would not suffice. Along
similar lines, Watson claims that comparative law goes beyond a study of one foreign system and
that one should instead study interrelationships between individual rules or between branches of
the law in different legal systems.283

Turning to ISDS, Schill argues that “[c]omparative public (administrative, constitutional, and
international) law should become part of the standard methodology of thinking about issues in
international investment law.”284 Similarly, Vadi describes ISDS as “a sort of melting pot of
different legal traditions as it presents mixed characteristics of common law and civil law
traditions.”285 Therefore, more complex comparisons seem to be inevitable for studying
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interrelationships of different legal systems beyond the states’ borders and the traditional
comparative perspectives of legal families and foreign laws.286 In this vein, Riles, in her
elaboration on Teubner’s work, notes his view that the core differences of comparative work do
not lie in the state law’s systems, “but rather between the legal orders attached to particular
economic sectors (e.g. the private arbitration system for adjudicating disputes … versus the statebased judicial system …).”287 In other words, comparative lawyers should study differences among
sectoral legal systems and trace the interconnections between them.288 For my own study, the focus
is on shared values of the rule of law that can be seen as interconnecting factors of the compared
dispute settlement systems.

My approach to the comparative inquiry is “functional”. According to Danneman, a functional
approach distinguishes “micro-comparison” that focuses on specific legal problems from “macrocomparison” that deals with general questions.289 The fact that specific legal problems are the core
of my research suggests that my work is more in the realm of the micro-comparison. On microcomparison, Danneman notes that the general expectation is that different legal systems offer
similar solutions to similar issues.290 In his analysis of functionalism, Danneman refers to the
claims of Zweigert and Kötz that this expectation of similar solutions applies to legal systems
“despite the great differences in their historical development, conceptual structure, and style of
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operation.”291 In other words, different legal systems face similar issues.292 Danneman also recalls
Ancel’s view that “comparing radically different legal systems might yield more significant results
than comparing similar legal systems.”293 These views suggest that it is not necessary to limit one’s
research to perfect comparators. Indeed, perfect comparators simply may not exist.

There are three possible modes to examine similarities and differences, distinguished by its focus
on prevailing similarities, prevailing differences, or the balance of both. 294 Danneman notes that
whether the emphasis is on similarities or differences “depends on the purpose of comparative
enquiry.”295 There are techniques used to safeguard values of procedural fairness and adjudicative
independence and impartiality. Similarities and differences between comparators are both
invaluable for understanding the use of these techniques in the whole context, including the role
of distinguishing and interconnecting features. In my research, I seek differences in the approaches
taken by ISDS administering bodies compared to other adjudicative bodies, but I also look for
patterns and similarities.

I expect that the understanding and applicability of the core values will vary among the
comparators. This varied understanding and application stems from the difference in the values
that these systems traditionally serve and in the functions of compared modes of adjudication:
public law versus private law, arbitration versus litigation, domestic versus international. Also,
globalization has an impact on the understanding of norms and values. Along these lines, Wiener
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claims that, “[i]n light of moving processes, practices, and principles of governance out of the
modern state context, the contested quality of normative meaning is enhanced and differences in
the interpretation of norms and their meanings are expected as a rule rather than as an exception.”
Wiener further observes that the same norms or values may have a different connotation for
different actors, although they all agree on them.296 Since the whole context plays an important
role, it is understandable that values that are shared by public and private law, when presented in
various settings, will also be perceived differently. For illustration, the party autonomy principle
has greater force in FINRA or WIPO that both regulate disputes between purely private parties
than it does in courts administering judicial review. I anticipate that the study of tools and methods
used by individual forums will generate a spectrum of findings with some similarities and
differences emerging as more common than others.

3. Scope
My comparative study contrasts procedures of ISDS with international and supranational courts.
In the process of comparison, I draw an analogy among four categories of public and private legal
systems: domestic courts, European courts, international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and
international and domestic arbitral tribunals. Each has characteristics and functions comparable to
ISDS. My focus is on the procedural rules that these legal systems use to safeguard the core values
of fairness and of adjudicative independence and impartiality. Legal regimes in general
acknowledge the importance of these shared values and typically employ a range of mechanisms
for their effective protection, such as guaranteed participation, security of tenure, objective
methods of remuneration, an objective method of case assignment, etc. These mechanisms

Antje Wiener, “Contested meanings of norms: a research framework” (2007) 5:1 Comp Eur Pol 1 at 1–5,
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individually and cumulatively ensure access to a fairly administered law. I seek to understand the
kinds of mechanisms used by each forum in order to illuminate whether, how, and to what extent
ISDS deviates from practices of these other comparators.

I cover these mechanisms under two overarching umbrellas: 1) adjudicative independence and
impartiality, which is divided between a) separation of powers and b) personal security afforded
to adjudicators; and 2) fairness. In dealing with the methods of appointment and case assignment,
I examine whether these forums separate the powers to nominate, select, and appoint adjudicators;
whether they separate the process of appointment from case assignment thus affording another
layer of separation; and whether they assign cases to tenured members using objective means to
prevent selection based on subjective or personally-linked motives. While analyzing the personal
security afforded to adjudicators in each system, I examine two closely connected tools: security
of tenure and the method of remuneration. I focus on whether tenure is afforded and accompanied
by salaries; whether any remuneration received is objectively assessed, set or capped, and
independent from outside sources or peculiarities of proceedings; and whether there is
remuneration beyond the term of service. I also analyze fairness in term of standing or fair
representation. In this respect, I map parties that are guaranteed the right to standing and examine
whether all legally affected parties have a fair and adequate right to representation. All of these
individual mechanisms complement each other in the effort to create a fair dispute settlement and
help boost public confidence in the adjudicative system.
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4. Comparators
a) Selecting Criteria
To gain an adequately large sample of representative data while examining a narrow range of tools,
I decided to select a broad pool of comparators that covers a spectrum of adjudicative regimes
across different disciplines and borders. At the same time, since it is not feasible to include all
adjudicative regimes, I narrowed the list to those that are frequently compared to or share several
important similarities with treaty-based ISDS. These similarities I discuss later in this chapter.

In this comparison, I examine four categories of legal forums: domestic courts, European courts,
international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and international and domestic arbitral tribunals.
Each category has characteristics and functions that are similar to those of ISDS. The forums are
the core subject of the study. I sought to compare procedural rules of the major international ISDS
arbitral organizations - the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to the remaining four groups. I have represented the other forums as follows: (1) domestic courts
- senior courts of England and Wales and the US Supreme Court; (2) European courts - the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU);
(3) international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies - the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the
World Trade Organization (WTO); (4) domestic and international arbitral tribunals - the Financial
Industry Regulatory Agency (FINRA) in the US and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO).
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In deciding on the comparators, I looked for similarities with the following four characteristics of
ISDS: arbitration as the form of dispute settlement; disputes based on transnational agreements,
bilateral or multilateral treaties; the ability to exercise judicial review; and a vertical relationship
between parties to the dispute. Since no organization shares all four of these characteristics, the
order in which I discuss them is arbitrary.

First, I discuss the relationship between the parties to the dispute. In ISDS, the disputing parties
have a vertical relationship by which a person can sue governmental or regulatory bodies. About
half of all the comparators, domestic and European courts, also administer vertical disputes.
However, the vertical relationship in ISDS is at the international level and rather unique; thus,
there are no other arbitral bodies to examine in this respect. In contrast, various other comparators
operate at a horizontal level. Since investment treaties are negotiated and agreed on among states,
while excluding private parties from the negotiating process and emerging as an alternative to
diplomatic protection of foreign nationals (exercised exclusively at the state level), it seemed
appropriate also to examine state-state dispute resolution at the ICJ and the WTO. The WTO, albeit
state-state, is frequently compared to ISDS. Still, some commentators view ISDS as a form of a
private settlement and so I also assess private arbitral forums: FINRA297 and WIPO.298

Second, I sought out international organizations that administer disputes based on transnational
agreements and thus resemble the origins of treaty-based ISDS. Again, the uniqueness of ISDS
makes it impossible to find perfectly matching forums. Here, only the European and international
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courts and quasi-adjudicative bodies meet the requirement. The treaty-governed WIPO operates at
the international level, but it administers disputes based on private agreements. The other forums
operate at the domestic level under the remit of state laws. Despite these similarities, each of these
forums lacks other ISDS characteristics.

Third, some commentators characterize the function of ISDS as analogous to judicial review.299
Judicial review is defined as “the procedure by which individuals seek to challenge the decision,
action or failure to act of a public body ... exercising a public law function”300 or as a “court’s
authority to examine an executive or legislative act and to invalidate that act if it is contrary to
constitutional principles.”301 With this analogy in mind, I focus on forums that exercise similar
powers of review. All domestic and European courts do so, whereas the ICJ executes them only
occasionally302 and to the exclusion of other forums.

Finally, since ISDS is arbitration, I assess forums that settle disputes using arbitration. WIPO and
FINRA share this characteristic. WIPO, like ISDS, administers cross-border disputes (including
domestic ones), while FINRA operates within the US. Unlike ISDS, both WIPO and FINRA deal
with private disputes.
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In sum, each forum reflects an adjudicative regime that is comparable to ISDS. No perfect
comparators exist due to ISDS’ unique adjudicative features, but as noted, comparative studies do
not have to be restricted in this way. Accordingly, I did not seek perfect comparators but rather a
sample drawn from a variety of public and private regulatory systems of adjudication, each with
close connections or similarities. Each comparator or group of comparators may share a different
set of similarities. However, it is impossible to say which group is further afield from ISDS as it
depends on the point of reference. From the basic comparison in Table 3, it appears that FINRA
and WIPO have the least similarities and that European courts have the most, although it obviously
depends on what aspects are compared and how they are weighted.

Table 3: Comparators and their Similarities & Differences with ISDS

Comparators

Basic characteristics of dispute settlement

ISDS*

Arbitration

Based on
treaties

Domestic courts**
European courts***

No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No****

International judicial and
quasi-judicial bodies
Domestic and international
arbitral tribunals

The ICJ
The WTO
FINRA
WIPO

Similar to
judicial
review
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

With parties
with a vertical
relationship
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

Number of
similarities
4
2
3
2
2
1
1

*All examined ISDS bodies. **All examined domestic courts. ***Applicable to both European courts. ****Although the WIPO is based on treaties,
disputes between parties are governed by consensual agreements.
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Domestic Courts
This group includes the superior courts of the United Kingdom (the Supreme Court303 and the
Senior Courts for England and Wales)304 and the Supreme Court of the United States.305 These
states have been major players in commercial dealings. While the UK remains one of the EU
Member States, it voted in 2016 to leave the EU.

Judicial review in the UK is “a procedure by which a court can review an administrative action by
a public body.”306 The UK lacks constitutional judicial review, yet the courts may hold any
unconstitutional law to be void. While judges may review secondary legislative acts, they are
unable to review the lawfulness of Acts of Parliament.307 Despite the 1998 Human Rights Act
(HRA) having made access to judicial review easier, it still does not allow the courts to quash
legislation. According to this Act,308 the courts must interpret the law, as far as possible, in a way
that is compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights309 but, if that is impossible, the
courts may declare the respective Act of Parliament to be incompatible with the Convention.310
The power to exercise judicial review and declare incompatibility311 is afforded to the Senior
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Courts (the High Court312 and the Court of Appeal313) and the highest court of the land, the
Supreme Court.314 Judicial review of administrative and executive powers, including decisions of
inferior courts,315 is done by the Administrative Court (part of the High Court).316 Claimants
dissatisfied with the court’s decision can apply for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal
(civil cases)317 or to the Supreme Court (criminal cases).318

In the US, the highest court with the power to decide the constitutional validity of a legislative act
through the process of judicial review is the Supreme Court. This power was established by the
landmark decision of Marbury v Madison, where the Supreme Court ruled that “because the
Constitution clearly states that it is the supreme law of the land and because it is the province of
the judiciary to uphold the law, the courts must declare state laws and even acts of Congress null
and void when they are inconsistent with a provision of the Constitution.”319 The same principle
applies to executive actions contrary to the Constitution.320

European Courts
This group consists of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU), consisting of the Court of Justice (CofJ), the General Court (GC),

312
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and specialized courts (I do not examine the rules of these courts).321 The CJEU and ECHR have
close ties since the CJEU gives decisions of the ECHR “special significance” as a “guiding
principle” in its case law. I also included the European courts among the comparators because of
the ongoing debate, led by the EU, to establish a multilateral court and Investment Court System
(ICS) as alternatives to ISDS.322 Considering the CJEU and these alternatives, it remains to see
what interaction the regimes would have.

The CJEU and ECHR cover horizontal (state-state) as well as vertical (individual-state)
relationships.323 Both exercise regulatory functions including powers of judicial review and both
accept cases brought by natural and legal persons. The CJEU can deal with a variety of violations
and inactions; the ECHR specializes in breaches of human rights and hears two types of cases:
those brought by individuals, companies, or non-governmental organizations (NGO) and those
referred by a state party against another state party for an alleged breach of the provisions of the
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Convention and the Protocols.324 In my assessment, I have paid special attention to cases brought
by individuals since the resolution of such cases resembles ISDS more closely.

International Judicial and Quasi-judicial Bodies
This group includes the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), a quasi-judicial body. The ICJ is the primary judicial branch of the United Nations
(UN).325 The authority of the Court is twofold. It decides legal disputes between States and
submitted by states and it provides advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by United
Nations organs and specialized agencies.326 Although the Court deals with state-state disputes, it
is, like ISDS, an international adjudicative body with no appellate mechanism.327 Until recently,
some sitting ICJ judges frequently sat as arbitrators in ISDS.328

For its part, the WTO dispute settlement is a mandatory and binding two-level mechanism,
consisting of a panel as the first instance, and the Appellate Body as a second instance. It is the
only organization that deals with the rules of trade between states.329 The WTO has close relations
with, and has been frequently compared to ISDS despite the inherent differences: adjudicating
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329
WTO has currently 164 members. See: “WTO Members and Observers” (last visited 13 May 2019), online: WTO
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disputes between parties with unlike relations, two-level versus one-stop mechanism, etc.330 It is
common that WTO adjudicators frequently sit as arbitrators in ISDS cases.

International and Domestic Tribunals
This group consists of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Both are arbitration organizations. As forums
administering horizontal disputes, they deal, unlike treaty-based ISDS, with disputes arising from
consensual relationships between private parties. FINRA operates domestically, whereas WIPO is
an international body.331

FINRA is the largest independent self-regulatory body (all US brokers must register with
FINRA)332 authorized by the US Congress to regulate the securities industry.333 FINRA was
created in 2007 through the consolidation of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) and New York Stock Exchange Regulation (NYSE Regulation) to streamline and avoid
overlapping regulation of the two former bodies.334 FINRA prescribes its own procedural rules335
that must be approved, based on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, by the US Securities and

Jürgen Kurtz, “The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents”
(2009) 20:3 Eur J Intl L 749.
331
WIPO, WIPO intellectual property handbook, 2nd ed (Geneva: WIPO Publication No 489(E), 2008) at para
4.152 [WIPO Handbook]; WIPO, Guidelines on Developing Intellectual Property Policy: For Universities and R&D
Institutions in African Countries (Geneva: WIPO Publication No 848(E)); WIPO, A Brochure on Intellectual
Property Rights: For Universities and R&D Institutions in African Countries (Geneva: WIPO Publication No
849(E)).
332
“What We Do” (last visited 16 May 2019), online: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
<www.finra.org/about/what-we-do> [FINRA].
333
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334
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the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority - FINRA” (30 July 2007), online: FINRA
<www.finra.org/newsroom/2007/nasd-and-nyse-member-regulation-combine-form-financial-industry-regulatoryauthority>.
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Exchange Commission (SEC).336 FINRA has the power to discipline its members and,337 like
ISDS, is dedicated to protecting investors (no membership or arbitration agreement is required to
bring a lawsuit) and administers industry-related disputes through arbitration.338 FINRA, by
drafting its own rules, has the power to shape the industry yet is itself immune from liability when
breaking these rules.339

WIPO is an independent agency, subject to the competence of the United Nations, that provides a
global forum to address and resolve domestic or cross-border intellectual property (also a form of
investment340) and technology disputes.341 WIPO administers both arbitration and mediation342
through the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center. WIPO’s authority is based on 26 multilateral
treaties, including the WIPO Convention,343 and has a membership of 192 states.344 While the
WIPO’s primary focus is on disputes about intellectual property rights, its arbitration rules are
generally suitable for all types of commercial disputes.345 WIPO administers disputes under its
own WIPO Arbitration Rules and WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules as well as under the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (designed for ad hoc arbitration), where the Center acts as the
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appointing or the administering authority.346 WIPO, like ISDS, does not require persons wishing
to bring a claim to be one of its members but, unlike ISDS, WIPO is open to any consensual dispute
including domestic ones.347

ISDS Administering Bodies
This group includes some of the most important international arbitral institutions that administer
ISDS348: the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).349 Each
administers disputes and acts as an appointing authority under its own procedural rules as well as
a selection of others - for instance, the UN Commission on International Trade Law350
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules351 or rules ad hoc.

“Center Services in ad hoc Arbitrations, and in particular, under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” (last visited
29 May 2019), online: WIPO <www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/uncitral/index.html> [“Center Services in ad hoc
Arbitrations”].
347
WIPO, supra note 298.
348
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349
UNCTAD, “Latest Developments in Investor-state Dispute Settlement” (2012) IIA Issue Note, No 1 at 2
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known ISDS cases was administered under the ICSID (or under the ICSID Additional Facility) Rules (279 cases)
and the UNCITRAL Rules (126 cases) making these two institutions the most important in ISDS. Other venues like
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) (21 cases), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (7 cases),
the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) (1 case), and the London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA) (1 case) were used infrequently. In 2013 and 2014, the distribution of ISDS cases
among these venues was similar. Since other venues do not make their cases public, there may be more ISDS cases
administered by them. Therefore, the role of these other venues may be more than marginal.; See also, UNCTAD,
“Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments In 2014” (2015) IIA Issue Note, No 2 at 4
(UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2015/2), online: UNCTAD <unctad.org>; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014:
Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan (New York: UN Publications, 2014) at 125, online: UNCTAD <unctad.org>
[World Investment Report 2014].
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ICSID, a part of the World Bank, has 163 contracting states.352 It is the only forum that specializes
in ISDS (unlike the PCA and ICC) and only one that conducts annulment procedures where
applicable.353 The PCA, although having the word in its title, is not a court but an
intergovernmental arbitral organization with 121 contracting parties.354 The ICC is a world
business organization that promotes international trade and provides dispute resolution at the ICC
International Court of Arbitration (ICA).355 The ICC ‘Court’, like the PCA, does not make formal
judgments but supervises arbitral proceedings and makes sure that the ICC Rules are properly
applied.356 Although the ICC specializes in commercial arbitration, it has dealt with a series of
ISDS cases.357

The ICSID Arbitration Rules358 are the most frequently used in ISDS, with the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules currently undergoing reform consultations359 and the second most-used.360 The
PCA has administered the majority of its 106 registered ISDS cases under the UNCITRAL rules,361
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making it their largest administrator.362 I discuss these rules in connection with this forum. The
ICC Rules of Arbitration, although used less frequently, are potentially very important. 363 Since
the ICC adheres to the principle of confidentiality, its data are incomplete and so its role may be
more significant than generally known. Also, since we live in a climate of procedural reform in
ISDS, there is a possibility (underscored by forum shopping) that less frequently used bodies will
gain a stronger influence. Accordingly, I included in my research the ICC Court, a forum that does
not play a central role yet, but to which parties may turn if, due to reforms, they lose all other
convenient options. Put differently, when a favorable organization changes its rules in ways that
are less beneficial to investors, the only parties that can initiate ISDS, the arbitrations may shift to
more pro-investor forums.

b) Structure
I deal with each group of comparators separately in my examinations in chapters 4 to 6. Within
each group, I examine each example individually and compare the findings to the ISDS
administering bodies. First, I examine superior domestic courts in the UK and the US. Next, I
assess European courts. I continue with international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. Lastly, I
examine domestic and international tribunals. I end the comparison by assessing ISDS
administering bodies and then conclude each chapter by commenting and analyzing all of the
findings.

In May 2019, out of 727 of ICSID arbitration cases 16 were administered under UNCITRAL rules; see: “Cases”
(last visited 14 May 2019), online: ICSID <icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx>; By 2017,
the ICC administered 40 ISDS (mostly under the ICC Arbitration Rules): see International Chamber of Commerce,
ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin (ICC Publication, 2018) at 56.
363
UNCTAD, “Latest Developments in Investor-state Dispute Settlement” (2012) IIA Issue Note, No 1 at 2
(UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2012/10) at 2, online: UNCTAD <unctad.org>.
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5. Framework - Document Survey
I conducted a document survey of formal rules, including primary and secondary laws and
procedures. Since the range of selected regimes is broad, I limited the study to sources that are
presently in force and to earlier versions only as far as they affect these current rules. The formal
governing rules can be found in a variety of documents such as legislative acts, treaties, statutes,
protocols, and understandings. Primary sources typically do not contain all rules, but in practice
there is a degree of leeway for adjudicative bodies to administer their internal affairs. I also analyze
secondary legal instruments stemming from these legislative acts and treaties, including
regulations, directives, decisions, rules of arbitration, recommendations, opinions, special
procedural orders, codes of procedures, rules of the courts, practice directions, working
procedures, etc.

The broad span of selected regimes also influences the temporal framework. On the one hand,
there are rules that were recently amended: the ICC Rules of Arbitration in 2017; the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules in 2014; the ECHR’s 2018 Rules of Court; etc. On the other hand, other regimes
employ procedural rules from sources that were adopted a few decades ago; for example, the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 1994, or the rules of the ICJ that trace back under the
Hague Conventions364 to 1899 and 1907.

In common law, case law is regarded as the primary source of law whereas in civil law it is a
secondary source that is subordinate to statutory law. With this in mind, I draw knowledge from
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the landmark cases of any given forum. In arbitration, there is no principle of precedence, yet, in
international arbitration, tribunals frequently give regard to previous decisions. Also, all cases in
general reflect the application and interpretation of formal rules. Thus, I assess a range of cases
from the point of view of case law but also to illustrate some controversial points. To a lesser
extent, I consult dissenting opinions and third-party submissions. Yet, since arbitration frequently
adheres to the principle of confidentiality, the number of accessible cases has been limited (ICSID
is an exception). This limited access makes the assessment somewhat incomplete.

The formal rules are the core of the research, but other sources, such as internal documents, guides,
guidelines, manuals, resolutions, handbooks, guides, guidance notes, FAQs, etc., usually give
additional details and reveal surrounding debates and controversies. Thus, they enlighten the
governing texts. Although “internal” documents and communications from organizations that
operate commercially and confidentially are difficult to acquire, all comparators typically make
the above documents publicly accessible. On this basis, I include them in my analysis when
necessary. However, ISDS forums usually do not provide a variety of other details. Thus, to gain
a thorough understanding, I also check other alternative sources that evidence or reflect on
practices in the interpretation of these formal rules. These may include newspapers, interviews,365
researched data,366 speeches, comments, etc. For instance, for remuneration based on official
schedules and fees, I examine samples of cases that disclose arbitrators’ fees as well as official
websites, guides, newspapers, reports, analysis, etc. Since rules frequently change, I also examine

Nik de Boer, “Interview with Judge Sacha Prechal of the European Court of Justice: Part I: Working at the
CJEU” (18 December 2013), online (blog): European Law Blog <europeanlawblog.eu/2013/12/18/interview-withjudge-sacha-prechal-of-the-european-court-of-justice-part-i-working-at-the-cjeu/>.
366
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reports and debates of former or existing working groups when these reports assist in
understanding the rules in force. They also help to capture the up-to-date developments in ISDS
and so point to where ISDS reform is going, such as in the case of the proposal by the European
Commission to set up a multilateral and Investment Court System (ICS).367

6. Summary
Public and private laws share certain values. Likewise, international and domestic laws are
frequently interdependent. ISDS can learn from systems with similar functions and goals. This
learning process can be facilitated by comparing and analogizing ISDS to other regimes, a process
that provides a basis for observation and insight beyond a single system. In the following chapters,
I compare other public and private legal systems, and draw analogies to reveal different procedures
and tools, structures and approaches of these systems for safeguarding values of participation and
adjudicative independence and impartiality. This study can assist ongoing reform efforts.

367
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Chapter 4: Significance of Methods of Adjudicative Appointment and Case Assignment

Introduction
In this chapter, I concentrate on procedural mechanisms that aim to secure adjudicative
independence and impartiality - values of the rule of law and prerequisites to procedural fairness.
Adjudicators should decide issues according to the law and facts, without favoritism or
interference for whatever reason from appointing or assigning authorities.368 Independence means
freedom from such interference whereas impartiality - fair, unbiased, non-prejudicial and equal
treatment including the absence of a personal interest in the case369 - is the direct opposite of
favoritism. Various tools have been used to safeguard adjudicative independence and impartiality,
such as security of tenure, set remuneration, the separation of powers in the process of adjudicative
appointment, and objective methods of case assignment (including separation of the methods of
appointment from those of case assignment). These mechanisms that are often intertwined support
adjudicative independence and impartiality as common and cumulative goals and are in place well
before the dispute has reached the adjudicative body. In this chapter, I concentrate on the latter
two: adjudicative appointment and methods of case assignment. I examine security of tenure and
remuneration in the next chapter.

Adjudicative appointment is the process by which a qualified individual is nominated, selected
from among the nominees, and appointed. The “method” of case assignment is the process by
which cases are assigned to individual adjudicators from a list of qualified and (usually) already

Philippe Sands, Campbell McLachlan & Ruth Mackenzie, “The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of
the International Judiciary” (2005) 4:2 Law & Prac Intl Cts & Trib 247.
369
P H Collin, Dictionary of Law, 5th ed (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007), sub verbos “impartial”,
“impartially”.
368
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appointed persons. These two steps - appointment and case assignment - are typically dealt with
in separate phases. The core of my study is whether, in the process of appointment and case
assignment, the principle of separation of powers as well as a system of checks and balances have
been employed. I focus on decision-making powers to nominate, select, and appoint and on the
powers and mechanisms that are used to assign cases to individual adjudicators. While
qualifications and competencies play an important part in adjudicative appointment, I do not
concentrate on these requirements.

There are various stages in the process of adjudicative appointment and case assignment. These
stages can be allocated to and decided by different decision-makers. The relevant procedures
define who has the power to decide, allowing decision-makers, at one end of the spectrum, to
influence only an individual step (those that nominate cannot select nor appoint and vice versa) of
the appointment process while, at the other end of the spectrum, other decision-makers can
influence the appointment or case assignment process as the whole. The key purposes of the
separation of powers is to make the process fair by containing the powers of individual decisionmakers. Considering this principle, I examine who has the power to decide whether such powers
are divided among various actors and whether the appointment process is separated from the
assignment process.

The separation of powers as classically introduced by Montesquieu, calls for a system of checks
and balances.370 In his study of its historical development in the UK and the US, Erwin notes that:
Judicial independence is the strongest safeguard against the exercise of tyrannical power
by men who want to live above the law, rather than under it. The separation of powers
370

Charles de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, translated by Thomas Nugent (London, UK:
George Bell and Sons, 1902).
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concept as understood by the founding fathers assumed the existence of a judicial system
free from outside influence of whatever kind and from whatever source, and further
assumed that each individual judge would be free from coercion even from his own
brethren.371
This concept requires separation of adjudicative, executive and legislative powers372 and serves as
a check against the concentration of power in the hands of a few privileged individuals.
Concentrated powers are problematic due to the risk of judicial decisions becoming politically
motivated instead of being based on law and facts. This risk is reduced by dividing appointing
powers among multiple decision-makers and confining them to the appointment stage. This
implies a need for the separation of the power of adjudicative appointment, usually exercised by
the executive branch, from the method of case assignment by allowing the latter step to be taken
within the adjudicative branch. This separation limits the powers of any individual appointing
decision-maker to assign adjudicators to specific cases, thus enhancing judicial independence and
impartiality by making the assignment process and so adjudication free from an outside influence.

Once the appointment is made, the independence and impartiality of a new judge become backed
by the immediate granting of security of tenure. Since tenured adjudicators are subject to the
court’s internal processes, the appointing authority has no power over the new judge. It has no
tools to: alter the term or impose arbitrary conditions to it; remove adjudicators from office;
obstruct their re-appointments (during the term there are none); or otherwise influence or pressure
non-conforming individuals to succumb its decision-making to its demands. Also, tenure by
cutting down (term) or eliminating (lifetime tenure) the need for reappointments reduces

Sam J Jr Ervin, “Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence Judicial Ethics” (1970) 35:1 Law & Contemp
Probs 108 at 121.
372
“Separation of Powers-An Overview” (1 May 2019), online: National Conference of State Legislatures
<www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx>.
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temptations to adjust one’s behavior in accordance with the will of the appointing authority in
order to secure future appointments. In specific cases, a lack of independence and impartiality is,
however, a legitimate reason to disqualify an adjudicator.373

In the internal procedures of the court, an objective method of case assignment - rotation,
algorithms, automated systems generating names, etc. - is usually used to secure independence and
impartiality from within the adjudicative branch by limiting powers of individual decision-makers
to make assignments political, personal or otherwise unfair. According to Fabri and Langbroek,
“[c]ase assignment is the core-business of court organisations, because it touches upon some of
the essential aspects of rendering justice: judicial independence and impartiality, organisational
flexibility and efficiency.”374 According to the European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary
(ENCJ),375 the principles and criteria for allocating cases:
should be objective and include: the right to a fair trial; the independence of the Judiciary;
the legality of the procedure; the nature and complexity of the case; the competence,
experience and specialism of the Judge; the availability and/or workload of the Judge; the
impartiality of the Judge and lastly, the public perception of the independence and
impartiality of the allocation.376

Accordingly, an objective and neutral mechanism bolsters the public perception of impartiality
and neutrality in the adjudicative system and on the part of acting adjudicators.

See for instance, Diego M Papayannis, “Independence, Impartiality and Neutrality in Legal Adjudication Rule of
Law” (2016) 28 Revus: J Const Theory & Phil Law 33 at 41; UNCTAD, “Recent Developments in Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS)” (2014) IIA Issue Note, No 1 (UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2014/3) at 23, online:
UNCTAD <unctad.org>; “2013-2014 ICSID Investment Treaty Cases - Key Issues” (25 August 2014), online:
McNair Chambers <www.mcnairchambers.com/publications-full-list/> at 9–10.
374
Fabri & Langbroek, supra note 366 at 1.
375
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376
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However, the use of objective mechanisms alone does not suffice to safeguard independence and
impartiality. Every protection serves its own purposes: the separation of powers is achieved by
dividing appointing and case assigning powers to various stages and variety of decision-makers;
adjudicative independence and impartiality from outside influence is safeguarded by dealing with
case assignment within the adjudicative branch and so separately from appointment; and lastly
independence and impartiality from coercion from within the adjudicative branch is achieved by
objective methods of case assignment. Success in achieving adjudicative independence and
impartiality depends on what safeguards, if any, are used and their cumulative outcome, as
reflected in Table 4. In order to support public confidence in the fairness of the system as well as
to minimize potential risks of misuse of power, it is important to have protections of adjudicative
independence and impartiality at each stage of the adjudicative process.

ELEMENTS

SEPARATE

Table 4: Separation of Powers and Components of Judicial Appointments and Case Assignments

Appointment

The Two
Processes
(appointment
and case
assignment)

Case Assignment

Methods of
Allocation

Overall
Safeguards*

Objective
(Rotation,
randomness,
algorithms, etc.)

Strong

Discretionary

Weak

SEPARATION
OF POWERS

Yes

Dispersed to a variety
of actors in individual
steps of the process

Separated

Within the
adjudicative branch

No

Concentrated in the
hands of a few
individuals

Merged

Outside the
adjudicative branch
(e.g. executives)

*Of adjudicative independence and impartiality.

To evaluate ISDS, in this chapter I examine existing methods of adjudicative appointment and case
assignment, as tools to safeguard adjudicative independence and impartiality, in a variety of
adjudicative regimes. In this evaluation, I first examine what entity is empowered to make the
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adjudicative appointment and whether the power to appoint is separated among various actors or
concentrated in the hands of a few. Next, I assess the methods of case assignment and whether
they are separate from the appointment process. In turn, I examine whether case assignment is
done ad hoc in the adjudicative regime or whether, in contrast, a permanent body of adjudicators
has been established. Lastly, I assess whether objective tools, such as rotas or algorithms, have
been used in the process of case assignment.

1. Domestic Courts

a) UK Superior Courts (laws specific to England and Wales)
i.

Appointment

The UK superior courts are the UK Supreme Court and the Senior Courts. The process of the
appointment of judges to these courts is not identical. The appointment to the Supreme Court
requires a specially convened selection commission every time there is a vacancy to be filled,377
whereas to the Senior Courts the appointment is made by a permanent executive non-departmental
public body - the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) - established in 2006 following the
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA 2005).378

The Supreme Court
In the process of appointment, since candidates apply for the role themselves, there is no official
body with powers to nominate but only to select.379 The selection commission for the appointment

Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (UK), ss 25–31, sch 8 [CRA 2005]. See “Appointments of Justices” (last visited
1 May 2019), online: The Supreme Court <www.supremecourt.uk/about/appointments-of-justices.html>.
378
CRA 2005, pt 4, sch 12.
379
See for instance, Information Pack: Vacancy for President of The Supreme Court of The United Kingdom (last
visited 16 May 2019), online: The Supreme Court of The United Kingdom
<www.supremecourt.uk/docs/information_pack_president.pdf> at 6 [Information Pack]; Appointment Process for
377
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of a Justice to the Supreme Court must be convened by the Lord Chancellor. Following the CRA
2005, the commission must have an odd number of members (the minimum is five) and include at
least one non-legally-qualified person, one senior judge but not a Justice of the Supreme Court,
and a member of each the Judicial Appointments Commissions/ Board in England and Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland nominated by chairs of these three latter bodies.380

In its deliberation, the commission must consult persons specified by the Supreme Court (Judicial
Appointments) Regulations 2013 (UK).381 Among these persons are senior judges,382 Lord
Chancellor, First Ministers in Scotland and Wales and the Judicial Appointments Commission in
Northern Ireland.383 From the nominated persons, the commission selects one candidate and
notifies the Lord Chancellor about its decision. The Lord Chancellor can either accept, reject or
ask for reconsideration of the commission’s selection.384 After the Lord Chancellor’s approval, the
Prime Minister must recommend the approved candidate to Her Majesty the Queen for the
appointment.385 The role of the Queen as well as the Prime Minister is strictly formal.386

Deputy President of the Supreme Court (2017), online: The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
<www.supremecourt.uk/docs/appointment-process-for-the-deputy-president-of-the-supreme-court.pdf> at 3.
380
CRA 2005, s 27 sch 8 as amended by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK), [CCA 2013]. See Procedure for
Appointing a Justice of The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (April 2016) online: The Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom <www.supremecourt.uk/about/appointments-of-justices.html> at 1 [Procedure for Appointing a
Justice].
381
Supreme Court (Judicial Appointments) Regulations 2013 (UK), SI 2013/2193, s 18 [SC (JA) Regulations 2013].
382
According to the CRA 2005, s 60(1): the senior judges are the judges of the Supreme Court; the Lord Chief
Justice of England and Wales; the Master of the Rolls; the Lord President of the Court of Session; the Lord Chief
Justice of Northern Ireland; the Lord Justice Clerk; the President of the Queen’s Bench Division; the President of the
Family Division; the Chancellor of the High Court.
383
SC (JA) Regulations 2013, 14 s 18.
384
CRA 2005, ss 29–31; SC (JA) Regulations 2013, s 20–22.
385
Procedure for Appointing a Justice, supra note 380 at 3.
386
“Parliament’s role in hiring and firing judges” (28 March 2012), online (blog): The House Divided: Politics,
Procedure and Parliament <pp549.wordpress.com/2012/03/28/parliaments-role-in-hiring-and-firing-judges/>.
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Senior Courts of England and Wales
Appointments to the Senior Courts are made by the JAC,387 a permanent executive nondepartmental public body, sponsored by the Ministry of Justice.388 The JAC recommends
candidates for judicial appointments up to and including the High Court and other senior posts like
Lord Chief Justice, Heads of Division, Senior President of Tribunals, and Court of Appeal
positions.389 After consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chancellor may request the
JAC to select a person for a recommendation or an appointment.390 In order to complete the task,
the JAC will announce a competition and invite applications for the position - aspiring candidates
apply directly to the JAC.391 The JAC convenes selection panels (usually 3 persons) that assess
each shortlisted candidate’s merits and a competency - using panel interviews, situational
questioning about scenarios an applicant may face as a judge, a role-play, simulations of a court
or tribunal’s environment, and presentations. After their assessments, these panels recommend the
most suitable candidates to the Commission. In its deliberation, the Commission considers not
only these reports but all other relevant criteria. Unless waived, the JAC must carry statutory
consultations - consulting individuals with experience with the post (for example, someone who
has held the same office) - and other background checks.392 The JAC Commissioners sitting as the
Selection and Character Committee - examine potential character issues of each candidate and
make the final decision who to recommend to the Appropriate Authority (Lord Chancellor, Lord
Chief Justice or Senior President of Tribunals) for the appointment.393 The Appropriate Authority
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CRA 2005, ss 61–62, sch 12; The Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013 (UK), SI 2013/2191 [JAC
Regulations 2013].
388
“The organisation” (last visited 15 May 2019), online: Judicial Appointments Commission
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389
CRA 2005, pt 4; JAC Regulations 2013.
390
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JAC Regulations 2013, s 15.
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can either accept, reject or ask for reconsideration of their selection.394 On the advice of the Prime
Minister and the Lord Chancellor following the recommendation of an independent selection
panel, Her Majesty the Queen makes the appointment.395

Table 5: The UK Superior Courts - Appointment
APPOINTMENT TO

Nomination

Selection
By a specially convened Selection
Commission:

The Supreme
Court*

Candidates apply

High Courts of
England and
Wales

By a permanent body
- the JAC - that
announces
competitions and
invites applicants.

•
•

Conducts consultations
Recommends one candidate to the
Lord Chancellor (The Lord
Chancellor can accept, reject or ask
for reconsideration).

Appointment

After the Lord Chancellor’s
approval, the Prime Minister must
recommend the candidate to Her
Majesty the Queen for the
appointment.

By the JAC that
•
•

Conducts selection (a multilevel
process).
Recommends a list of selected
candidates to the Appropriate
Authority.**

Made by Her Majesty the on the
advice of the Lord Chancellor and
the Prime Minister following the
recommendation of an
independent selection panel.

*12 permanent Justices. **Can accept, reject the candidate or ask for reconsideration.

ii.

Case assignment

In any proceedings, the Supreme Court must consist of an uneven number of justices (at least
three) - more than half of them selected from the permanent members.396 Since these are the only
legislative requirements and the Court has typically twelve permanent justices, it is for the Court
to decide the size of panels. The size can range from three to eleven. 397 According to the Court,
cases of high importance - constitutional, public issues, etc. - require panels of more than five

394

Ibid ss 8, 14, 20, 26, 32, 41.
Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK), s 10 (1)–(2) [SCA 1981].
396
CRA 2005, s 42; The Supreme Court Rules 2009 (UK), SI 2009/1603, s 3(2), [SC Rules 2009].
397
Joe Tomlinson, Jake Rylatt & Duncan Fairgrieve, “And Then There Were Eleven: Some Context on the Supreme
Court Sitting En Banc in the Article 50 Case” (9 November 2016), online (blog): UK Constitutional Law Blog
<ukconstitutionallaw.org/>.
395
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justices.398 Since panels of five justices have been criticized as potentially insufficient (two panels
of five justices may deliver different decisions to the same case), panels of nine or seven justices
have been increasingly more common.399 Justices to individual cases are assigned by the Registrar
after a consultation with the President and the Deputy President of the Court (they both typically
chair these panels)400 according to the case specificities and expertise of individual justices.401
Since there are no hard rules to follow, the process as desired is flexible but its subjective approach
makes it problematic. Thus, the system would be improved if the selection process is made more
transparent.402

The Queen’s Bench Division is one of the three divisions of the High Court dealing with judicial
review.403 It serves as an example of the High Court and its methods of case assignment. According
to the court’s guidelines, supplementing the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and the supporting
Practice Directions (PD), cases are assigned on a rota basis.404 The PD empowers the Senior
Master, and the Chief Master to make arrangements for proceedings to be assigned to individual
Masters.405 The arrangements may vary in general or in particular cases, for example, after an
assignment has been made the case may be transferred to another Master. This technique makes
the system flexible to accommodate actual needs.

“Panel numbers criteria” (last visited 16 May 2019), online: The Supreme Court
<www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/panel-numbers-criteria.html>.
399
Penny Darbyshire, “The UK Supreme Court - is there anything left to think about?” (2015) 21:1 Eur J Curr Legal
Issues at para 2.
400
Information Pack, supra note 379 at 5.
401
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402
Richard Buxton, “Sitting en banc in the new Supreme Court” (2009) 125 Law Q Rev 288; Hugh Tomlinson,
“Selecting the Panel and the Size of the Court” (last modified 4 October 2009), online (blog): UKSCBlog
<ukscblog.com/selecting-the-panel-and-the-size-of-the-court-updated/>.
403
SCA 1981, s 31, sch 1(2); The Queen’s Bench Guide 2018: A guide to the working practices of the Queen’s
Bench Division within the Royal Courts of Justice (Judiciary of England and Wales, 2018) at para 1.5.1 [The
Queen’s Bench Guide 2018].
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The Queen’s Bench Guide 2018, supra note 403 at paras 1.1.2, 1.7.4, 9.1.1.
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A 2007 study claims that despite the formal role vested in “the head of court and the top of the
judicial system” - the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, etc. - the assignment is typically
done by the court clerk.406 The case is assigned following a “ticketing system” - the clerk assigns
the case to the first professionally qualified and available judge.407 The study notes that in “England
the professional values are apparently considered to be self-evident and internalised by the judicial
services - and do not seem to have the need to lay down these values in rules.”408 This process
while bringing a higher flexibility lacks transparency. In order to explain how organizational
(distribution of cases, etc.) and professional (judicial independence, impartiality, integrity, etc.)
values are balanced it has been suggested that on the case assignment the court should create clear
policies.409

Table 6: The UK Superior Courts - Case Assignment

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Internal process - separate from appointment process

The Supreme Court
(12 Justices)

Cases are assigned according to the specificities of individual cases and expertise of Justices.

High Courts of
England and Wales

On a rota basis - using a ticketing system.

b) US Supreme Court
i.

Appointment

The Supreme Court consists of nine Justices - the Chief Justice of the United States and eight
Associate Justices.410 The appointment process of a Court Justice follows a multi-level procedure

406

Fabri & Langbroek, supra note 366 at 4, 13–14.
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408
Ibid at 24.
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Ibid at 25.
410
28 USC § 1 (2017). See “Justices” (last visited 18 May 2019), online: Supreme Court of the United States
<www.supremecourt.gov/about/justices.aspx>.
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devised to separate appointing powers - appointments are made by the President of the United
States with the advice and consent of the US Senate.411

The power to nominate a Justice is vested in the President by the US Constitution.412 Since the
Constitution is silent about the nominee’s qualifications, the President is free to choose any
individual. It has been suggested that Presidents usually nominate persons that share their political
and ideological interests.413 The President’s nomination is referred to the US Senate where the
Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC) conducts hearings where nominees provide their testimonies.414
The SJC reports out its nomination to the full Senate’s consideration - favorably, negatively, or
without recommendation.415 The Senate’s role is to provide advice to the President. Yet there are
several views about the scope of its advisory role. One view suggests that the Senate’s advisory
role is strictly confined to the approval or disapproval, after the President selected a nominee, of
the President’s choice.416 Another view suggests that the Senate’s advisory role is broader - in
addition to confirming the President’s choice, the role equally applies before the nominee’s
selection.417 Further, another view bridging the former two suggests that this advisory role is
somewhere in between these two opposing views - the Senate is entitled to provide advice even
before selection, but such advice is not binding.418 A simple majority vote is required to confirm

411

US Const art II, § 2, cl 2.
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413
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Appointment Process: President’s Selection of a Nominee” (27 June 2018) R44235, Congressional Research Service
at 8.
414
See “United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary” (last visited 19 June 2019), online: Committee on the
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(14 August 2018) R44236, Congressional Research Service at 17–20.
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or reject a nominee.419 In order to appoint the President’s nominee the person must receive
confirmation - empowers the President to appoint the candidate as a member of the Court - from
the Senate.420

Table 7: The US Supreme Court - Appointment
APPOINTMENT TO

The US
Supreme Court
(9 permanent
Justices)

ii.

Nomination

By the US
President

Selection
Hearings - by the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC) that
reports nominations to the Senate
Consideration - by the full Senate that must confirm the
nominee in order to get appointed

Appointment

By the US President
on the advice of the
Senate

Case assignment

The US Constitution, the Court Rules421 or Guides say almost nothing about the institutional design
of the Court and the method of case assignment.422 Despite its current number (nine Justices), in
history, the number varied from six in 1789 to ten in 1863 and for nearly four decades the Court
authorized a one-Justice panel to decide all its cases during the summer.423 The number of sitting
Justices depends on availability. The current Court sits as a full court - a unified bench of nine
Justices.424 Yet the court can and has already decided a high percentage of its cases in a smaller
number typically due to vacancies, illnesses and recusals.425 In order to decide a case, a quorum of
at least six Justices is required to ensure a sufficient presence.426 However, even if their number

Barry J McMillion, “Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote” (7 September
2018) R44234, Congressional Research Service at 15.
420
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drops below six, the Chief Justice, authorized by Congress, can delegate the Court’s authority to a
panel of three most senior judges.427

Table 8: The US Supreme Court - Case Assignment
CASE ASSIGNMENT
The US
Supreme Court
(9 permanent Justices)

Internal process - separate from appointment

A full Court (at least a quorum of six Justices) but can sit in a smaller number

c) Analysis
All examined domestic courts have resembling appointment processes of their permanent judges.
These processes are divided to several phases - nomination/ application, selection, and
appointment - each typically decided by a set of different decision-makers. This means that actors
with powers to nominate are different from those who assess and select. The latter are typically
also different from those who ultimately appoint the candidate. By dividing the powers among
numerous actors, the process guarantees separation of powers and prevents ill-motivated
appointments.

Considering methods of case assignment, all courts follow their internal procedures. Since this
internal process is separate from the process of the adjudicative appointment the powers to appoint
and assign are also separate. Yet each court assigns its cases to its permanent judges following a
different scheme: the UK Senior Courts use a ticketing system on a rota basis; the UK Supreme
Court assigns cases according to their specificities (including the size of the panel); the US
Supreme Court requires sitting of the full Court. In addition, all courts have discretionary powers

427
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to adjust case assignment beyond the normal mechanisms to retain flexibility. In sum, considering
qualities of methods of case assignment used by these courts, the UK Supreme Court uses the most
subjective one.

2. European Courts

a) ECHR
i.

Appointment

The ECHR has 47 judges (the same number of its state Parties) that operate on a permanent
basis.428 Requirements and procedures of their election are set in the European Convention on
Human Rights (Convention).429 This election process has two phases: (1) party states select their
candidates; (2) the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe elects judges.430 Since states
can decide their own procedures of selection, it is upon them to ensure that their selecting
procedures are fair and transparent.431 To ensure that the selected candidates are fully qualified,432
contracting states make their selections with the help from the Advisory Panel of Experts on
Candidates for Election as Judge to the ECHR.433 Once their selection is done, states provide lists

428

ECHR Convention, supra note 164, as amended by Protocol No 11 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby, 11 May 1994
(entered into force 1 November 1998) [Protocol No 11] and Protocol No 14 to the Convention for the Protection of
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of their three candidates to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. After all
candidates are approved as qualified, the Parliamentary Assembly (the second phase), consisting
of 324 parliamentarians, elects judges from these lists.434 Candidates with the absolute majority of
votes are declared elected and become permanent members of the Court.435 In every proceeding,
each contracting party has a right to have present a “national judge” - a judge elected in respect of
the respondent state.436 If there is no national judge among its permanent members,437 the President
of the Court may appoint the judge ad hoc - by selecting from a list of candidates submitted by the
relevant state.438 While serving on the court, “the judges shall not engage in any activity which is
incompatible with their independence, impartiality or with the demands of a full-time office.”439
This requirement applies to both permanent as well as judges ad hoc.

Table 9: ECHR - Appointment
APPOINTMENT
TO

Selection

Election
By the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from lists
submitted by states.

ECHR
(47 permanent
judges)

Each state selects own candidates
with help of the Council of
Europe.

Permanent judges - candidates with the absolute majority of votes.
Judges ad hoc – appointed by the President of the Court from a list of
candidates submitted by the relevant state.

ECHR Convention supra note 164 art 22. “Election of Judges”, supra note 430.
“Election of Judges”, supra note 430.
436
Rules of Court, 2018 art 29(1) [ECHR Rules of Court]. See “Composition of the Court”, supra note 428.
437
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438
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ii.

Case assignment

Every ECHR judge is assigned to one of the Court’s five Sections.440 Composition of these sections
should consider different legal systems of the Contracting States while being geographically and
gender balanced.441 These Sections are set up for a period of three years.442 The Court has four
main court formations consisting of one, three, seven (a Chamber) and seventeen judges (the Grand
Chamber).443 Since most of the judgments are delivered by Chambers444 and the Grand Chamber
decides issues of highest importance,445 I concentrate on these two formations. Chambers are
formed within each Section.446 The Chamber consists of 7 judges, the President of the Section, the
national judge of the State concerned, and five other judges designated by the Section President in
rotation from among the remaining members of the Section.447 The Grand Chamber consists of 17
judges,448 the President and Vice-Presidents of the Court, the Presidents of the Section and the
national judge, together with other judges selected by the drawing of lots.449 No judge sitting in a
Chamber which first examined the case can sit in the case referred to the Grand Chamber, except
the President of the Section and the national judge.450 The use of a rotational system and of drawing
lots ensures randomness in composition of Chambers and the Grand Chambers.

ECHR Rules of Court, rs 1(d) and 25. See “Composition of the Court”, supra note 428.
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442
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Table 10: ECHR - Case Assignment
CASE ASSIGNMENT

ECHR
(47 permanent judges)

Size

Judges sitting in every case

All remaining judges randomness

The Chamber
(7 judges)

The President of the Section and the
national judge

Rotation

The Grand Chamber
(17 judges)

The President and Vice-Presidents of
the Court, the Presidents of the
Sections and the national judge

Drawing of lots

b) CJEU
Treaties relevant to the appointment and case assignment processes of the two courts of the CJEU
- the Court of Justice (CofJ) and the General Court (GC) - are the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The CofJ consists of one judge
from each Member State - 28 judges - and 11 advocates general.451 According to the TEU, the GC
should include at least one judge per Member State.452 The number of GC judges is determined by
the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union453 - currently the GC consists of 47
judges,454 however, in September 2019 the number will increase to two judges per Member
State.455
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TEU, supra note 321, art 19(2). Conditions of the appointment are set out in TFEU, supra note 323, arts 253–
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Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending Protocol No 3
on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 December 2015, OJ, L 341/14 (entered into force
25 December 2015).
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i.

Appointment

Judges are nominated by each Member State456 and appointed by common accord of the
governments of all the Member States.457 Before making their appointments, Member States must
consult the suitability of selected candidates with for that purposes established panel.458 This panel
has been set up459 and already twice renewed by the Council of the European Union.460 The panel
comprises seven members chosen from among former members of the CofJ and the GC, members
of national supreme courts and lawyers of recognized competence.461 Since all appointed judges
(both courts) must perform their duties impartially and conscientiously, they are (unless exempted)
precluded from holding any political or administrative office or any other occupation.462

Table 11: The CJEU - Appointment
APPOINTMENT TO

Nomination

Consultation

Appointment

CJEU
(The CofJ - 28 judges,
and the GC - 47 judges)

By each Member State.

Member States must consult for that
purposes designated panel.*

By common accord of
the governments of
the Member States

*Consists of former members of the CofJ and the GC members of national supreme courts and lawyers of recognized competence.
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ii.

Case assignment

Court of Justice (CofJ)
The Court’s process of case assignment is governed, in addition to the Statute of the Court of
Justice of the European Union, by the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. The Court
operates ten Chambers consisting of four to six judges.463 The power to assign judges to these
chambers is given to the President of the Court who does it in a secret process. 464 The Court sits
in chambers of three and five judges, in a Grand Chamber (13 judges) or as a full Court.465
Complexity of the case determines the number of judges assigned to each case.466

Chambers of three or five judges are composed of the President of the Chamber, the JudgeRapporteur and the remaining number of judges.467 Lists of the members of the Chambers of three
and five judges, excluding their presidents, and a list of the Presidents of Chambers of five judges
are drawn up and published in the Official Journal of the European Union.468 Order of these lists
is determined by seniority of judges, the date on which they took up their duties or, if found equal,
by their age.469 There is no specialisation among chambers.470 Cases are assigned to chambers by
the president’s cabinet according to a list.471 This process is described as “arbitrary”.472 Judges to

“Court of Justice: Composition of chambers” (last visited 22 May 2019), online: Court of Justice of the European
Union <curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7029/en/>.
464
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every case assigned to a chamber are drawn from a relevant list following the order laid in the
Rules of Procedure.473 This means that they cannot choose their own cases.474According to these
rules, in every case assigned to a Chamber, “the starting-point on those lists” is “the name of the
Judge immediately following the last Judge designated from the list for the preceding case assigned
to the Chamber concerned.”475 Allocation of other judges to particular cases not only follows the
order but also alternate with the reverse order, thus the pattern goes as follows, the first judge on
the list goes first, then goes the last one followed by the second one, penultimate one, third one
and so on.

The Grand Chamber is composed of the President and the Vice-President of the Court, the JudgeRapporteur, three Presidents of Chambers of five judges, and the number of judges necessary to
reach fifteen.476 Individual judges of the latter two are selected from designated lists - a list of
Presidents of Chambers of five judges and a list of the other judges477 - that are drawn according
to their seniority.478 Allocation that ensues follows the order of these lists alternating with the
reverse order.479

The quorum for chambers of five and three judges requires three sitting judges whereas for the
Grand Chamber there must be eleven judges.480 Judges may be prevented from sitting in cases in
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which they were previously involved in some other capacities.481 On similar grounds, parties can
request a change in the composition of the Court or one of its chambers. 482 However, they cannot
do it on the grounds of the nationality of a judge.483 If the required quorum for any assigned case
is impossible to attain,484 the President of the Court may designate one or more judges according
to the order of the relevant list - the list of other judges for composition of the Grand Chamber,485
and the lists for the composition of the Chambers of five and three judges.486 If it is not possible
to replace a judge within the designated chamber then the President of the Court may designate
another judge to complete the Chamber.487

General Court (GC)
A composition of the chambers488 and the process of case assignment is governed, in addition to
the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, by the Rules of Procedure of the General
Court.489 The Court sits in chambers of three or five judges,490 in a Grand Chamber (15 judges),491
as a full Court492 or as a single judge.493 Since the majority of cases is decided by the chambers of
three and five judges494 and those of legal difficulty or of a higher importance by the Grand

481

Ibid art 18, and 47: CofJ and GC respectively. See also Code of Conduct for Members and former Members of
the Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 December 2016, OJ, C 483/1, arts 3–4.
482
Statute of the CofJ, art 18.
483
Ibid.
484
Ibid, art 17(2)–(3).
485
Ibid, art 27(4).
486
Ibid, art 28(2)–(3).
487
Ibid, art 17(5); Rules of Procedure of the CofJ, arts 34–35.
488
Rules of procedure of the General Court, 23 April 2015, OJ, L 105/1, arts 13–15 (entered into force 1 July 2015)
[Rules of procedure of the GC]; Statute of the CofJ, art 50.
489
Statute of the CofJ, art 50.
490
Rules of procedure of the GC, art 13.
491
Ibid, art 15.
492
Ibid, art 10; Statute of the CofJ, arts 16, and 50.
493
Statute of the CofJ, arts 16, and 50; Rules of procedure of the GC, art 29.
494
Niamh Nic Shuibhne, “The Court of Justice of the European Union” in John Peterson & Michael Shackleton, eds,
The Institutions of the European Union, 3rd ed (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012) 148 at 159: Between
2005 to 2009, more than half of all cases were resolved by chambers with five members while chambers of three
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Chamber,495 I focus on these three formations. The Court has nine chambers of three as well as
five judges. Since judges are assigned to more than one chamber, they can sit on both three and
five chamber cases.496 Cases are assigned to chambers by the President of the Court.497 Cases other
than appeals against the decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal (assigned to the Appeal Chamber)
should be assigned to Chambers of three judges following prescribed rotas.498 The President of the
General Court can derogate from these rotas on certain conditions, such as connections between
cases or to evenly spread the workload.

Each chamber has its own President. If in any Chamber of five or three judges the number of
assigned judges to it is higher than five or three respectively, the President of the Chamber decides
who takes the part in the judgment of the case.499 The Grand Chamber is composed of fifteen
judges, the President of the General Court, the Vice-President, the nine Presidents of Chambers,
and other four judges filled on a rotational basis.500 The quorum for chambers of five and three
judges requires three sitting judges501 whereas for the Grand Chamber there must be eleven
judges.502 If the required quorum is impossible to attain, a substitute judge may be designated from
the same chamber or if that is not possible then from the court.503

judges decided a third of cases. See also Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report 2017: Judicial
Activity (Luxembourg: Court of Justice of the European Union, 2018) at 107.
495
Rules of procedure of the GC, art 28.
496
“General Court: Composition of chambers” (last visited 22 May 2019), online: Court of Justice of the European
Union <curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7038/en/>.
497
Rules of procedure of the GC, art 26(1).
498
Criteria for the assignment of cases to Chambers, 16 August 2016, OJ, C 296/04: applicable from 20 September
2016 to 31 August 2019.
499
Rules of procedure of the GC, art 26(3).
500
Shuibhne, supra note 494 at 159.
501
Rules of procedure of the GC, art 23(1).
502
Ibid, art 23(1).
503
Ibid, arts 17, 23(2), and 24(2).
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Table 12: The CJEU - Case Assignment
CASE
ASSIGNMENT

The CofJ
(28 judges)

The GC
(47 judges)

Judges to
individual
chambers
Assigned by
the Court.

Assigned by
the Court.

Cases to
chambers

The number of judges assigned
to each case

Assigned by the
Court

Depends on complexity of the
case.

according to
(Chambers of three or five judges
a list.
decide most cases).
Assigned by

President
of the Court.

Depends on complexity of the
case.

the

(Chambers of three or five judges
decide most cases).

Composition
•
•

Judges sitting in all sittings.
Remaining judges selected
following rotas.

•
•

Judges sitting in all sittings.
Remaining judges selected
following rotas.

c) Analysis
All examined European courts have similar features to previously examined domestic courts. They
have permanent judges and similar processes of their appointment. The process is done in phases
with appointing powers dispersed among various actors that are external to these courts. The
Member States select their candidates with help from an external body, either the Council of
Europe or a designated panel of persons of recognized competence set up by the Council of
European Union. The adjudicative appointment is then made either by the Parliamentary Assembly
or by common accord of the governments of the Member States as appropriate.

The process of appointment is clearly separated from the mechanics of case assignment. The case
assignment is dealt with by these courts internally. The process is complex but once again similar
in both courts. At the initial stage, judges are allocated to chambers and cases are then allocated to
these chambers by the court. In each chamber there are judges who sit in every case, such as the
President of the Chamber, while the remaining judges are allocated to individual cases following
rotas. In these courts the case assignment methods differ in subtleties. They range from rotation
and the drawing of lots, at the ECHR, to drawn lists and a use of forms of rotation (with selection
following order of these lists alternated by a reverse order) at both courts of the CJEU. This
112

separation and multiplicity of steps safeguards independence and impartiality by preventing judges
from being selected for cases in which they might have an interest or by preventing parties from
interfering with the process.

3. International Judicial and Quasi-judicial Bodies

a) ICJ
i.

Appointment

The Court consists of 15 permanent judges,504 including President and Vice-President, a Registrar
and judges ad hoc. Requirements and appointing procedures are governed by the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, the Rules of Court and the Practice Directions. Candidates to the
ICJ are nominated by national groups designated by Member States.505 They consist of jurists who
become members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).506 States that are not represented
on the PCA must first designate their own national groups following the same procedures as those
prescribed for the PCA members.507 Each national group nominates up to four persons, but no
more than two of its own nationality.508 The ICJ judges are elected from the list of all nominees
by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council in two independent votes.509
The selected candidate must have an absolute majority of votes in both bodies.510 All appointed
judges must declare to exercise their powers impartially and conscientiously.511

504

Statute of the International Court of Justice, (1945) ICJ Acts & Doc 6, art 3 [Statute of the ICJ].
Ibid, art 4.
506
Ibid, art 4(1).
507
Ibid, art 4(2).
508
Ibid, art 7(1): Stipulates that only nominees are listed as eligible for election with exception to this rule in art
12(2).
509
Ibid, arts 7–12.
510
Ibid, art 10.
511
Ibid, art 20.
505
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Table 13: The ICJ - Appointment
APPOINTMENT TO

Nomination

ICJ
(15 permanent judges)

By national
groups designated
by Member
States.

ii.

Appointment
Candidate with an absolute majority votes received from two separate votes:
•
•

The UN General Assembly and.
The Security Council.

Case assignment

The Court generally discharges its duties as the full Court.512 The Rules of Court may provide for
allowing one or more judges, according to circumstances and in a rotation, to be dispensed from
sitting.513 A quorum of nine judges, excluding judges ad hoc,514 suffices to constitute the Court.515
The Chamber of Summary Procedure, comprising five judges, includes the President, VicePresident, three judges and two substitute judges.516 It is elected every year by the Court.517 The
Court may also form permanent or temporary chambers of a smaller number of judges, for
example, three.518 Elections to all Chambers, judges and presidents of Chambers, is done by secret
ballot and by a majority of votes.519

If a judge of the nationality of one of the parties sits on the bench, then the other state party may
choose a judge ad hoc.520 Similarly, all parties may choose a judge ad hoc when no judge of their
nationality is on the bench.521 The nationality of the ad hoc judge does not have to correspond with

512

Ibid, art 25(1).
Ibid, art 25(2).
514
Rules of Court, (1978) ICJ Acts & Doc 6, art 20 [Rules of Court] (as amended in 2005).
515
Statute of the ICJ, art 25.
516
Ibid, art 29; Rules of Court, art 15.
517
“How the Court Works” (last visited 23 May 2019), online: International Court of Justice <www.icjcij.org/en/how-the-court-works>.
518
Statute of the ICJ, arts 25–26; Rules of Court, art 16.
519
Rules of Court, art 18.
520
Statute of the ICJ, art 31(2); Ibid, arts 1(2), and 35–37.
521
Statute of the ICJ, art 31(3).
513
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the nationality of the party.522 It is preferable that the judge ad hoc is chosen from the list of the
nominees to the court.523 Parties in their selection should refrain from nominating persons who are
acting or have acted in the last three years as an agent, counsel, or advocate in another case before
the Court.524 Ad hoc judges must declare, just like the elected judges, to exercise their powers
impartially and conscientiously.525

In order to preserve adjudicative independence and impartiality, judges may not act as agent,
counsel, or advocate in any case or sit in any case in that they previously acted as agents, counsels,
or advocates for one of the parties, or in any other capacity. 526 Further, judges may not exercise
any political or administrative function, engage in any other occupation of a professional nature.527
Yet, until recently, ICJ judges frequently sat in ISDS cases.

Table 14: The ICJ - Case Assignment
CASE ASSIGNMENT

ICJ
(15 permanent judges)

Size

Allocation

Typically, the full Court - 9 judges
(one can be dispensed from sitting).

Election of all chambers done by secret ballot and a
majority of votes.*

*Ad hoc judges selected by parties preferably from the list of nominees.

522

Rules of Court, art 35.
Statute of the ICJ, arts 4–5.
524
ICJ Practice Directions, (2013), ICJ Acts & Doc 6, Practice Direction VII.
525
“Judges ad hoc” (last visited 23 May 2019), online: International Court of Justice <www.icj-cij.org/en/judgesad-hoc>.
526
Statute of the ICJ, art 17 (1)–(2).
527
Ibid, art 16.
523
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b) WTO
i.

Appointment

As noted, the WTO has a two-level dispute settlement mechanism - a panel and the Appellate
Body - governed by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).528 Characteristics, composition,
as well as procedures of these two levels have substantial differences. The Appellate Body is a
permanent body with permanent adjudicators called Appellate Body members, whereas panels,
consisting of panelists, must be established ad hoc.529

Panel
The ad hoc panels usually consists of three persons although it can also have five.530 The WTO
Secretariat maintains an indicative list of qualified individuals from which panelists may be
drawn.531 Yet names outside of the list can also be considered.532 The list includes governmental
and non-governmental individuals nominated by the WTO Members.533 However, being on the
list does not automatically lead to selection.534 In practice, many panelists “are members of
delegations to the WTO.”535 Since panelists must act independently and impartially,536 they should
disclose any information which “is likely to affect or give rise to justifiable doubts as to their

528

DSU, supra note 97: Rules related to panels and the Appellate Body are set in articles 8 and 17 respectively.
“Dispute Settlement System Training Module”, online:
<www.wto.org/english/Tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/signin_e.htm> s 6.3 at 2.
530
DSU, art 8.5; Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and
Materials, 2nd ed (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at para 3.3.2.3.
531
DSU, art 8.4.
532
“Dispute Settlement System Training Module”, supra note 529.
533
DSU, art 8.4: Members shall provide “relevant information on [nominees] knowledge of international trade and
of the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements.” See also Louise Johannesson & Petros C Mavroidis,
“The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2016: A Data Set and its Descriptive Statistics” (2016) EUI Working
Paper, RSCAS 2016/72 at para 3.2.1.
534
Ibid.
535
Ibid.
536
WTO, Rules of conduct for the understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (11
December 1996) WTO doc WT/DSB/RC/1 at paras II, III, and IV(1), online: WTO <docs.wto.org> [DSU Rules of
conduct].
529
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independence or impartiality.”537 Further, in order to secure independence and impartiality of
serving panelist, citizens of member states being parties to the dispute should not serve, unless
parties to the dispute agree otherwise.538

In this process of appointment, the Secretariat and the Director-General are quite influential.539 In
order to establish a panel, the Secretariat proposes nominations to the parties to the dispute.540
Disputing parties should not oppose these nominations unless they have a compelling reason.541 If
parties cannot agree on their panelists within the given time limits, either party may request the
Director-General,542 in consultation with the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Board and the
Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee to compose the panel.543 In practice, the DirectorGeneral appoints panelists more frequently than parties.544

Appellate Body
The WTO’s permanent Appellate Body is composed of seven persons. Although all WTO Member
States can nominate candidates,545 appointments are carried, following the recommendation made
by the Preparatory Committee for the WTO, by the Dispute Settlement Board (DSB)546 on jointly
formulated proposals with a Selection Committee, composed by the Director-General and the

537

Ibid at para VI (2).
DSU, art 8.3.
539
See DSU Rules of Conduct. See also Johannesson & Mavroidis, supra note 533 at para 3.2.1.
540
DSU, art 8.6.
541
Ibid.
542
Since September 2013, it is Roberto Azevêdo: See “WTO Director-General: Roberto Azevêdo” (last visited 25
May 2019), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dg_e.htm>.
543
DSU, art 8.7. See also Craig VanGrasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade Organization (Geneva:
World Trade Organization, 2013) at 258.
544
Johannesson & Mavroidis, supra note 533 at 28 (table 16).
545
Elvire Fabry & Erik Tate, “Saving the WTO Appellate Body or returning to the wild west of trade?” (2018)
Policy Paper No 225, Jacques Delors Institute at 4.
546
DSU, art 17(1).
538
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Chairs of the General Council, Goods Council, Services Council, the TRIPS Council and chaired
by the DSB Chair.547 The Committee’s task is to conduct interviews and make recommendation to
the DSB.548 Once the Committee’s task is complete, the DSB takes its final decision to appoint.549

Table 15: WTO - Appointment
APPOINTMENT TO
Panel
(untenured governmental or
non-governmental panelists)
Appellate Body
(7 permanent members)

ii.

Nominations
By Member States.
By Member States.

Selection
By the Secretariat that
proposes candidates to
parties.
By the Selection
Committee.

Appointment
Ad hoc - by the Director-General or
parties.
Final decision and appointment by the
DSB.

Case assignment

Since, the WTO panel merges appointment and case assignment procedures together (discussed
above), I will examine methods of case assignment related to the WTO Appellate Body only. In
order to decide an appeal, a body of three Appellate Body members out of seven, called a Division,
must be established.550 The process of selection of these three members is governed by the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review, drawn by the Appellate Body in consultation with the
Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General.551 To ensure randomness, unpredictability, and
opportunity for all members to serve regardless of their nationalities, they are selected to Divisions

On 6 December 1994, the WTO approved its Preparatory Committee’s recommendations for the procedures for
the appointment of Appellate Body members See Preparatory Committee for the World Trade Organization,
Establishment of the Appellate Body, (8 December 1994), WTO Doc PC/IPL/13 at para 13, online: WTO
<docsonline.wto.org> approved by WTO in WTO, Establishment of the Appellate Body, (19 June 1995) WTO Doc
WT/DSB/1 at para 13, online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org>. See also WTO, Appointment/Reappointment of
Appellate Body Members (25 January 2016), WTO Doc WTO/DSB/70, online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org>.
548
Ibid.
549
Ibid.
550
DSU, art 17.1; WTO, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, 16 August 2010, WTO doc WT/AB/WP/7 rs 1
and 6, online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org> [Working Procedures for AB]. See also “Dispute Settlement System
Training Module”, supra note 529 s 6.5 at 3. See also “Appellate Body Members” (last visited 19 June 2019),
online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm>.
551
DSU, art 17; Working Procedures for AB (2010), r 6(2).
547
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on a rotational basis.552 In practice the Appellate Body members are assigned to cases according
to a mathematical scheme. Members are assigned a unique number - draw numbered chips out of
a bag and the number is recorded (to identify them) - according to which they are assigned to
cases.553 VanGrasstek notes that “[t]his method ensures that no one knows in advance which cases
they will be assigned or which of their six colleagues will be named to the same appellate panel.”554
Since members of the Appellate Body, just like panelist, must be independent and impartial, they
cannot sit in cases that might create conflict of interest, direct or indirect555 yet, unlike panelists,
they can serve regardless of nationality.556

Table 16: WTO - Case Assignment
CASE ASSIGNMENT
Panel
(untenured governmental or
non-governmental panelists)
Appellate Body
(7 permanent members)

Size

Allocation

3-5 members.

Nominations and proposals made by Secretariat or DG from the list.

3 out of 7 members.

Rotation, randomness (mathematical scheme).

c) Analysis
The ICJ and the WTO Appellate Body have permanent adjudicators. Their appointments are done
in stages - nomination, selection, and appointment - with individual tasks vested in different
decision-makers independent of the parties to a dispute. Nominations to both forums are made by
member states or national groups. Selection and appointment are typically done by other decisionmaking bodies - the UN General Assembly and the Security Council (the ICJ), and the Selection
DSU, art 17(1); WTO, Working Procedures for AB (2010) r 6. See also “WTO Analytical Index: Working
Procedures for Appellate Review – Rule 6 (Practice)” (January 2018), online: WTO
<www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/ai17_e.htm>.
553
VanGrasstek, supra note 543 at 241.
554
Ibid.
555
DSU, art 17(3); DSU Rules of conduct, at paras III–IV(1): These rules can be found as Annex II to the Working
Procedures for AB.
556
DSU, art 8(3); “Dispute Settlement System Training Module”, supra note 529 s 6.5 at 3.
552
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Committee and the DSB (the WTO). This power-separating method reduces the risk of politically
motivated appointments. Case assignment by both forums is dealt with internally and, thus,
separately from the process of the appointment - confining the powers of the appointing authority
to the process of the appointment only. Further, to ensure independence and impartiality, both
forums use mechanisms ensuring objectivity of their case assigning method - secret ballot and a
majority of votes (the ICJ), and rotation (the WTO).

In contrast, the WTO panels are constituted ad hoc. The WTO maintains an indicative list - being
on the list does not guarantee an appointment - of potential panelists. Nominations are done by
Member States. Yet it is the Secretariat that proposes candidates - persons outside of the list may
also be considered - to parties that have limited options to oppose it. Parties must agree on their
panelists, if they cannot agree, they can ask the Director-General to make the appointment. This
ad hoc nature makes the process less robust than that to the Appellate Body. This is due to the lack
of the use of permanent panelists (a tool that confines appointing powers to the process of
appointment), an objective method of case assignment and a clear separation of the process of
appointment from the case assignment. Instead, the method seems to be merging these processes
and in turn the powers behind them - making these powers concentrated in the hands of a few.
Despite these potential setbacks, values of adjudicative independence and impartiality are
safeguarded by the possibility to appeal decisions made by the ad hoc panel to the higher-ranking
Appellate Body that employs robust safeguarding mechanisms.
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4. Domestic and International Tribunals

a) FINRA
i.

Appointment

FINRA maintains a roster of more than 7,200 public and non-public arbitrators.557 Non-public
arbitrators are those affiliated with the securities industry while public ones are not. 558 FINRA
arbitrators are not regarded as employees but independent contractors.559 Candidates for the post
are referred by FINRA Recruitment Ambassadors or apply directly to FINRA.560 Before becoming
an arbitrator, the application must pass through a multi-phase process. Once the FINRA’s
preliminary review is successfully completed, the application is forwarded to a subcommittee of
the National Arbitration and Mediation Committee (NAMC) for an approval. Once approved, the
applicant must complete FINRA’s Basic Arbitrator Training Program561 on which successful
completion, the applicant is added to its roster.562

Table 17: FINRA - Appointment
APPOINTMENT
TO

FINRA
(more than 7,200
untenured
arbitrators)

Nominations

Selection

Appointment

Candidates are
referred or apply
directly.

A three-step process:
•
Preliminary review by FINRA.
•
An approval by a subcommittee of the National
Arbitration and Mediation Committee (NAMC).
•
Approved applicants must successfully complete
FINRA’s Basic Arbitrator Training Program.

After the successful
completion of the
training program, the
applicant is added to
FINRA’s arbitrator
roster.

Customer Code, supra note 335, r 12400; Industry Code, supra note 335, r 13400. See also “Become an
Arbitrator Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)” (last visited 28 May 2019), online: FINRA
<www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/become-arbitrator-frequently-asked-questions-faq> at para 1 [“FAQ”].
558
Customer Code, r 12100 (r)(y); Industry Code, r 13100 (r)(x). See also “FAQ” supra note 557 at para 5;
“Become a FINRA Arbitrator” (last visited 28 May 2019), online: FINRA <www.finra.org/arbitration-andmediation/become-finra-arbitrator> [“Become a FINRA Arbitrator”].
559
“Become a FINRA Arbitrator”, supra note 558.
560
Ibid; “Arbitrator Recruitment Ambassador Initiative” (last visited 28 May 2019), online:
<www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/arbitrator-recruitment-ambassador-initiative>.
561
See online: FINRA <www.finra.org>.
562
“FAQ”, supra note 557.
557
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ii.

Case assignment

The FINRA’s case assignment method is governed by two sets of arbitration rules - the Customer
Code and the Industry Code.563 The number of arbitrators sitting at any panel - one or three depends on the amount claimed.564 Arbitrators for each FINRA proceeding are selected by a
Neutral List Selection System (NLSS).565 This system generates lists of randomly selected
candidates that are sent to disputing parties.566 In doing so, the system excludes arbitrators
identified as having current conflicts of interest.567 Once the arbitrator’s name is added to the
roster, the name starts to appear on these lists – they may contain 10, 15 or 20 names. The number
of generated names depends on various factors: the governing code, the form of dispute, the
number of arbitrators and their role (public, non-public or a chairperson).568 This process is also
used to select chairpersons of individual panels.569 Parties select their panel members by ranking
and striking persons on these lists.570 The Director of the Office of Dispute Resolution then
combines these ranked lists and appoints the highest-ranked and available individuals.571 If the
number of arbitrators available from the combined lists is insufficient to form a panel, the Director

563

Customer Code, supra note 335; Industry Code, supra note 335.
Customer Code, r 12401 and Industry Code, supra note 335, r 13401: In claims up to $50,000 there is one
arbitrator, in claims of more than $50,000 but less than $100,000 there are three arbitrators, and in other claims,
there are three arbitrators, unless parties agree to one.
565
Customer Code, rs 12400, 12402–12403, and 12800; Industry Code, rs 13400, 13403, 13406(c), and 13800.
566
Barbara Black, “The past, present and future of securities arbitration between customers and brokerage firms” in
Jerry W Markham & Rigers Gjyshi, eds, Research Handbook on Securities Regulation in the United States
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 412 at 430 (note 110): The system was introduced in 2005 and
replaced the previously used rotational method.
567
Customer Code, rs 12402(b)(2), and 12403(a)(3); and Industry Code, rs 13403(a)(4), and (b)(4).
568
Customer Code, rs 12402(b), and 12403(a): respectively, one arbitrator - a list of 10 public persons, and three
arbitrators - lists of 10 non-public and 10 chairpersons and 15 public persons; and Industry Code, rs 13403(a)–(b):
respectively Disputes Between Members: one arbitrator - a list of 10 non-public persons; and three arbitrators - lists
of 20 non-public arbitrators and 10 non-public chairpersons; and Disputes Between Associated Persons or Between
or Among Members and Associated Persons: one arbitrator - 10 public arbitrators; and three arbitrators - lists of 10
non-public persons, 10 public persons and 10 public chairpersons.
569
Customer Code, r 12403 (a) (1) (C); and Industry Code, r 13403 (a)(b).
570
Customer Code, rs 12400 (a); 12402(d); 12403(c); 12404 (a); and Industry Code, rs 13400 (a); 13404; 13407 (a);
13804(b).
571
Customer Code, rs 12402 (e)(f), 12403 (d)(e); and Industry Code, rs 13405–13406.
564
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has the discretion to appoint a person not on the list.572 If parties agree, they may select their own
arbitrators from or outside the FINRA roster.573 If they are outside the roster, FINRA will attempt
to secure their participation.574 This option gives parties flexibility while merging the two
processes - appointment and the case assignment - into a single process.

Table 18: FINRA - Case Assignment
CASE
ASSIGNMENT
FINRA
(more than
7,200
untenured
arbitrators)

Allocation

Size
Default
Panels of 1 or 3
members - (according
to the amount
claimed, unless
parties agree
otherwise).

•
•
•

Randomly generated lists of candidates.
Parties select their panels by ranking and striking
persons on lists.
The Director - after combining parties ranked lists
- appoints the highest-ranked arbitrator (he has
the discretion to appoint a person not on the list).

Parties’ choice
Parties can agree to own
arbitrators on or outside
the roster.
FINRA will try to secure
their participation.

b) WIPO
The WIPO’s role in proceedings is administrative. The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center
maintains a database of over 1500 individuals - consisting of highly specialized practitioners and
experts in a field of various forms of intellectual property to seasoned commercial dispute
resolution generalists - called “neutrals”.575 WIPO does not make its full list of neutrals available
to the public,576 instead, it makes only accessible more narrowly focused list of the WIPO Domain
Name Panelists.577

572

Customer Code, rs 12402 (f), and 12408; and Industry Code, rs 13406, and 13412.
FINRA, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s Dispute Resolution Activities” (last modified 16 April
2018), online: FINRA <www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2018_AC_Arbitration_Procedures.pdf> at 18: Applies for
Large Cases; See also Customer Code, rs 12402 (a); and 12800 (b); and Industry Code, rs 13402; 13800 (b); 13802
(c); 13806 (c).
574
“Large Case Pilot - FAQ” (last visited 28 May 2019), online: FINRA <www.finra.org/arbitration-andmediation/faq-large-case-pilot> at para 12.
575
“WIPO Neutrals” (last visited 29 May 2019), online: WIPO <www.wipo.int/amc/en/neutrals/index.html>.
576
Ibid.
577
“WIPO Domain Name Panelists” (last visited 29 May 2019), online: WIPO
<www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/panel.html>.
573
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i.

Appointment

The appointment of neutrals has several steps. The process of inclusion may commence on the
Center’s own initiative or on a candidate’s direct application.578 In their applications, candidates
must provide their qualifications, expertise, and experience.579 These as well as other factors
(publication, professional membership, etc.) are considered by the WIPO Center Neutrals
Committee.580 Once the application gets accepted, the Center invites the candidate to join its
database.

Table 19: WIPO - Appointment
APPOINTMENT
TO

WIPO
(more than
1,500 untenured
“neutrals”)

ii.

Nominations

Selection

Appointment

On the Center’s own
initiative or direct
application by candidates.

Applications are considered by the
WIPO Center Neutrals Committee.

Once the Committee accepts an
application, the Center invites the
candidate to join its database.

Case assignment

The WIPO administers two types of disputes, default and ad hoc arbitration. The WIPO’s role is
to assist to select arbitrators from its list of neutrals.581 The appointment of arbitrators to specific
disputes is governed by either the WIPO Arbitration Rules, the WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules,
the UNCITRAL Rules (see below) or where applicable ad hoc rules.582 The WIPO rules “are open
to being modified by party agreement.”583 Yet parties are encouraged to consult the Center before
making any modifications.584

“WIPO Neutrals”, supra note 575.
Ibid.
580
Ibid.
581
“Role of the Center” (last visited 29 May 2019), online: <www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/role.html>.
582
“Center Services in ad hoc Arbitrations”, supra note 346.
583
WIPO, Guide to WIPO Arbitration (Geneva: WIPO Publication No 919E) at 14 [Guide to WIPO Arbitration].
584
“Drafting Efficient Dispute Resolution Clauses” (last visited 29 May 2019), online:
<www.wipo.int/amc/en/clauses/clause_drafting.html>.
578
579
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According to the WIPO Arbitration Rules, parties’ agreement should be followed.585 Parties may
agree on the number of arbitrators, procedures of their appointment and even select their own
arbitrators (even outside of the WIPO List of Arbitrators).586 In contrast, under the Expedited
Arbitration, there is always a sole arbitrator587 whose nomination should be done by parties, subject
to confirmation of the appointment by the Center.588 If within the given time-frame - pursuant
parties’ selected procedures - the tribunal has not been established, the Center steps in with its
default procedure.589

Under the WIPO Arbitration Rules, if parties fail to agree on the number of arbitrators, the tribunal
should have a sole arbitrator, unless the Center determines a three-member tribunal as more
appropriate.590 Unless parties agreed otherwise, they should nominate the sole arbitrator jointly.591
If not, selection of the sole or presiding arbitrator (in a three-member panel) will follow a listprocedure according to which the Center sends an identical list of at least three candidates with
any qualification that parties agreed on.592 After taking parties’ preferences and objections to these
candidates into account, the Center makes the appointment.593 Yet the Center is authorized to use
its discretion if parties do not agree, the selected candidate is not available, or the process is
inappropriate.594

585

WIPO Arbitration Rules (2014), art 15.
Ibid, arts 14–15; Guide to WIPO Arbitration, supra note 583 at 22.
587
WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules (2014), art 14(a).
588
Ibid, arts 14(a), and 17–18.
589
WIPO Arbitration Rules, arts 15(b), 19. See also Guide to WIPO Arbitration, supra note 583 at 22.
590
WIPO Arbitration Rules, arts 14(b), 16–17: The rules and the timeframe for a sole arbitrator is governed by art
16, while for three arbitrators by art 17. See also Guide to WIPO Arbitration, supra note 583 at 17.
591
WIPO Arbitration Rules, art 15.
592
Ibid, art 19 (b)(i); WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, art 14 (b)(i).
593
WIPO Arbitration Rules, art 19(b).
594
Ibid, art 19 (b)(v).
586
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If in the three-member arbitration parties have not agreed on their appointment procedure then a
default procedure applies - each party nominates one arbitrator, the two arbitrators then nominate
the presiding one.595 If either party fails to appoint its arbitrator596 the Center will use its listprocedure.597 Likewise, under the Expedited Arbitration, if parties fail to nominate their arbitrator,
the Center will use its list-procedure, unless the Center deems a different procedure as more
appropriate.598 The Center makes an appointment while taking the parties’ preferences and
objections into account.599 If no suitable person is found, the Center is authorized to make the
appointment directly.600 Despite using the WIPO List of Arbitrators as the primary source,601 in its
selection, the Center may also draw upon other sources.602

Table 20: WIPO - Case Assignment

CASE

Allocation
(from within or outside the WIPO roster)

Size

ASSIGNMENT
Parties
•
WIPO
(more than
1,500
untenured
“neutrals”)

A sole or a threemember panel
(parties’ choice or
by default).

Free to choose
the method.

•

Default
A sole member* - by parties’ joint decision (subject to
confirmation by the Center).
A three-member tribunal - each party appoints one arbitrator these two arbitrators appoint the presiding one).

If not, a list-procedure applies: a sole or presiding arbitrator - parties
provide preference or objections, the Director selects or appoints
directly (e.g. there is no suitable candidate).

*The WIPO Arbitration & Expedited Arbitration Rules.

595

Ibid, art 17(b)–(c).
Ibid, art 17(b).
597
Ibid, art 17(d), and 19.
598
WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, art 14 (b)–(c).
599
Ibid, art 14(b).
600
Ibid.
601
“Center Services in ad hoc Arbitrations”, supra note 346.
602
Ibid.
596
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c) Analysis
Both arbitral bodies have databases of quasi-permanent but untenured arbitrators appointed
through a multilevel process (application/ nomination, selection, and an appointment), and
independently from the parties to the dispute. In each phase, there are different decision-makers.
Actors with powers to nominate are different from those who assess, select and finally appoint the
candidate. FINRA’s nominations are done by entrusted adjudicators or on direct applications from
candidates. The first review is done by FINRA whereas the final approval is conducted by the
NAMC. After a successful completion of the FINRA’s training program, the applicant is added to
its roster. Similarly, the WIPO Center may act on its own initiative or on a candidate’s direct
application. Applicants are considered by for that purposes created Committee. Once accepted,
they are invited to join the WIPO roster.

As a default, the case assignment is dealt with internally and, thus, separately from the process of
the adjudicative appointment. Consequently, powers to appoint are separated from powers to
assign. In the process, both forums employ neutral mechanisms - a randomly generated lists
(FINRA) and a list-procedure (WIPO) on which parties provide their preferences and objections.
Even though these forums appoint arbitrators while considering parties’ choices, if necessary, they
are authorized to arrange assignments directly. These techniques of power separation help to
prevent unsuitable or ill-motivated appointments.

Since both forums respect the party autonomy principle (an ability to choose procedures,
arbitrators, etc.), the default procedure only applies if parties fail to agree or appoint. In
appointments outside of databases these forums step in by providing consultation or trying to
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secure these individuals. Assignments that follow parties’ choices are, thus, the only exception to
the separation of powers as well as processes (appointment and case assignment) as parties by
selecting their own arbitrators circumvent the multilevel-appointing process.

5. ISDS Administering Bodies

a) ICSID
i.

Appointment

ICSID has its Panel of Arbitrators consisting of more than four hundred untenured persons603
designated by ICSID contracting states (up to four persons of any nationality per state) and the
Chairman604 of the ICSID Administrative Council (ten persons of different nationalities).605 Since
the process of designation - identification and selection of panel members - is within the discretion
of each member state, an interested individual must approach the state he or she wants as the
designating authority. Once the selection is made, the state informs the Secretary-General about
its designation.606 In contrast, in his delegation (in addition to the required qualifications),607 the
Chairman should assure representation on the Panel of the main forms of economic activity and of
principal legal systems of the world.608 Despite its existence, the Panel of Arbitrators is not a
permanent panel.

603

Members of the Panels of Conciliators and of Arbitrators (20 March 2019) ICSID/10 [Members of the Panels].
See also Updated Background Paper, supra note 353, at para 38.
604
ICSID Convention, art 5. Since April 2019, the Chairman of the Administrative Council is the US candidate
David R Malpass acting also as the President of the World Bank. See online: World Bank Group
<president.worldbankgroup.org/home>. These offices were previously held by Jim Yong Kim (also the US
candidate) who stepped down three years before expiry of his office.
605
ICSID Convention, arts 3, and 13. See Members of the Panels, supra note 603. See also Updated Background
Paper, supra note 353 at para 36.
606
Administrative and Financial Regulations (2006), reg 21. See also “Panel Designation Procedure” (last visited 29
May 2019), online: ICSID <icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Panel-Designation-Procedure.aspx>.
607
ICSID Convention, art 14(1).
608
Ibid, art 14(2).
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Table 21: ICSID - Appointment
APPOINTMENT TO
ICSID
The Panel of Arbitrators
(over 400 untenured arbitrators)

ii.

Selection
Within the discretion of each
member state and the
Chairman.

Appointment
By:
•
Member States - up to four.
•
The Chairman - ten members.

Case assignment

Assignments in ICSID, unlike courts, are administered ad hoc by disputing parties or an executive
official, the Chairman. In individual cases, parties are free to agree on the number of arbitrators
and the method of their appointment (e.g. parties may each elect an arbitrator who in turn choose
their presiding arbitrator).609 If parties are unable to agree on the number of panelists, the ICSID
default mechanism applies and the tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators610 most of whom
should have nationalities different from those of disputing parties unless parties agree otherwise.611
In addition, a person who previously acted as a conciliator or arbitrator in any proceedings for the
settlement of the dispute cannot be appointed to the tribunal. 612 Since parties are not obliged to
confine their selection to the Panel of Arbitrators,613 their arbitrators are frequently outside of the
list.614 Consequently, the Panel of Arbitrators is most often used for appointments where parties
are unable to agree on a nominee, where they request the Chairman to appoint the number of
arbitrators not yet appointed or where the Chairman appoints the ad hoc Annulment Committee
(three persons).615 For appointments to tribunals a default procedure applies according to which

609

Ibid, art 37(2); ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (2006), r 1 [ICSID Arbitration Rules].
ICSID Convention, art 37(2)(b); ICSID Arbitration Rules, rs 2–3; ICSID Additional Facility Rules (2006), art 9
[ICSID AFR].
611
ICSID Convention, art 39; ICSID Arbitration Rule, r 1(3); ICSID AFR, art 7.
612
ICSID Arbitration Rule, r 1(4).
613
ICSID Convention, art 40.
614
“How to become an ICSID Arbitrator, Conciliator or Committee Member” (last visited 29 May 2019), online:
ICSID <icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/arbitrators/How-to-Become-an-ICSID-Arbitrator-Conciliator-andCommittee-Member.aspx>.
615
ICSID Convention, arts 38, and 52(3); ICSID Arbitration Rules, r 4(1); ICSID AFR, art 10. See also “Panels of
Arbitrators and of Conciliators” (last visited 29 May 2019), online: ICSID
<icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Panels-of-Arbitrators-and-Conciliators.aspx>.
610
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the Chairman provides a ballot form containing names of potential arbitrators.616 Even though the
Convention stipulates that the Chairman is restricted to choosing from the Panel of Arbitrators the
ICSID Centre claims that selected arbitrators may or may not be its members.617 In the ballot,
parties indicate whether they accept or reject any candidate. The candidate on which parties agree
is appointed as an arbitrator. If there are more candidates on which parties agree the final selection
is made by the ICSID Centre.618

Since the Panel of Arbitrators is merely an indicative list, its membership does not provide any
guarantee that an arbitrator will ever be assigned to a case. In other words, some of its members
might be less frequently selected, if ever, than others. In practice, there are just a few arbitrators
who adjudicate the majority of ISDS cases.619 Also, the nationality of the Chairman who is at the
same time the President of the World Bank620 - the US candidate David R Malpass621 - may play
a key role in the selection of arbitrators. The fact that the appointee has always been the candidate
of the US is seen as an unfair advantage for the US.622

“Selection and Appointment of Tribunal Members - ICSID Convention Arbitration” (last visited 29 May 2019),
online: ICSID <icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Selection-and-Appointment-of-Tribunal-MembersConvention-Arbitration.aspx>.
617
Ibid.
618
ICSID Convention, art 38. “Selection and Appointment of Tribunal Members - ICSID Convention Arbitration”
(visited 18 December 2017), online: ICSID <icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Selection-and-Appointment-ofTribunal-Members-Convention-Arbitration.aspx>.
619
Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 5; Pia Eberhardt, “Profiting from injustice: How law firms and arbitrators fuel the
investment arbitration boom”, The Monitor (July/August 2015) 27 at 28–29, online: Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives <www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/monitor/how-canada-gets-peopletortured/trackback?page=1>. See also Kanaga Raja, “Investment Arbitration a ‘Self-Serving’ Industry, says study”
(6 December 2012), online: Third World Network <www.twn.my/title2/FTAs/info.service/2012/fta.info.241.htm>.
620
ICSID Convention, art 5.
621
“About David R. Malpass” (last visit 29 May 2019), online: World Bank Group
<president.worldbankgroup.org/home>.
622
ICSID Convention, art 5. See also Ante Wessels, “International investment court plan threatens our democracy”
(23 March 2015), online (blog): BlogFFII.org <blog.ffii.org/international-investment-court-plan-threatens-ourdemocracy/>; Ante Wessels, “White House defends ISDS” (1 March 2015), online (blog): BlogFFII.org
<blog.ffii.org/white-house-defends-isds/>.
616
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Table 22: ICSID - Case Assignment
CASE
ASSIGNMENT

ICSID
The Panel of
Arbitrators
(over 400
untenured
arbitrators)

Allocation
(from within or outside the ICSID roster)
Default

Size
Parties’ choice

A threemember
panel unless
parties agree
otherwise.

Free to choose the
method of
appointment,
number of
arbitrators and
individuals to serve
(also, outside the
Panel of
Arbitrators).

•
•

A sole member - jointly by the parties.
In a three-member tribunal - each party selects one arbitrator, the
third arbitrator the parties choose jointly.

If not: a list-procedure applies: the Chairman* provides a ballot
form - a list of potential arbitrators (restricted to select from the Panel
of Arbitrators) - to which the parties provide their preferences and
objection. The candidate on which the parties agree is appointed as
an arbitrator. If the parties agree on more candidates, the ICSID
Centre makes the final selection.

*The Annulment Committee also formed by the Chairman.

b) PCA-UNCITRAL
i.

Appointment

The PCA provides a stable institutional framework and a roster of experts for ad hoc arbitration.
The PCA consists of a panel of more than 300 jurists called “Members of the Court”623 appointed
by member states who can potentially act as arbitrators.624 Each member state can designate up to
four individuals.625 Members of the Court of each member state form a “national group”.626 In the
PCA Rules, there are no further instructions regarding this selection process except that states are
required to select individuals with appropriate competencies.627

Table 23: PCA-UNCITRAL - Appointment
APPOINTMENT TO
PCA
“Members of the Court”
(over 300 untenured arbitrators)

Selection

Appointment

Within the discretion of each
member state.

By Member States of up to four members.

“Members of the Court” (last visited 30 May 2019), online: PCA-CPA <pca-cpa.org/en/about/structure/membersof-the-court/>.
624
1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 29 July 1899, art 23 (entered into force 4
September 1900) [Hague Convention 1899] and replaced by 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, 18 October 1907, art 44 (entered into force 26 January 1910) [Hague Convention 1907].
625
Ibid.
626
See note 623.
627
See note 624.
623
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ii.

Case assignment

PCA Arbitration Rules628
According to these rules, arbitrators are selected by parties, by the two party-selected arbitrators
or the appointing authority on a case-by-case basis.629 In their selection, parties and the appointing
authority are free to choose outside of the list of the Members of the Court.630 In any dispute,
parties can agree on the number of arbitrators631 and the method of their appointment.632 In
tribunals of three or five members, each party selects one arbitrator who in turn choose their
presiding arbitrator or the remaining three as the case might be unless parties agreed otherwise.633
If parties are unable to agree on the size of the tribunal, a default of three members applies.634

If parties fail to appoint their arbitrators, an appointing authority - selected by parties or the
Secretary-General of the PCA635 (parties made no selection, or the designated appointing authority
fails to act)636 - may be asked to step in. In addition, under the PCA Arbitration Rules the Secretary-

628

Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States (1992); Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes
between Two Parties of Which Only One is a State (1993); Optional Rules for Arbitration Between International
Organizations and States (1996); Optional Rules for Arbitration Between International Organizations and Private
Parties (1996); PCA Arbitration Rules (2012): It is a consolidation of all the four prior sets of the PCA procedural
rules that all rules remain valid. See “PCA Arbitration Rules” (last visited 30 May 2019), online: PCA <pcacpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/pca-arbitration-rules-2012/>. The PCA Arbitration Rules (2012) [PCA
Arbitration Rules] and the PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One is
A State are the only PCA arbitration rules out of all PCA arbitration rules relevant for ISDS.
629
PCA Arbitration Rules, arts 6, and 8.
630
PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One is a State, art 8; PCA
Arbitration Rules, art 10(4); 1907 Convention, art 47.
631
PCA Arbitration Rules, arts 8–9.
632
Ibid, arts 7–10.
633
Ibid, art 9; PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One is a State, art
7(1). Both articles refer to three arbitrators only.
634
PCA Arbitration Rules, arts 7(1), 8(2), and 9(3); PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two
Parties of Which Only One is a State, art 5.
635
Since 2012, the Secretary General is Hugo Hans Siblesz. See “Secretary General” (last visited 30 May 2019),
online: PCA <pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduction/secretary-general/>.
636
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 6; PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only
One is a State, arts 6–7.
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General acts as an appointing authority.637 In a sole-arbitrator tribunal,638 the appointing authority
makes its selection through a list-procedure unless parties agree otherwise, or the appointing
authority decides that the list-procedure is not appropriate.639 The appointing authority provides
an identical list of at least three arbitrators to each party to indicate their preferences. In its
selection, the appointing authority should consider persons who are most likely independent and
impartial and of a nationality other than nationalities of the parties.640 The appointing authority
makes the appointment in accordance with the parties’ order of preference.641 If the appointment
cannot be made, the appointing authority has the right to exercise its discretion.642

In the case of three arbitrators, if within the prescribed time one party fails to make an appointment
then the other party can ask the appointing authority to do it.643 Similarly, if within the prescribed
time limits the two appointed arbitrators fail to appoint presiding or other remaining arbitrators
then the appointing authority makes these appointments by using the above list-procedure.644

637

PCA Arbitration Rules, art 6.
Ibid, art 8.
639
Ibid, arts 7(2), 8(2), and 9(3); PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only
One is a State, art 6(3).
640
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 6(3); PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which
Only One is a State, art 6(4); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 6(7).
641
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 8(2).
642
Ibid, art 8(2)(d); PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One is a
State, art 6.
643
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 9 (2).
644
Ibid, art 8(2).
638
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UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
As noted, along with its own rules, the PCA administers the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.645
Since the PCA rules have been updated in light of the UNCITRAL rules (version 2010), 646
considering the appointment process and number of arbitrators, these two sets of rules are nearly
identical.647 While they both give parties freedom to choose - methods of appointment,648 the
number of arbitrators,649 etc. - the UNCITRAL rules, unlike the PCA rules, do not refer to the
Members of the PCA Court650 and do not contain provisions for tribunals of five members
(although parties are free to agree on any number of arbitrators).651

According to the UNCITRAL rules a party may propose one or more persons as an appointing
authority unless parties have already agreed on the appointing authority.652 If after this proposal
parties have not reached an agreement then any party may request the Secretary-General of the
PCA to designate the appointing authority.653 Any appointing authority may exercise its discretion
in appointing the sole or the presiding arbitrator (a three-member tribunal).654 In general, when
acting as an appointing authority, the Secretary-General follows the UNCITRAL list-procedure
which is identical to the above PCA list-procedure.655 According to this list-procedure, the

645

The latest revision of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules was done in 2013, previous versions are: UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (1976) and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010).
646
See “PCA Arbitration Rules” (last visited 30 May 2019), online: PCA <pca-cpa.org/en/services/arbitrationservices/pca-arbitration-rules-2012/>.
647
The 2013 version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules contains new article 1(4) otherwise the rules are the same
as the 2010 version.
648
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 10.
649
Ibid, art 7.
650
Ibid, arts 9(1), and 10(4) as compared to the PCA Arbitration Rules (2012), arts 9–10.
651
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), arts 7(1), and 10.
652
Ibid, arts 6, 8–10, and 14. Parties may propose as an appointing authority also the Secretary-General of the PCA.
653
Ibid, art 6(2).
654
Ibid, arts 8–9: sole arbitrator; and three arbitrators, respectively.
655
Ibid, art 8(2); PCA Arbitration Rules (2012), art 8(2); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), art 8(2); UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (1976), art 6(3).
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appointing authority provides a list of at least three candidates to which parties give their
preferences or objections.656 The Secretary-General is not limited to any list or panel and is,
therefore, free to exercise his discretion and choose the person he thinks is the most appropriate
for the matter at hand.657

Table 24: PCA-UNCITRAL - Case Assignment*

CASE
ASSIGNMENT

PCA
“Members of
the Court”
(over 300
untenured
arbitrators)

Size

A threemember panel
is by default
unless parties
agree
otherwise
(to one, five
or more
members).

Allocation
(from within or outside the PCA roster)
Parties’
choice

Default
•
•

Free to choose
procedures,
individual
arbitrators,
and the
appointing
authority.

•

A sole arbitrator - by parties’ agreement
A three-member tribunal - each party appoints one arbitrator - these
two arbitrators appoint the presiding one).
A tribunal of five or more members - each party appoints one
arbitrator - these two arbitrators appoint the remaining ones).

If not: a list-procedure applies: the selection of a sole, presiding or any
number of required but not appointed arbitrators is done by an
Appointing Authority - parties provide preference or objections - the
Appointing Authority selects or if unable appoints directly (e.g. there is
no suitable candidate).

*The PCA and the UNCITRAL rules are nearly identical on this point.

c) ICC Court
i.

Appointment

For the 2018-2021 term, the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) appointed 176 Court members representing more than 100 countries.658 These
members of the Court are appointed by the ICC World Council on the proposal of the local ICC
national committees and groups - one member per each committee or group.659 If there is no

656

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 8. See also Rules of ICC as Appointing Authority (2018), art 6(3).
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 8. See also “Appointing Authority” (last visited 30 May 2019), online:
PCA <pca-cpa.org/en/services/appointing-authority/>.
658
“2018: 10 key moments from ICC’s Dispute Resolution year” (3 January 2019), online: ICC - International
Chamber of Commerce <iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/2018-10-key-moments-iccs-dispute-resolutionyear/> at para 7. See also “Court members” (last modified 1 July 2018), online: ICC - International Chamber of
Commerce <iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/icc-international-court-arbitration/court-members/>.
659
ICC Arbitration Rules (2017), Appendix I, art 3.
657
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national committee or group, the proposal is made by the President of the Court in jurisdictions660
who also proposes its alternate members.661 Once appointed, in the performance of their functions,
Court members must remain independent from the national committees or groups.662

In order to become an ICC arbitrator an individual should contact the National Committee of the
ICC under which the person wants to serve.663 Yet being on the list does not guarantee that an
individual will ever be appointed. In selecting an arbitrator, the Court conducts an individual
search each time a request for an arbitrator is made.664 In its search, the Court requests an
appropriate National Committee or Group of the ICC to make a proposal.665 In ISDS cases, states
expressed concerns that ICC National Committees lack neutrality as “they are often composed of
leading companies and business associations in their respective countries.”666 The ICC Rules have
been revised in order to address this concern. Since this revision, if a proposal from an ICC
National Committee is not acceptable, the Court may appoint the sole or presiding arbitrator
directly.667

Table 25: ICC Court - Appointment
APPOINTMENT TO
ICC Court
(about 200 untenured members
of the Court)

Nomination
By the local ICC National Committees and Groups or the
President of the Court in jurisdictions - one member per
each Committee or Group.

660

Appointment
By the ICC World Council.

Ibid, art 11.
Ibid, Appendix I, art 3(4).
662
Ibid, Appendix II, art 3.
663
See for example: The US affiliate of the International Chamber of Commerce, the United States Council for
International Business (USCIB): “International Chamber of Commerce ICC” (last visited 31 May 2019), online:
USCIB <www.uscib.org/international-chamber-of-commerce-icc-ud-754/>; The UK ICC: “Dispute Resolution
Services” (last visited 31 May 2019), online: ICC United Kingdom <iccwbo.uk/pages/dispute-resolution>.
664
“Dispute Resolution” (last visited 31 May 2019), online: USCIB <www.uscib.org/icc-dispute-resolution/>.
665
ICC Arbitration Rules, art 13(3).
666
Commission on Arbitration and ADR, ICC Commission Report: States, State Entities and ICC Arbitration (2017)
at para 38.
667
ICC Arbitration Rules, art 13(3)–(4). See also Ibid at paras 37–39.
661
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ii.

Case assignment

Arbitrators are assigned on a case-by-case basis by parties, the Court or an appointing authority.
Although the ICC Arbitration Rules contain a presumption in favour of a sole arbitrator, parties
are free to agree on the number of arbitrators and the method of their appointment.668 As reported,
states and state entities usually prefer the three-member panels.669 In sole member tribunals, if
parties agree, they can nominate the sole arbitrator for confirmation.670 In the three-member
tribunals, unless parties agree otherwise, each party selects one arbitrator while the Court appoints
the presiding one.671 If parties fail to agree or appoint,672 or one party is a state or a state entity,673
the Court makes the appointment directly. When the Court or the Secretary-General confirm or
appoint arbitrators, they must consider nationality and the candidate’s relationship to the parties.674
The decisions of the Court as to the appointment, confirmation, challenge or replacement of an
arbitrator are final.675 The Court may also act as an appointing authority upon the party agreement,
designation by the Secretary-General of the PCA or otherwise following the UNCITRAL or other
arbitration proceedings.676

668

ICC Arbitration Rules, art 12. See also ICC Arbitration Clauses (2017), at 76.
Commission on Arbitration and ADR , supra note 666 at 63–67.
670
ICC Arbitration Rules, art 12(3).
671
Ibid, art 12(5).
672
Ibid, art 12 (2)–(5), and (8).
673
Ibid, art 13(4).
674
Ibid, art 13(1)–(2), and (5).
675
Ibid, art 11(4).
676
Rules of ICC as Appointing Authority (2018), arts 1–2.
669
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Table 26: ICC Court - Case Assignment
CASE
ASSIGNMENT
ICC Court
(about 200
untenured
members of
the Court)

Size
A presumption of a
sole arbitrator, unless
parties agree
otherwise - states or
state entities generally
prefer a three-member
tribunal.

Allocation
(from within or outside the ICC Court roaster)
Parties’ choice
Default
Free to choose
procedures,
individual
arbitrators, and the
appointing
authority.

•
•

A sole arbitrator - parties nominate their arbitrator for
confirmation (by the Court or the Secretary-General).
A three-member tribunal - each party appoints one
arbitrator and the Court appoints the presiding one.

If parties fail to agree or to appoint: The Court makes
the appointment directly

d) Analysis
All examined forums provide default procedures that determine who has the power to select and
to appoint arbitrators to specific disputes unless parties agreed otherwise. Generally, the parties
choose their arbitrators (except the presiding one). Where parties fail to agree or to appoint another
default procedure steps in. For such purposes, ICSID and the PCA-UNCITRAL employ a listprocedure whereas the ICC Court makes the appointment directly. All these methods allow parties
to influence the process - by selecting arbitrator or giving preferences and objections. Yet the final
decision is at discretion of the appointing authority - usually the executives of these forums (the
Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council, the Secretary-General of the PCA, the ICC Court,
etc.).

None of these organizations has a permanent list of arbitrators. All forums - ICSID, the PCA, and
the ICC - maintain databases of arbitrators, a panel of arbitrators, members of the court or a
database of arbitrators, but their procedural rules do not require that individual arbitrators should
be selected from the respective list. Those with powers to appoint - parties, the party-appointed
arbitrators, the forums executives (except the Chairman of the ICSID) or another appointing
authority - are free to choose arbitrators as they wish. Since these lists are only indicative, there is
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no equally spread workload or guaranteed appointment among its members. In fact, the system
works in such a way that some individuals might never get appointed.

A case-by-case appointment merging processes of adjudicative appointment with case assignment
is the norm for all of these bodies resulting in the lack of several levels of institutional safeguards.
Since these processes are not separate, powers to appoint and to assign an arbitrator to a case are
not dispersed but concentrated. This practice of case-by-case appointment - with powers vested in
the disputing parties and executive officials - raises a concern of potentially inappropriate pressure
on arbitrators. Generally, the separation of the process of adjudicative appointment from case
assignment helps to shield adjudicators from this risk. The ISDS administering bodies, however,
allow a direct link between the appointing authority and the adjudicator in each case. Thus, the
appointing (or potentially appointing) officials can directly influence who is assigned to adjudicate.
Also, by the nature of these systems, none of these appointing bodies and the associated rules use
neutral mechanisms of case assignment such as rotation or random selection from a list of
permanent adjudicators. Workload among members of the indicative lists is starkly uneven.

6. Comparative Remarks

In this chapter, I examined adjudicative appointment and methods of case assignment as values of
adjudicative independence and impartiality. Collected dataset shows a spectrum of patterns
ranging from bodies that employ multiple safeguarding methods at various stages of the process
and supporting each other to bodies that use hardly any of these measures. Separation of powers
at various levels of these processes prevent ill-motivated appointments. Consequently, out of all
examined forums, domestic, European, and international courts use the strongest protections by
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employing multiple safeguards of adjudicative independence and impartiality, they: (1) divide
appointing powers to multiple independent stages – nomination/ application, selection, and
appointment; (2) separate powers to assign (an internal process) from powers to appoint; (3) utilize
objective methods of allocation - algorithms, principles of randomness, rotation or a secret ballot;
(4) spread their workload evenly; and (5) disable parties to select their own adjudicators.

The WTO Appellate Body has characteristics similar to courts, but the WTO panels as constituted
ad hoc lack various safeguards like separation of processes, separation of powers, objective
selection, etc. Similarly, domestic and international arbitral tribunals - FINRA and WIPO - as
constituted ad hoc lack a variety of safeguards, a fact exacerbated by their commercial nature and,
thus, the need to respect values like party autonomy, confidentiality, etc. Yet, despite these
characteristics, FINRA’s default procedure has a range of safeguards that resemble those of the
courts (unless parties agree otherwise): (1) an elaborate mechanism of adjudicative appointment;
(2) separate processes of adjudicative appointment and case assignment; (3) a neutral allocative
mechanism from a list of independently appointed arbitrators. WIPO, in contrast, seems to put a
stronger emphasis on party autonomy since its default list-procedure only applies if parties do not
agree or fail to appoint. Further, the powers to select the candidates under this list-procedure, while
this process of the selection remains unclear, are vested in the WIPO executives.

Finally, all ISDS forums, just like WIPO, respect party autonomy - freedom to choose procedures,
arbitrators, etc. - and use its default procedures only where parties fail to agree or appoint. In all
cases, a party’s choice of arbitrator, or agreement to choose an arbitrator, occurs against the
backdrop of the party’s view of who the appointing body would appoint if it were to exercise its
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default powers used when parties cannot reach an agreement. The processes of ISDS forums do
not come even close to the complexity and degree of safeguards that are employed by the courts
due to: (1) the primacy of party autonomy and ability to influence the process (parties can select
or provide their preferences to the list of candidates); (2) the use of merely indicative lists of
adjudicators (the selection from them is not mandatory); (3) limited or no separation of powers to
nominate, select, and appoint; (4) the merged processes and, thus, powers to appoint and to assign;
(5) quasi-objective case assignment (a list-procedure); (6) the power of executives to appoint using
its discretion; and (7) unevenly spread workload. Such practices reduce the division of powers to
a bare minimum. Further, they make ISDS safeguards weaker than for instance, FINRA, a
regulatory body that deals with purely commercial disputes but employs strong judicial safeguards
while it retains flexibility for cases where parties agree on ad hoc rules. In contractual and hence
horizontal disputes, the party autonomy principle has its place whereas in the ISDS treaty-based
vertical relationships this arrangement is controversial. Yet even if ISDS is regarded as private
arbitration, which is not, it provides weaker protections than other arbitral bodies. Further, FINRA
as a mandatory forum for its members blocks any possibility of forum shopping. Consequently,
while all the above courts lie on one end of a spectrum, the ISDS forums lie toward the opposite
end.

In sum, in comparison to other bodies, the appointment and case assignment processes in ISDS
lack several levels of institutional safeguards. The absence of these safeguards may influence
public perception and raises questions about independence and impartiality. Along these lines,
some commentators argue that selection on a case-by-case basis may put inappropriate pressures
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on arbitrators linked to their prospects for future appointment.677 Arbitrators who are selected caseby-case may feel a need to adjust their behavior and decisions in ways that are expected to increase
their chances of re-appointment.678 Further, unlike the state-state and arbitral bodies examined
above, ISDS is a vertical arrangement in which only investors can initiate ISDS. The system thrives
only if investors see it as favorable. As a result, arbitrators may feel a need to adjust their actions
to the needs of investors as ‘buyers’ of their services.

Some arbitrators oppose these claims and point to their reputation for integrity as evidence of their
independence and impartiality. Yet these statements reinforce the critique in that arbitrators, unlike
judges, have a need to preserve their ‘reputation’ in order to be re-appointed. The word reputation
raises the question of what kind of reputation arbitrators have in mind since the word can have a
different connotation for different stakeholders. In addition, Eberhardt and Olivet claim that
arbitrators may feel pressure from among their own tight-knit community of arbitrators, who exert
immense influence over the investment arbitration system.679 They argue that such a tight-knit
community requires arbitrators to act in certain ways to preserve the hope of future
appointments.680 Breaking with this tight-knit community by independent judgment that is
opposed to the mainstream ideology could mean that arbitrators do not get further appointments.681

In summary, the structure of ISDS for all of the examined ISDS contexts does not give adequate
guarantees to secure independence and impartiality. A lack of separation of powers arises from the
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Jan Hendrik Dalhuisen, Additional Opinion in Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v
Argentine Republic (2010), ARB/97/3 at para 25 (ICSID).
678
Ibid: Dalhuisen criticized practices of ISDS arbitrators in seeking re-appointments as an issue related to
adjudicative independence.
679
Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 5 at 35–43.
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Ibid.
681
Ibid at 37.
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merging of appointment and case assignment processes. This issue is exacerbated by the absence,
in some cases, or insufficiency of objective methods of case assignment. These aspects create an
environment of potential threat to independence and impartiality and an impression that these core
values are inadequately protected. Despite claims that ISDS is neutral and apolitical, it is ultimately
governed by the will of those with the power to decide who, in the case of ISDS, are not insulated
from those with the power to appoint.
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Chapter 5: Adjudicative Security – Tenure and Remuneration

Introduction
In this chapter, I explore two essential conditions of adjudicative independence and impartiality security of tenure and remunerative techniques.682 These typically interconnected forms of security
support each other in providing a set of stable and repetitive incomes over the term of tenure. They
create a vital background for fair adjudication by entering the picture of adjudicative proceedings
immediately after the appointment process but well before any dispute is initiated. They safeguard
personal independence of individual adjudicators by providing “freedom from external pressure,
regardless of the source” - appointing authorities, friends, other adjudicators, governmental
officials, the public, pressure groups, parties to the dispute, and other branches of government.683
- and freedom from an inappropriate influence in the form of personal, professional or monetary
incentives, repercussions or uncertainties.684

Security of Tenure
There are various conditions of adjudicative independence, yet the Supreme Court of Canada in R
v Valente noted that security of tenure is the first and an essential one.685 Tenure - a legal guarantee
that an adjudicator will not be removed from office on arbitrary grounds - serves as a tool against
external powers seeking to interfere with the judges’ decision-making. Examples of its widespread
use can be found in the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and the Council
of Europe Recommendation on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges both using
682
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identical words: “Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a
mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.”686 Despite this
range of character and quality of tenure - term of office with or without a possibility of a renewal
or a life tenure - removals from office are possible only in exceptional circumstances - on
grounds of proven misbehaviour or incapacity.

It took centuries of struggle, for example in England and its colonies, before security of tenure was
recognized as a core principle of judicial independence.687 These struggles turned on whether to
use tenure during good behaviour, as opposed to the more problematic option of tenure during the
pleasure of the executive - the king or a governor.688 Tenure during the pleasure of the executive
was seen as problematic because it carried a considerable risk that a judge could be removed from
office at the king’s pleasure if the judge decided against the king’s will.

In contemporary adjudication, tenure serves as a mechanism to maximize adjudicative
independence as well as public confidence in the judiciary.689 While it is appropriate that
adjudicators’ powers are constrained by law and accountability to their peers, external sources of

Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 at paras 49–52 and “Explanatory
Memorandum” at paras 54–55, reprinted in Council of Europe, Judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub, 2011); International Commission of Jurists, International Principles on the
Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors: Practitioners Guide No 1 (Geneva:
International Commission of Jurists, 2007) at 51–54; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR), UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September
1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985,
Principle 12 [UN Basic Principles].
687
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688
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689
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Cooperation with the International Bar Association,
Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers,
Professional Training Series 9 (New York: United Nations, 2003) at ch 4 para 4.5.2 [Human Rights in the
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inappropriate influence are problematic.690 Fair adjudication must be based on facts and the
applicable law leaving political or economic preferences of powerful actors (such as states and
private actors) aside. Tenure provides the space and security needed to decide fairly by shielding
adjudicators from external powers: it separates adjudicators from powers, agendas and ideologies
of those who appointed them (typically executives); disempowers external powers to enforce
compliance by using repercussions – such as a change of work conditions, and removal from
office;691 fixed terms of office, or preferably, tenure until retirement age, reduce or eradicate the
need to seek re-appointment with all of the associated risks – in particular a temptation to reach
decisions favourable to the appointing powers in order to secure re-appointment.

Remuneration
Financial security provides another way to safeguard adjudicative independence and impartiality.
In Valente, the Supreme Court of Canada described remuneration as “[t]he second essential
condition of judicial independence.”692 Similarly, the Council of Europe maintains that
remuneration - a part of the minimum working conditions that reflect responsibilities that
adjudicators bear - is an essential factor for the independence of adjudicators.693 Financial security
brings financial stability and protection against remunerative uncertainties through a variety of
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facets - an adequate salary or other remuneration,694 protections against reductions or erosion of
salary,695 and where appropriate even security of pension.696

Legally-mandated remuneration (typical to the judiciary)697 gives adjudicators financial stability
as well as independence. The amount is usually set and received in monthly instalments during the
term of office or beyond as a secure pension. This arrangement gives adjudicators freedom to
decide fairly - their decision-making does not affect their income - as well as freedom from having
to compete each time with others for work and thus income. In contrast, remuneration for ad hoc
(case-by-case) appointments has different qualities. Since ad hoc appointments are irregular and
uncertain, also income for this work is unpredictable and insecure. This uncertainty underscored
by scarcity of future appointments might force individual adjudicators, once appointed, to seek the
best pay to cover the time without the income. In such a case, adjudicators have not only incentives
to get appointed but also a personal stake in cases they adjudicate due to fees they receive.
Remuneration based on personal incentives undermines public confidence in adjudicative
independence and impartiality.

Methods of remuneration that promote financial security safeguard adjudicative independence and
impartiality whereas inadequate methods can be used as tools to improperly influence decisionmakers. There are various inadequate methods, for example, salaries paid externally instead of by
the adjudicative branch. Along these lines, Ervin points out that salaries paid directly by the
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executives can create dependence on the will of the executive.698 Similarly, Barak argues that
executive officials should not set the salary of a judge but rather should be administered internally
by the judiciary.699 In addition, low remunerative rates are problematic as they might create
conditions for corruption.700

Other factors may also lead to problems. These include scarcity and competitive dynamics of ad
hoc appointments and excessive remuneration. They all create monetary incentives - a form of an
inappropriate external influence.701 In this regard, Pauwelyn in his observation of the WTO and
ICSID, two systems using ad hoc appointments but with disproportionate levels of remuneration,
maintains that “low compensation comes with low pressures to seek reappointment and low
temptations to be predisposed, biased or corrupted.”702 This constraining influence contrasts with
high remunerative rates that create a competitive market for appointments and rulings. Also, for
many, a competitive market leads to a few or zero appointments equal to income that is too low or
none (unless secured from another source). This lack of income - an unacceptable pressure - makes
adjudicators vulnerable to temptations to boost their chances for reappointments by adhering to
the agendas of those with powers to appoint.703
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My research
As noted above, ISDS is empowered by IIAs. Yet IIAs are typically silent on the point of tenure
and remuneration. The recently adopted Colombia-Japan BIT704 that addresses the latter - ICSID
fees and expenses apply unless parties agreed otherwise705 - is an exception to this trend. Because
of this widespread silence, the existence and qualities of individual adjudicative security is
typically governed by rules and procedures set by one of the ISDS administering bodies.
Accordingly, in this chapter, I assess the set of individual adjudicative security afforded by
individual ISDS forums (ICSID, the PCA-UNCITRAL, and the ICC) in comparison to other
adjudicative regimes. I map the use of security of tenure and variety of components of methods of
financial security (see Table 27). Considering the latter, I assess whether these methods adequately
safeguard independence and impartiality. Although the adequacy can be assessed by calculating
the amount of compensation paid (including all emoluments), I do not evaluate this aspect. Rather,
I focus on whether these methods provide stable remuneration that does not turn on the
peculiarities of individual cases. That is, I examine remuneration from the perspective of qualities
of stability and protection from scarcity, instability, or fluctuation. Accordingly, I am concerned
with the general terms of remuneration, such as whether a basic salary is guaranteed, whether the
salary is based on a scale or calculated ad hoc, whether the salary depends on performance, whether
the salary is protected against reductions, whether there are other emoluments, and whether there
is a financial security - as a part of the remunerative scheme - that goes beyond the terms of present
service.
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Table 27: Components of Adjudicative Security: Tenure and Remuneration

STRONG SAFEGUARDS
Tenure

WEAK SAFEGUARDS

Yes
•
•

Income

No

Source
of remuneration

Set salaries during the term of office
Prescribed by the law
Paid by the adjudicative branch

Methods of income

Regular
Based on a scale
By legal instrument

Protections &
Stability of income
•
•
Adequacy of remuneration
Income beyond
the term of present service
Transparency

Ad hoc - discretionary appointments

Term of office (some renewable) or
Lifelong
Guaranteed

Uncertain
Ad hoc - based on appointments
Based on peculiarities of the appointment e.g.
the length of proceedings, etc., decided by
adjudicators and paid by the parties
Irregular
Schedules and fees, parties agree, caps applied
None

Annual adjustments
Protection against reduction
Neither low nor excessive
Guaranteed pension
Salaries - publicly known

Either too low or excessive
None
Salaries - confidential, disclosed at discretion

1. Domestic Courts

a) UK Superior Courts (laws specific to England and Wales)
The UK Supreme Court judges hold their offices during good behaviour up to the age of seventy.706
Likewise, judges of the Senior Courts - the Court of Appeal and the High Court707 - hold their
offices during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy unless they vacate the office
earlier.708 Judges cannot be removed from their offices, except for serious misconduct and only by
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Her Majesty on the Address presented to Her by both Houses of Parliament.709 Despite the
existence of this practice in England and Wales since the Act of Settlement (1700), no attempts to
remove Senior or Supreme court judges have been exercised yet.710

The UK Supreme Court and the Senior Courts judges are entitled to salaries and allowances set by
legislative acts and generally remunerated according to the salary groups to which they belong.711
These salaries can be increased but not reduced.712 Current as well as historical sets of salaries are
publicly available on the Ministry of Justice website.713 The level of remuneration (salary and
allowances) is determined by the Lord Chancellor714 on the recommendation made by an
independent Senior Salaries Review Body (SSRB).715 Sets of salaries specify a salary for a given
group and for whom such group applies. For example, in 2018-2019,716 the President of the
Supreme Court falls into the salary group 1.1 with annual salary of GBP 229,592, the Justices of
the Supreme Court and the Chancellor of the High Court fall into salary group 2 with GBP 221,757,
and the Puisne Judges of the High Court717 fall in the salary group 4 with GBP 185,197.718 In
addition to base salaries, all judges are entitled to a pension.719 For example, judges who retire
after they have served 20 or more years or after they have reached the age of 70 receive one half
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of their final annual salary.720 If they retire earlier, they receive a reduced amount according to a
pre-defined rate.721 The use of set salaries implies that the length of proceedings does not determine
judges’ remuneration.

Table 28: The UK Superior Courts - Adjudicative Security
Remuneration
(publicly available)

Tenure

Peculiarities of
proceedings

Yes
The UK
Superior
Courts*

Until the retirement age of
70.
(A judge cannot be
removed from office
unless for serious
misconduct.)

•
•
•
•

Set salaries and allowances
Annual adjustments
Salaries during the term of office cannot be reduced
Pension (a half of the last salary or at appropriate rate)

Irrelevant

*The UK Supreme Court and High Courts of England and Wales.

b) US Supreme Court
According to the United States Constitution, Justices of the Supreme Court have lifetime tenure
“during good behavior”722 and may only be removed from office through a process of
Congressional impeachment for the conduct of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors.723 This lifetime tenure brings financial security. Judicial salaries including their
increases are set by the legislature724 and publicly available.725 Judges are remunerated according
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to annually adjusted pay schedules.726 These adjustments, if made during justices’ continuance in
office, may only increase but not reduce their salaries.727 For instance, as of January 2019, the base
salary of the Chief Justice is US$ 270,700, whereas in the preceding year it was US$ 267,000.728
The same rule applies for the associate justices whose base salary in 2019 is US$ 258,900, whereas
in the preceding year it was US$ 255,300.729

Moreover, after reaching the qualifying age and terms of service justices are entitled to a
pension.730 There is the so-called “Rule of 80” - the retirement age and the years served must add
up to 80 - that each Justice must satisfy.731 Accordingly, the minimum years served for those of
age 70 is 10, whereas Justices who decide to retire at the age of 65 must have served 15 years.
During the remainder of their lifetime, Justices are entitled to receive an annuity equal to the salary
they received at the time they retired.732 Alternatively, a Justice may decide to retain the office and
only retire from the regular active service.733 In turn, after performing a range of required tasks,
the person will receive the same annual salary as when in active service. 734 A pension is also
guaranteed to Justices retiring because they are disabled from performing their duties.735 Justices
have also other benefits, for instance, an option to enrol in a federal health insurance plan.736 For
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remuneration, since the use of the set salaries, the length of proceedings is irrelevant.
Consequently, Justices have no financial incentive to tamper with their length.

Table 29: The US Supreme Court - Adjudicative Security
Remuneration
(publicly available)

Tenure
Yes
The US
Supreme
Court

Until retirement age and years of
service according to the Rule of 80*
(A judge cannot be removed from
office unless for serious misconduct.)

•
•
•
•

Set salaries and allowances
Annual adjustments
Salaries during the term of office cannot be
reduced
Pension (if qualified the same amount as the
last salary or lower)

Peculiarities of
proceedings

Irrelevant

*E.g. earliest age 65 + 15 years of service or at latest at age of 70 + 10 years of service.

c) Analysis
The senior courts in the UK and the US employ similar safeguards (see Table 30). Senior judges
have secure tenure and cannot be removed from offices except for particularly serious misconduct.
In both countries the retirement age is 70, with some exceptions. In terms of remuneration, salaries
are based on legislated scales that are annually adjusted. To protect against uncertainties, these
annual adjustments cannot lead to a reduction of salaries. Judges in both countries are protected
by pension schemes and as well they may receive some other benefits – such as allowances, and a
federal health insurance scheme. Despite the extensive range of similarities, the pension amount
for senior judges varies substantially between the two countries. In the UK, the maximum a senior
judge can receive is one-half of the final annual salary, whereas in the US the amount is equal.
Due to the use of scaled salaries, peculiarities of proceedings - especially their length - do not
affect the amount of remuneration. This mechanism acts as a prevention against potential conflicts
of interest. This use of robust measures suggests that domestic courts have strong remunerative
safeguards.
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Table 30: Domestic Courts - Adjudicative Security
Remuneration
(publicly available)

Tenure
Yes
The UK
Superior
Courts*

The US
Supreme
Court

Until the retirement age of 70.
(A judge cannot be removed
from office unless for serious
misconduct.)
Yes
Until retirement age and years
of service according to the Rule
of 80*
(A judge cannot be removed
from office unless for serious
misconduct.)

•
•
•
•

Set salaries and allowances
Annual adjustments
Salaries during the term of office cannot be reduced
Pension (a half of the last salary or lower)

•
•
•
•

Set salaries and allowances (insurance scheme)
Annual adjustments
Salaries during the term of office cannot be reduced
Pension (if qualified the same amount as the last
salary or lower)

Peculiarities of
proceedings

Irrelevant

Irrelevant

*The UK Supreme Court and High Courts of England and Wales.

2. European Courts

a) ECHR
The ECHR has 47 permanent judges.737 Judges are elected for a non-renewable term of nine
years.738 The term of office ends when judges reach nine years of service or age of 70.739 No judge
can be dismissed from office unless the judge ceased to fulfill conditions required by the office.740
A decision to dismiss a judge can only be made by a majority of two-thirds of all judges.741

737

David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment
Policy Community (2012) OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2012/03 at 11. See “Composition of
the Court”, supra note 428.
738
ECHR Convention, supra note 164; Protocol No 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 13 May 2004 (entered into force 1 June 2010). See “Composition of the Court”, supra note
428.
739
ECHR Convention, art 23(2).
740
Ibid, art 23(4).
741
Ibid.
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Financial security accompanies the term of office. Tenured judges are paid from the budget of the
Council of Europe that is financed by states’ contributions.742 In addition to annually adjusted basic
salaries, judges are paid allowances and expenses.743 Above the basic salaries, the President, VicePresidents of the Court and the Presidents of Sections receive additional annually adjusted
remuneration.744 In contrast, judges ad hoc receive 1/365th of the annual salary payable to the
ECHR permanent judges for each day of their service.745 Basic salaries, additional remuneration
and all annual adjustments follow the scale for and adjustments to salaries of Council of Europe
staff members based in France.746 Annual adjustments are recommended by the Co-ordinating
Committee on Remuneration (CCR) and typically increase the amount previously received. Yet in
2016, the Ministers’ Deputies adopted a remuneration adjustment procedure that allows the
Committee of Ministers in specific budgetary or economic circumstances leading to a significant
reduction in the Organization budget747 to accept annual adjustments recommended by the CCR
in part or not at all.748 Considering these adjustments, in 2014 the basic monthly salary was EUR
14,464.04,749 and in 2016, it amounted to EUR 14,767.80.750 In 2017 and 2018 the CCR’s proposed

742

Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 737 at 71. See Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Resolution on the
status and conditions of service of judges of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Commissioner for
Human Rights CM/Res(2009)5, (2009), arts 3, 4, and 10 [Resolution CM/Res(2009)5] as amended by Resolutions
CM/Res(2013)4, and CM/Res(2015)5 and having regard to Resolution Res(2004)50 on the status and conditions of
service of judges of the European Court of Human Rights, (2004).
743
Resolution CM/Res(2009)5; Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Decision CM/Del/Dec(2018)1330/11.1,
at para 5.
744
Resolution CM/Res(2009)5, supra note 742, art 3(3). Additional annual remuneration in 2009 for the President of
the Court was EUR 13,885 and for the Vice-Presidents of the Court and the Presidents of Sections it was EUR 6,942
adjusted according to adjustments made to salaries of the staff in France.
745
Ibid, art 12; Resolution Res(2004)50 on the status and conditions of service of judges of the European Court of
Human Rights, (2004), Appendix II, art 1(1).
746
Resolution CM/Res(2009)5, art 3(1).
747
For instance, the withdrawal of or a default of payment by one or more member countries.
748
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Decision CM/Del/Dec(2016)1268/11.5.
749
“Judge of the European Court of Human Rights with Respect to Ireland” (16 September 2016), online:
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade <www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/intpriorities/humanrights/judgeechr/Information-Note-16-September-2014.pdf>.
750
The gross monthly salary was EUR 16,613.78 (a basic salary of EUR 14,767.80 and a displacement allowance of
EUR 1,845.98): see “Judge of the European Court of Human Rights” (4 January 2016), online: Judicial
Appointments Commission <www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/vacancies/018>; See also “Judge of the European
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adjustments to EUR 15,442.25 and EUR 15,640.62 respectively. However, due to an economic
crisis and following this new adjustment procedure, the Committee of Ministers, did not approve
these proposed adjustments.751

Further, judges who have completed at least five years of service can elect to join the Council of
Europe pension scheme.752 There are two applicable scenarios: (1) judges with more than five but
less than ten years of service can elect whether to take this retirement pension or a lump sum; (2)
judges who have served more than ten years receive the retirement pension.753 In contrast, judges
with less than five years of service are only entitled to a leaving allowance.754 The maximum rate
of the pension cannot exceed 70 percent of the last base salary grade.755

Since judges cannot engage in outside business,756 they are fully dedicated to ECHR cases.757 In
2001, the average length of proceedings was over three years.758 Another study in 2005 found that

Court of Human Rights - Information Pack” (2016), online: Judicial Appointments Commission
<www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/sites/default/files/sync/basic_page/information_pack_final_0.pdf>. Staff
Regulations publicly available do not reproduce the applicable salary scales.
751
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Decision CM/Del/Dec(2017)1300/11.4 at paras 1 and 4: A decision
not to award the CCR’s proposed annual adjustments. See also Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers,
Documents CM(2017)123-add2: Salary adjustment proposals that set out the basic salary scales. Council of Europe,
Committee of Ministers, Decision CM/Del/Dec(2018)1330/11.1 at paras 1 and 5: A decision not to award the CCR’s
proposed annual adjustments.; See also Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Documents CM(2018)137 at
Annex 4: The CCR’s proposed annual salary adjustment.
752
Resolution CM/Res(2009)5, art 10(1). The detailed rules for the Pension Scheme are set out in Appendices V, V
bis, and V ter to the Staff Regulations, 2019 as amended by Resolution CM/Res(2019)1 and read in conjunction
with Resolution CM/Res(2009)5 as amended.
753
Ibid the Staff Regulations, Appendix V bis and Appendix V ter.
754
Resolution CM/Res(2009)5, art 10(1).
755
Calculation of the amount of pension of the ECHR judges follows the Council of Europe Staff Regulations based
in France. See Council of Europe Staff Regulations, (2019) Appendix V, art 10, Appendix V bis, art 10, and
Appendix V ter, art 10, online: Council of Europe
<publicsearch.coe.int/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680782c27#_Toc1483406>.
756
ECHR Convention, art 21(3).
757
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 737 at 11.
758
Frédéric Edel, The length of civil and criminal proceedings in the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights, 2nd ed, Human rights files No 16 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2007) at 102.
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while about three-quarters of the applications were pending for no more than two years, some other
proceedings lasted longer than three or even five years.759 Also, there are no time limits for full
rehearing before Grand Chamber.760 Since remuneration is based on salary scales and not on
peculiarities of particular proceedings, their average length is irrelevant (except for the ad hoc
judges). Yet, despite financial benefits the ad hoc judges might have from prolonged proceedings,
they have limited power to influence their length.

Table 31: ECHR - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
(non-renewable)
Yes
The
ECHR

Remuneration
(publicly available)
•

Nine years or until age of 70.*
(No dismissal unless judge
unsuitable to fulfill conditions
of the office.)

•
•

Set salaries and emoluments paid by the Council of
Europe
Annual adjustments (increase the amount)
Pension (if elected cannot exceed 70 percent of the
last annual base salary)

Peculiarities of
proceedings

Irrelevant

*Whichever comes first.

b) CJEU
All judges of the CJEU - 28 judges of the Court of Justice and 47 in the General Court - are
appointed for a renewable six-year term.761 The Court Presidents elected by judges in each Court
serve a renewable three-year term.762 During the term of office, a judge may be deprived of office

759

Ibid at 102–103, n 522.
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 737 at 71.
761
TFEU, supra note 323, arts 253–254; TEU, supra note 321, art 19(2).
762
See “Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)” (16 June 2016), online: European Union
<europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en>.
760
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only, if he or she no longer fulfills the requisite conditions or no longer meets the obligations
arising from the office, on a unanimous peer vote.763

The term of office, as is the case with ECHR judges described above, is accompanied by protection
of financial security. Salaries, allowances and pensions of individual judges are determined by
Regulations adopted by the Council of the European Union.764 Judges are remunerated according
to the posts they hold765 - judges of different ranks and court affiliation have been assigned
different percentages. The President and the Vice-President of the Court of Justice have the highest
percentages, 138 and 125 percent respectively.766 To get the basic salaries of individual posts, one
must apply each post’s percentage to the basic salary of an official of the Union with the highest
step and grade (of the highest civil service grade).767 Salaries are expressed in euros and annually
reviewed.768 The new scales are always applicable from 1st July, for instance, from July 1st, 2016,

Statute of the CofJ, supra note 455, art 6. See also Udo Bux, “The Court of Justice of the European Union”
(October 2018), online: Fact Sheets on the European Union: European Parliament
<www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/26/the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union> at para 2(b).
764
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/300 of 29 February 2016 determining the emoluments of EU high-level public
office holders, 29 February 2016, OJ, L 58/1 (entered into force 4 March 2016) [Council Regulation (EU)
2016/300].
765
Ibid, art 2; Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the staff Regulations of officials and the conditions
of employment of other servants of the European Economic Community and the European atomic energy
Community, 14 June 1962, OJ 45/1387, art 62 [Regulation No 31] as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No
1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending the Staff Regulations of
Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, 22
October 2013, OJ, L 287/15 (entered into force partially 1 November 2013 and partially 1 January 2014).
766
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/300, supra note 764 art 2: for example, President, Vice-President and other judges
of the Court of Justice get 138%, 125% and 112.5% of the basic salary respectively while President, Vice-President
and other judges of the General Court get 112.5%, 108% and 104% respectively.
767
Ibid art 2: it is “the third step of grade 16”. See also Regulation No 31, art 66 as amended by 2018 Annual update
of the remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants of the European Union and the correction
coefficients applied thereto, 14 December 2018, OJ, C 451/4, s 1.1 [2018 Annual update]: applicable from 1 July
2018.
768
Regulation No 31, arts 63, and 65-66.
763
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the basic salary was EUR 19,587.99,769 in 2017 it was 19,881.81,770 whereas in 2018 it was
20,219.80.771 In addition to the basic annual salaries, judges get various allowances as well as
reimbursement of their travel expenses.772

Further, the financial security of the CJEU judges is supported by a pension scheme773 also
annually updated.774 Judges are entitled to their pension either after they have served at least ten
years or after they reach the pensionable age of 66.775 The amount is based on final salary and
depends on the number of years and months served.776 The maximum amount is 70 percent of the
judge’s final basic salary.777 Judges may start to draw their pensions six years before pensionable
age at a reduced rate.778 As far as the length of proceedings is concerned, in 2018, the reported
average of the Court of Justice was around 15 months, and of the General Court, it was less than
17 months.779 Yet as judges are remunerated based on the salary scales, the length of proceedings
is irrelevant.

769

2016 Annual update of the remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants of the European Union
and the correction coefficients applied thereto, 14 December 2016, OJ, C 466/5, s 1.1.
770
2017 Annual update of the remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants of the European Union
and the correction coefficients applied thereto, 14 December 2017, OJ, C 429/9, s 1.1.
771
2018 Annual update, supra note 767 s 1.1.
772
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/300, supra note 764 art 4–10.
773
Ibid, art 11.
774
Regulation No 31, arts 65–66 as amended by 2018 Annual update, supra note 767.
775
Regulation No 31, art 77.
776
Ibid, art 77; Council Regulation (EU) 2016/300, supra note 764, arts 11–12.
777
Regulation No 31, art 77.
778
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/300, supra note 764, art 11.
779
Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release, No 36/18 “Judicial statistics 2017: the number of cases
brought has once again exceeded 1 600” (23 March 2018), online: Court of Justice of the European Union Press
Release <curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7052/en/?annee=2018>; Court of Justice of the European Union, Press
Release, No 34/2016 “Statistics concerning judicial activity in 2015: new records in terms of productivity and cases
brought for the Court of Justice of the European Union” (18 March 2016), online: Court of Justice of the European
Union <curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7052/en/?annee=2016>: Since 2015, the length of proceedings has
decreased.
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Table 32: CJEU* - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
(non-renewable)
Yes
The
CJEU

Remuneration
(publicly available)
•

A renewable six-year term
(Dismissal only if the judge is
no longer fulfilling the
requirements of the office.)

•
•

Set salaries and emoluments (allowances,
reimbursed expenses, etc.) by the Council of the
European Union based on scales
Annual adjustments (increase the amount)
Pension (the maximum amount is 70 percent of the
final basic salary)

Peculiarities of
proceedings

Irrelevant

*The Court of Justice & the General Court.

c) Analysis
Both courts - the ECHR and CJEU - employ similar personal safeguards, see Table 33. They
protect their judges by the security of tenure although their terms differ. The ECHR affords nine
years of a non-renewable term or service until the age of 70, whereas the CJEU has a renewable
six-year term. During the term, dismissal - applicable to both courts - is possible only if the judge
no longer fulfills the requirements of the office. Yet the specific conditions for removal differ in
that the ECHR requires a vote of two-thirds of all judges, whereas the CJEU requires a unanimous
peer vote.

Judges of these courts receive guaranteed remunerative schemes that include salaries, other
emoluments, and a pension. In each case, the amount is decided by the executive branch;
respectively, the Council of Europe or the Council of the European Union. Remunerations are set
by resolutions or regulations of the appropriate council. Salaries as well as pensions are based on
prescribed scales and annual adjustments. Pension schemes are available for those who complete
an appropriate length of service or reach the required pensionable age. The maximum pension
cannot exceed 70 percent of the last annual base salary. The calculation of remuneration is complex
yet its individual components are generally publicly available. Since the use of these elaborate
protections, remuneration is independent of peculiarities of individual proceedings.
161

Table 33: European Courts - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
(non-renewable)
Yes
The
ECHR

The
CJEU**

Remuneration
(publicly available)
•

Nine years or until age of 70.*
(No dismissal unless judge
unsuitable to fulfill conditions
of the office.)
Yes

•
•
•

A renewable six-year term
(Dismissal only if the judge is
no longer fulfilling the
requirements of the office.)

•
•

Peculiarities of
proceedings

Set salaries and emoluments paid by the Council of
Europe
Annual adjustments (increase the amount)
Pension (if elected cannot exceed 70 percent of the
last annual base salary)

Irrelevant

Set salaries and emoluments (allowances,
reimbursed expenses, etc.) by the Council of the
European Union based on scales by legislative acts
Annual adjustments (increase the amount)
Pension (the maximum amount is 70 percent of the
final basic salary)

Irrelevant

*Whichever comes first. **The Court of Justice & the General Court.

3. International Judicial and Quasi-judicial Bodies

a) ICJ
ICJ permanent judges are elected for a renewable nine-year term.780 A tenured judge cannot be
dismissed unless in the unanimous opinion of other members of the Court he or she no longer
fulfills conditions required for the office.781 Financial security is part of the term of office - an
annual salary,782 allowances, and refunds of travel expenses, all tax-free783 - fixed by the UN
General Assembly.784 During the term, remuneration cannot be reduced.785 The annual salary
consists of a base salary set in 2017 at US$ 174,742 plus an allowance of up to US$ 25,000 for the
President.786 At the end of their service, ICJ judges receive an annual pension equal to half of the

780

Statute of the International Court of Justice, (1945) ICJ Acts & Doc 6, art 13 [Statute of the ICJ].
Ibid, art 18(1); Rules of Court, (1978) ICJ Acts & Doc 6, art 6 [Rules of Court] (as amended in 2005).
782
Statute of the ICJ, art 32(1).
783
Ibid, art 32 (7).
784
Ibid, art 32.
785
Ibid, art 32(1)–(5).
786
International Court of Justice, CIJ Annuaire-ICJ Yearbook 2016-2017, No 71, (The Hague: International Court of
Justice, 2017) at 46–47; Conditions of service and compensation for officials other than Secretariat officials:
members of the International Court of Justice and judges and ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: resolution / adopted by the General
Assembly, GA Res 65/258, UNGAOR, 65th Sess, Suppl No 49, UN Doc A/RES/65/258 (2011) at para 6.
781
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annual salary.787 In contrast, ad hoc judges, such as those of nationalities of disputing parties, are
compensated for each day on which they exercise their functions.788 They are paid 1/365th of the
annual base salary and an interim cost-of-living supplement.789 Since the permanent judges have
set salaries, the length of proceedings is not relevant to their remuneration.790 Although the ad hoc
judges might benefit from prolonged proceedings, they have limited power to influence their
length.

On top of that, during the term of office, the permanent judges could at one time earn additional
substantive income by deciding ISDS cases.791 To July 2017, sitting ICJ judges reportedly sat as
arbitrators in 78 ISDS cases, about 10 percent of all known ISDS cases.792 In all concluded ISDS
cases which listed arbitrator fees (7 out of 14 cases), individual ICJ judges received on average
US$ 159,000 per case.793 In other ISDS cases ICJ judges are likely to receive on average US$
426,000.794 This role brought substantial financial supplements for their fixed remuneration at the
ICJ and in practice weakened the ICJ’s safeguards of adjudicative independence and
impartiality.795 ICJ judges could also benefit from working less at the court, undermining their
apparent dedication to the ICJ workload.796 The ICJ is an influential international adjudicative
body, thus there is also an implication of this practice for other international adjudicative bodies.

787

Statute of the ICJ, art 32(7).
Ibid, art 32(4).
789
International Court of Justice, supra 786 at 46–47.
790
International Court of Justice, Report of the International Court of Justice: 1 August 2017-31 July 2018, A/73/4
(New York: UN, 2018) at para 13; International Court of Justice, Report of the International Court of Justice: 1
August 2016-31 July 2017, A/72/4 (New York: UN, 2017) at para 13: Proceedings have been relatively short, “the
period between the closure of the oral proceedings and the reading of a Judgment by the Court … on average …
does not exceed six months.”
791
Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Brauch, supra note 328.
792
Ibid, at 1.
793
Ibid, at 2–3.
794
Ibid.
795
Ibid, at 4.
796
Ibid.
788
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This side work could also influence judges’ decision-making in cases before the ICJ if they have
an interest in ISDS appointments.797 Similarly, there is a problem with their independence and
impartiality if they decide challenges of other co-arbitrators or if they select arbitrators to sit in
ISDS who may in future select the ICJ judges as arbitrators.798 In light of these issues, it was
appropriate to end this practice,799 as the ICJ recently did. Notably, the ICJ Statute maintains that
judges may not ‘engage in any other occupation of a professional nature’.800

Table 34: ICJ - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
(non-renewable)

The ICJ

Remuneration
(publicly available)

Yes

•

Permanent judges elected for a
renewable nine-year term.

•
•

(Judges cannot be dismissed
unless they no longer fulfill
conditions required for the office.)

Set salaries, allowances and compensation fixed by the General Assembly based on scales
Annual adjustments (cannot lead to a reduction)
Pension (half of the base annual salary)

Peculiarities of
proceedings

Irrelevant except
for ad hoc judges

(Ad-hoc judges paid for each day - 1/365 of base
annual salary of permanent judges plus interim costof-living supplement).

b) WTO
As noted, the WTO Secretariat maintains an indicative list of qualified governmental and nongovernmental individuals,801 from which panelists may be drawn.802 As it is an indicative list, these
panelists, just like external ones, do not enjoy security of tenure; their primary employment may
be as government officials, academics, in the private sector or even in ISDS. In practice, many

797

Ibid, at 5.
Ibid.
799
“IISD Welcomes ICJ Judges’ Decision to no Longer Participate in Investor–State Arbitration” (27 October
2018), online: IISD <www.iisd.org/media/iisd-welcomes-icj-judges-decision-no-longer-participate-investor-statearbitration> [“IISD Welcomes ICJ Judges’ Decision”].
800
Statute of the ICJ, art 16.
801
DSU, art 8.
802
Ibid, art 8.4. See also Johannesson & Mavroidis, supra note 533 at 3.2.1.
798
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panelists are members of delegations to the WTO.803 In contrast, Appellate Body members are
appointed for a four-year term with a possibility of one renewal.804 Despite the four-year term, the
Appellate Body members do not work as full-time WTO employees but commonly work as
academics or in the private sector.805 Since panelists and Appellate Body members are not regarded
as full-time employees, they are not part of the WTO’s pension plan.806

Panelists and the Appellate Body members do not receive any compensation from the parties 807
but, despite the panelists’ untenured nature and the Appellate Body members’ nonemployee status,
are paid from the WTO budget.808 This method of remuneration assures that there is no financial
link between the parties and their adjudicators that might potentially adversely impact the
independence and impartiality of the latter.

The panelists’ remuneration, typically paid in Swiss francs (CHF),809 depends on whether they are
governmental, or non-governmental officials. Before 2016, non-governmental panelists were paid
a daily fee of CHF 600, whereas the governmental officials, commonly appointed by the WTO to
keep its budget low, received no fee apart from a subsistence or per diem and capped
reimbursement of expenses.810 This difference in fees comes from the understanding that

Johannesson & Mavroidis, supra note 533 at 3.2.1. See also “Dispute Settlement System Training Module”,
supra note 529, s 6.3 at 2.
804
DSU, art 17(2).
805
Pauwelyn, supra note 196 at 20.
806
Ibid at 21.
807
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 737 at 71.
808
DSU, arts 8(11), and 17(8).
809
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, Financial Rules of the World Trade Organization (22
February 2017) WTO Doc WT/L/157/Rev.2 at para 7.7(d), online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org>.
810
DSU, art 8(11). See also Louise Johannesson & Petros C Mavroidis, “Black Cat, White Cat: The Identity of the
WTO Judges” (2015) Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), IFN Working Paper, No 1066 at para 2.1.3.
803
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governmental panelists are paid for their services by the governments that employ them.811 The
WTO, however, has developed a practice allowing governmental officials who are doing their
panelist work outside of normal office hours (for example, on weekends) to get the same
compensation as their non-governmental colleagues.812 In 2016-2017, the level of fees changed:
fees for non-governmental panelists increased from CHF 600 to CHF 900; a daily fee of CHF 300
for governmental ones was introduced.813

As Appellate Body members are elected for four years, they receive a monthly retainer as well as
daily fees plus travel expenses and an allowance for meals and accommodation.814 Since the
introduction of the Appellate Body, the monthly retainer for the member’s availability and a daily
fee (originally set at CHF 7,000 and CHF 600 respectively) have increased. For instance, in 2011,
the retainer fee was CHF 9,031 plus CHF 330 for administrative expenses.815 The daily fees in
following years were reported to reach CHF 780.816

811

Pauwelyn, supra note 196 at 21.
Ibid at 20 (note 87): In 2015, it was CHF 600.
813
See 2018-2019 Budget Proposals by the Director-General, WTO Doc WT/BFA/W/427/Rev.1 para 3.23, online:
WTO <docsonline.wto.org> [2018-2019 Budget Proposals].
814
DSU, arts 8(11), and 17(8); “WTO Analytical Index: DSU – Article 8 (Practice)” (December 2018), online: WTO
<www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/ai17_e.htm> at para 1.1. Establishment of the Appellate Body:
Recommendations by the Preparatory Committee for the WTO approved by the Dispute Settlement Body on 10
February 1995 (19 June 1995), WTO Doc WT/DSB/1 at para 12, online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org>. See also
“Letter from the Chairman of the Appellate Body” in Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, Appellate
Body Members (18 March 2004), WTO Doc WT/BFA/W/109, online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org>; Appellate Body
Members (25 June 2004), WTO Doc WT/BFA/W/118 at 1, online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org>. In 1995 allowance
for meals and accommodation was set at CHF 435 and for administrative expenses CHF 300.
815
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, Dispute Settlement Expenditure (7 March 2011), WTO Doc
WT/BFA/W/228 at para 11, online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org>.
816
Filippo Fontanelli et al, “Lights and Shadows of the WTO-Inspired International Court System of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement” (2016) 1:1 Eur Inv L Arb Rev 189 at 54; See also Johannesson & Mavroidis, supra note 810 at
para 1.2.3.
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In 2015, before the increase of fees, Pauwelyn claimed that “600 CHF per day for nongovernmental panelists is not an attractive fee for high profile/ status individuals outside of the
government, especially private lawyers” and that the same was true for the Appellate Body
members.817 Although there was an increase in the remuneration, it seems that the increase may
still not be attractive enough for these high profile individuals. For this fees structure, the length
of proceedings is a relevant element for one’s remuneration. Proceedings of the Appellate Body
generally should not exceed 60 days; if a delay is necessary, then they in no case may exceed 90
days.818 According to a study in 2015, the Appellate Body generally meets the 90-day deadline.819
In contrast, a panel should generally issue its final report within six months or in cases of urgency
within three months from the date of its composition or the agreement of the terms of reference.820
It is possible for the panel to exceed these time limits by writing to the DSB with the reasons for
the extension and the estimated time it needs to issue the report. In no case, should the time exceed
nine months.821 Yet, in practice, these panel proceedings last 12 months on average.822 Since fees
are calculated daily, the lengthier the proceedings, the higher the fees. These limits, though,
suggest that there is a cap on daily fees per case and on the number of cases one can hear per year.
Also, their capped nature puts some restraints to temptations to increase the length artificially.
Overall, the WTO remuneration schemes indicate that panelists are less personally protected and
more vulnerable to different incentives and temptations than the Appellate Body members.
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Pauwelyn, supra note 196 at 21.
DSU, art 17(5).
819
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 737 at 59, and 71.
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DSU, art 12(8).
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Ibid, art 12(9).
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“Dispute Settlement System Training Module”, supra note 529, s 6.3 at 5. See also World Trade Organization, A
Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 2nd ed (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017) at
76–77 [WTO Handbook]: In this book, the WTO reports 11 months on average.
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Table 35: WTO - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
(non-renewable)
No
Panelists

Governmental or nongovernmental officials

Remuneration
(publicly available)
Daily fees fixed and paid by the WTO
•
Governmental officials - CHF 300 daily fee
•
Non-governmental officials - CHF 900 daily fee
•
No pension

Yes
Appellate
Body
members

Appointed for 4 years - with
one possible renewal.
(Commonly engage in other
work - academic, private, etc.)

Monthly retainer and daily fees fixed and paid by the WTO
•
Monthly retainer: CHF 7,000
•
Daily fee: CHF 600
•
No pension

Peculiarities of
proceedings
The length affects
daily fees.
The length affects
daily fees.
Capped daily fees
(max 90-day
trials)

c) Analysis
Between the ICJ and WTO, the protection of individual security for adjudicators vary. The
strongest level of protection is provided by the ICJ, where judges have security of tenure with a
possibility of re-election, a stable base annual salary that cannot be decreased during the term, and
paid allowances and travel expenses. After leaving the court, the financial security of the tenured
judges does not end but continues through a pension scheme. This form of personal protection that
reaches beyond the term of service gives judges peace of mind about their future, which means
less room for improper influences. With set salaries, the peculiarities of the proceedings do not
influence the amount of judges’ remuneration.

The WTO’s protections are more mixed. While the Appellate Body members have secure tenure
for four-year terms with a possibility of one renewal, WTO panelists are selected ad hoc from
either an indicative list or an external source. Thus, not all WTO adjudicators are protected by
tenure, although all of them do get some level of predefined compensation. Appellate Body
members get a monthly retainer, daily fees and travel refunds but are not regarded as full-time
employees and are not covered by the WTO pension scheme. They can and frequently do work in
the academic or private sectors or as arbitrators for ICSID. Since WTO panelists do not have secure
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tenure, they are paid daily fees only when appointed. Both governmental and non-governmental
panelists are typically engaged in another type of income-generating activity. The former panelists
work for the governments of WTO Member States; the latter work in the academic or private
sector. As such, panelists’ income from WTO adjudicative activities is only a supplement to other
income. The lack of a pension for panelists likewise entails a lack of financial security beyond the
terms of present service. In disputes, the WTO protects the independence and impartiality of
Appellate Body members and panelists by prescribing a maximum length for proceedings. This
method not only ensures speedy proceedings but also limits adjudicators’ personal incentives by
capping their fees. Yet the maximum length for panelists is longer and in practice exceeded by
several months. Since the WTO provides some personal protections to Appellate Body members
and very little, if any, to panelists, they are, thus, more vulnerable to external pressure. Despite the
stronger protections of Appellate Body members, they do not reach the level of protection provided
by the ICJ.

Table 36: International Judicial and Quasi-judicial Bodies - Adjudicative Security

The ICJ

WTO
Panelists

Tenure
(non-renewable)
Yes

Remuneration
(publicly available)
•

Permanent judges elected for a
renewable nine-year term except ad hoc judges.

•
•

Set salaries, allowances and compensation - fixed by
the General Assembly based on scales
Annual adjustments (cannot lead to a reduction)
Pension (half of the base annual salary)

(Judges cannot be dismissed
unless they no longer fulfill
required conditions.)

(Ad-hoc judges paid for each day - 1/365 of base annual
salary of permanent judges plus interim cost-of-living
supplement).

No

Daily fees fixed and paid by the WTO
•
Governmental officials - CHF 300 daily fee
•
Non-governmental officials - CHF 900 daily fee
•
No pension

Governmental or nongovernmental officials
Yes

Appellate
Body
members

Appointed for 4 years - with
one possible renewal.
(No full-employee status commonly engage in other
work - academic, private, etc.)

Monthly retainer and daily fees fixed and paid by the WTO
•
Monthly retainer: CHF 7,000
•
Daily fee: CHF 600
•
No pension
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Peculiarities of
proceedings

Irrelevant
except for ad
hoc judges

The length
affects daily
fees.
The length
affects daily
fees.
Capped daily
fees (60 or max
90-day trials)

4. Domestic and International Tribunals

a) FINRA
As noted above, FINRA arbitrators are regarded as independent contractors instead of employees.
Joining the FINRA’s database does not give arbitrators any personal security: tenure or guaranteed
monthly income. Arbitrators are paid only for cases that they decide.823 FINRA describes this type
of remuneration as a supplement to the arbitrator’s other income.824 In general, arbitrators receive
a fixed rate remuneration called “an honorarium” per one hearing session.825 In general, the
honorarium for one hearing session that lasts four hours or less826 is set at US$ 300 with an
additional US$ 125 per day for a chairperson.827 Arbitrators might receive different honoraria in
some other proceedings (US$ 350 or less)828 or get compensated for the performance of a special
task,829 for postponed hearings, etc.830 Arbitrators cannot ask parties to pay more than what they
are entitled to receive from FINRA.831 Since the honorarium depends on a variety of factors and
the total income of individual persons is not public, one can only estimate the base amount. In
regular proceedings, arbitrators get US$ 600 (two sessions - US$ 300 each), whereas the
chairperson receives US$ 725 a day.832 In 2017, FINRA reported that proceedings last 14 months
on average.833 It is, though, not clear how many sessions per these proceedings arbitrators had

Customer Code, supra note 335, r 12214; Industry Code, supra note 335, r 13214. See also “Honorarium” (last
visited 28 May 2019), online: FINRA <www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/honorarium> [“Honorarium”].
824
“Become a FINRA Arbitrator”, supra note 558.
825
Customer Code, r 12214(a); and Industry Code, r 13214(a).
826
Customer Code, r 12100(p); and Industry Code, r 13100(p).
827
Customer Code, r 12214(a); and Industry Code, r 13214(a).
828
Customer Code, rs 12214(c), 12800(f); and Industry Code, rs 13214(c), 13800(f), 13806(f).
829
Customer Code, r 12214(d); and Industry Code, r 13214(d): For example, a chairperson who writes a detailed
decision will receive US$ 400.
830
Customer Code, r 12214(a); and Industry Code, r 13214(a).
831
“Honorarium”, supra note 823.
832
Supra note 830.
833
FINRA, 2017 FINRA Annual Financial Report (Washington, 2018) at 41, and 43, online: FINRA
<www.finra.org/about/annual-reports-financials#annual-reports>.
823
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served. The number of appointments, the length of proceedings and the number of sessions served
all play a role in arbitrators’ remuneration. Although arbitrators may possibly influence the length
of proceedings and, thus, the number of sessions, the FINRA’s neutral selection system suggests
that arbitrators are unlikely to be able to influence their appointments.

Table 37: FINRA - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
•
No
FINRA

•

Arbitrators as independent
contractors.
•

Remuneration
(Not publicly available)*
Ad hoc - A supplement to an individual’s other
income
Honorarium per hearings + per specific activities
performed set and paid by FINRA after the SEC
approval (no parties involved)
No pension

Peculiarities of
proceedings
The number of
appointments and the
number of sessions
served both affect the
arbitrator’s
remuneration.

*Final salaries of individual arbitrators.

b) WIPO
As noted above, the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center maintains a list of more than 1500
neutrals834 - arbitrators, mediators, and experts - from more than 100 countries.835 This list serves
as a database from which the Center and the parties might but do not have to select the arbitrators.
Being on the list does not provide security of tenure or financial security in any way, nor does it
guarantee appointments. Remuneration depends on peculiarities and the number of cases
individual arbitrators adjudicate. WIPO has several sets of schedules of fees, for general and
specialized arbitrations, all expressed in US dollars.836 Calculation of hourly or daily fee rates in
each case follows the applicable WIPO’s Schedule of Fees and is fixed by the Center after

“WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center” (last visited 29 May 2019), online:
<www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/background.html>.
835
WIPO Handbook, supra note 331, at para 4.165.
836
AGICOA (meaning the Association of International Collective Management of Audiovisual Works) and
Expedited Arbitration for Film and Media are examples of specialised arbitrations. See, for instance, “AGICOA Schedule of Arbitration Fees and Costs” (last visited 19 June 2019), online: <www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/specificsectors/agicoa/expedited-arbitration/fees.html>.
834
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consultation with the arbitrators, and the parties.837 In its calculation, the Center takes into account
various factors: the amount in dispute; the number of parties; the complexity of the case; the status
of the arbitrator; and any special qualifications required of the arbitrator.838 The minimum hourly
rate is set at US$ 300 but can go up to US$ 600.839 In Emergency Relief Proceedings there is a cap
at US$ 20,000, and in Expedited Arbitration for the Association of International Collective
Management of Audiovisual Works (AGICOA) it is at US$ 5,000. Fixed fees are under the
Expedited Arbitration: cases of the amount up to US$ 2.5 million and over US$ 2.5 million apply
US$ 20,000 and US$ 40,000 respectively.840 Yet, based on the complexity of the case and time
spent by the arbitrator, even these fixed fees may be reduced or increased.841 Otherwise, if the
value of the case exceeds 10 million, then the amount must be agreed with the parties.842

On average, the length of proceedings under the WIPO Arbitration Rules takes 23 months, whereas
under the WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules it is seven months .843 It seems that in the calculation
of arbitrator’s fees, the length of proceedings plays only a partial role in fixed or capped fees,
whereas if they are agreed with parties as there is no cap,844 its role may be more significant.

837

WIPO Arbitration Rules, art 71; WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, art 64.
See “Schedule of Fees and Costs: WIPO Arbitration / WIPO Expedited Arbitration” (last visited 29 May 2019),
online: <www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/fees/index.html>; “Fees and Costs for WIPO Mediation and Expedited
Arbitration for Film and Media” (last visited 29 May 2019), online: <www.wipo.int/amc/en/film/fees/index.html>;
“Schedule of Fees and Costs: Emergency Relief Proceedings” (last visited 29 May 2019), online:
<www.wipo.int/amc/en/emergency-relief/fees/index.html>; and supra note 836.
839
Ibid.
840
See “Schedule of Fees and Costs: WIPO Expedited Arbitration”; and “Schedule of Fees for WIPO Mediation and
Expedited Arbitration for Film and Media”, supra note 838.
841
See supra note 838.
842
WIPO Arbitration Rules, art 69. See also Schedule of Fees and Costs: WIPO Arbitration / WIPO Expedited
Arbitration, supra note 838.
843
Ignacio de Castro & Judith Schallnau, “What does it cost to defend your IP rights?” (June 2013), online:
WIPO|Magazine <www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2013/03/article_0006.html>.
844
Such as in case of WIPO Arbitration and Expedited Arbitration (in cases where the claimed amount is over
$10M).
838
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Table 38: WIPO - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
No
WIPO

Only an
indicative
database

Remuneration
(Not publicly available)*
•
Ad hoc - linked to cases the arbitrator adjudicates - indicative hourly fees
•
According to a schedule with some fees fixed or capped**
•
Fees of cases exceeding the amount of US$ 10M are based on agreement of
the Center, parties and arbitrators.
•
No pension
(Final fees are fixed by the Center after consultation with the arbitrators and the
parties.)

Peculiarities of
proceedings
Its length affects
the arbitrator’s
fees.

*Final salaries of individual arbitrators. **Expedited Arbitration: US$ 20,000 or 40,000 according to the amount of the case; Emergency Relief
Proceedings: US$ 20,000; Expedited Arbitration for AGICOA: US$ 5,000.

c) Analysis
Both FINRA and WIPO do not provide security of tenure. Arbitrators at both bodies have no
financial security and are paid ad hoc for disputes they are appointed to decide. At FINRA, the ad
hoc character of its remuneration scheme suggests unguaranteed, irregular, and unstable
remuneration from the arbitrator’s viewpoint. While it is possible that some arbitrators might get
frequent appointments, the system of non-tenure is unable to deliver stable and evenly spread
workloads among all enlisted. Despite this lack of tenure and financial security, FINRA safeguards
the values of adjudicative independence and impartiality by using fixed fees for set sessions that
are paid exclusively by FINRA. This arrangement excludes parties from the remunerative process
and limits the dependence of remuneration on the peculiarities of individual proceedings. In other
words, there is no direct remunerative link between the adjudicator and the parties. FINRA also
safeguards these values indirectly by using a neutral selection system.845

WIPO has also elaborated a system of remunerative schedules and fees. Yet the fact that the
scheme allows the length of proceedings to influence an arbitrator’s fees, which are moreover fixed
by the Center after consultation with parties and the arbitrator, implies a potential conflict of

845

Discussed in Chapter 4.
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interest. That implication arises because the arbitrator’s income depends on factors that the
arbitrator can influence and because of the proximity between the parties and the adjudicators’
remuneration. Therefore, while WIPO employs an elaborate system of fees, it does not shield
arbitrators from such conflicts. The only protection at WIPO, in terms of personal security, is the
use of fee schedules and, in some situations, fixed or capped fees, which all help to fix the final
fees.

FINRA and WIPO deal with cases of private horizontal relations, where parties might seek flexible
ad hoc arrangements with, in general, no public interest at stake. For such purposes, the limited
personal safeguards may seem acceptable and reasonable. Yet the fact that these bodies are arbitral
bodies does not mean that further personal protections should not be used to strengthen
adjudicative independence and impartiality. Between the two bodies, FINRA uses stronger
protections and works as an example of how strong safeguards can be employed by arbitral
administering bodies. If the protections work for one arbitral body, with appropriate modifications
they can work for others too.

Table 39: Domestic and International Tribunals - Adjudicative Security
Remuneration
(Not publicly available)*

Tenure
No
FINRA

Arbitrators as
independent
contractors.
No

WIPO

Only an
indicative
database

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Peculiarities of
proceedings

Ad hoc - A supplement to an individual’s other income
Honorarium per hearings + per specific activities performed set and paid
by FINRA after the SEC approval (no parties involved)
No pension

The number of
hearings affects
the arbitrator’s
remuneration.

Ad hoc - linked to cases the arbitrator adjudicates - indicative hourly fees
According to a schedule with some fees fixed or capped**
Fees of cases exceeding the amount of US$ 10M are based on agreement
of the Center, parties and arbitrators.
No pension

Its length affects
the arbitrator’s
fees.

(Final fees are fixed by the Center after consultation with the arbitrators and
the parties.)
*Final salaries of individual arbitrators. **Expedited Arbitration: US$ 20K or 40K according to the amount of the case; Emergency Relief
Proceedings: US$ 20K; Expedited Arbitration for AGICOA: US$ 5K.
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5. ISDS Administering Bodies

a) ICSID
As noted, ICSID has a Panel of Arbitrators from which parties may but do not have to select their
arbitrators. The existence of the Panel suggests two different schemes: one applicable to the Panel
members and another to external arbitrators. Yet from the point of their personal security these
schemes are not dissimilar. Members of the Panel of Arbitrators are appointed for a renewable sixyear term. Yet for their adjudicative roles, remuneration of the Panel members, just like the
external arbitrators, is linked to cases they adjudicate and, thus, administered ad hoc.846 Since this
membership does not guarantee evenly spread workload nor appointments (in fact, some
arbitrators may never get appointed), one can hardly speak about any arbitrator’s personal security.

Also, the arbitrator’s appointment and its interconnected remuneration are not secured even when
the arbitrator gets initially appointed. Before the tribunal’s constitution, any appointed arbitrator
may be replaced if a party requests so;847 after its constitution arbitrators can be disqualified on a
party’s proposal on the grounds of a manifest lack of qualities required for the post,848 or on the
ground that the arbitrator was ineligible to be appointed.849 In matters of disqualification, other
members of the tribunal vote.850 If votes are equally divided, unless parties agree otherwise, the
final decision is made by the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council.851 As an example of
parties choice serves Perenco v Ecuador and Petroecuador852 where parties agreed that any

846

ICSID Convention, art 15(1).
ICSID Arbitration Rules, r 7; ICSID AFR, art 12.
848
ICSID AFR, arts 14–15.
849
ICSID Convention, art 57.
850
Ibid, 58; ICSID Arbitration Rules, r 7.
851
Ibid.
852
Perenco Ecuador Ltd v The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador)
(2009), Decision on challenge to Arbitration, Case No ARB/08/6 (ICSID).
847
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challenges should be decided by the Secretary-General of the PCA rather than by the remaining
members of the ICSID arbitration tribunal and under the IBA Guidelines instead of the ICSID
standard.853

Arbitrators’ income depends on the length of each case, its complexity and the amount under
dispute according to the ICSID Schedule of Fees.854 ICSID does not provide any financial security
beyond the term of service like a pension. ICSID arbitrators get compensation per day working on
the case as well as expenses - reimbursement of reasonably incurred travel and other expenses plus
a per diem allowance for days of travel (meals, tips, and valet). Since 2008, each arbitrator is
entitled to receive a fee of US$ 3,000 per meeting day or 8-hour day of other work (corresponding
to US$ 375 per hour).855 Each tribunal determines the fees and expenses of its members.856 The
tribunal members requests for higher fees is determined by the Secretary-General, with the
approval of the Chairman.857 Since arbitrators’ fees depend on the number of appointments and
peculiarities of proceedings, the more claims they are appointed to, and the longer these disputes
take, the better off financially they are.858 According to a study in 2014, the average compensation
of ICSID arbitrators is US$ 200,000 per case.859 In 2012, another study claimed that since 2009

853

Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 737 at 94 (note 270). See also Federico Campolieti & Nicholas Lawn,
“Perenco v. Ecuador: Was there a valid arbitrator challenge under the ICSID Convention?” (28 January 2010),
online (blog): Kluwer Arbitration Blog <arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2010/01/28/perenco-v-ecuador-wasthere-a-valid-arbitrator-challenge/>.
854
Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, “Are Arbitrators Political? Evidence from International Investment Arbitration”
(2017) USC FBE, online: University of Southern California <www-bcf.usc.edu/~yanhuiwu/>.
855
ICSID, Administrative and Financial Regulations (2006), reg 14. See also “Memorandum on the Fees and
Expenses” (6 July 2005), online: ICSID <icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/Memorandum-on-the-Fees-andExpenses-FullText.aspx>. See also, for example, The Renco Group, Inc V Republic of Peru (2013), Procedural
Order No 1, Case No UNCT/13/1 at para 3.2.1 (ICSID) (UNCITRAL Rules 2010).
856
ICSID Convention, art 60.
857
ICSID, Administrative and Financial Regulations (2006), reg 14(1).
858
Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Brauch, supra note 328. See also Waibel & Wu, supra note 854 at para 2.2.
859
Sergio Puig, “Social Capital in the Arbitration Market” (2014) 25:2 Eur J Intl L 387 at 389: Between 1972, year
of the first ICSID dispute, and February 2014.
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the average duration of proceedings dropped from over three to over two and a half years, and the
annulment proceedings took about two years.860 While the total income of each arbitrator is
lacking, some individual fees can be found in case documents and arbitral awards. The Centre
makes all the payments, excluding the parties from the process.861 Since the income of all
arbitrators depends on hours or days of work, there is no difference if an individual is a member
of the Panel of Arbitrators or not. The average remuneration is quite considerable yet unpredictable
since it relies on the number of appointments, if any, the length of proceedings as well as tastes
and choices of parties to the dispute.

Table 40: ICSID - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
No
ICSID

Only an
indicative
database

•
•
•

Remuneration
(Not publicly available)*
Ad hoc - linked to cases the arbitrator adjudicates - indicative hourly fees plus
expenses fixed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Chairman
Prescribed daily or hourly rate**
No pension

Peculiarities of
proceedings
Its length affects
the arbitrator’s
fees.

(The Centre pays the fees after the parties’ contributions.)

*Total income of individual arbitrators typically unavailable, except some fees in final awards etc. **Daily rate US$ 3,000 or hourly rate US$

b) PCA-UNCITRAL
Members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration are appointed for a renewable six-year term.862
From the point of adjudication, this term does not serve as tenure, nor does it guarantee
appointments to ISDS cases. Members of the Court can potentially act as arbitrators, yet those with
appointing powers do not have to select from among them. Instead, they can choose from other

860

Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 737 at 71.
ICSID, Administrative and Financial Regulation, reg 14(2).
862
1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 29 July 1899, art 23 (entered into force 4
September 1900) [Hague Convention 1899] and replaced by 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, 18 October 1907, art 44 (entered into force 26 January 1910) [Hague Convention 1907].
861
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sources: the PCA rosters of experts in various fields863 or outside of the PCA altogether. Once
selected, arbitrators can be challenged and removed from the panel for justifiable doubts as to their
impartiality and independence or due to their inactions.864 Removal of an arbitrator challenged by
one party ensues if other parties agree or if the arbitrator decides to withdraw.865 If neither happens,
the designated appointing authority must step in and resolve the challenge.866

Here again, remuneration depends on whether an individual is appointed to decide a case or not.
Since arbitrators are appointed ad hoc, there is no pension scheme. Considering arbitrator’s fees,
the PCA Rules provide similar criteria as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. According to these
rules, it is the arbitral tribunal that determines the costs of arbitration including the fees and
expenses of all arbitrators.867 In doing so, the tribunal should fix and state fees of each arbitrator
separately.868 Remuneration of arbitrators includes daily or hourly rates and travel and other
expenses. These fees and expenses should be reasonable and take into account: the amount in
dispute; the complexity of the subject matter; the time spent by the arbitrators, and any other
relevant circumstances of the case.869 Considering the latter, a set of the PCA Optional Rules870
and the UNCITRAL rules, in appointments made by appointing authorities, require the tribunal to

863

For instance, Panels of Arbitrators and Experts for Environmental Disputes; Panels of Arbitrators and Experts for
Space-related Disputes. See “Members of the Court” (last visited 30 May 2019), online: PCA <pcacpa.org/en/about/structure/members-of-the-court/>.
864
PCA Arbitration Rules (2012), art 12 [PCA Arbitration Rules]; PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes
Between Two Parties of Which Only One is A State, art 10; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 12.
865
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 12; PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only
One is A State, art 10; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 13(3).
866
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 13(3)–(5), PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of
Which Only One is A State, art 12; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 13(4).
867
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 40–41; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 40–41; PCA Optional Rules for
Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One is A State, art 38–39.
868
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 40(2)(a); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 40(2)(a); PCA Optional Rules for
Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One is A State, art 38(a).
869
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 41(1); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 41(1); PCA Optional Rules for
Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One is A State, arts 39(1).
870
PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One is A State.
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consider also relevant schedules of fees issued by the designated appointing authority.871 The
designated appointing authority or the Secretary-General of the PCA has the power to review these
costs and make adjustments if they are inconsistent with these rules.872 Ultimately, it is the PCA
that administers arbitrator fees from deposits made by parties.873

Under these rules there are no institutional limits or fee caps akin to ICSID. 874 Arbitrator fees in
the PCA administered ISDS cases are in general decided by agreement with parties.875 Applied
amounts of daily or hourly rates can often be found in Procedural Orders of the case.876 In Howard
v Canada, for example, the arbitrator’s fee was US$ 3,000 per day or 8 hours of work.877 The
tribunal found the fee reasonable since this amount is the standard fee applied by ICSID and
because there are other arbitral tribunals applying fees that are higher than this.878 Likewise,
Windstream Energy v Canada879 and Detroit v Canada880 both using the UNCITRAL rules applied
the same fee of US$ 3,000. In contrast, some tribunals order fees that are higher: in Mesa v
Canada,881 and in Clayton and Bilcon v Canada882 the hourly rate was US$ 550 totaling in US$

871

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 41 (2); PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two
Parties of Which Only One is A State, art 39(2)–(4): these rules also require tribunals to consult their fees with any
appropriate appointing authority.
872
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 41(2), and (3)(b); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 41(3)–(4)(c)–(d).
873
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 43(5); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 43(5).
874
ICSID fee is US$ 3,000 per day or 8 hours of work.
875
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 737 at 20 (note 28).
876
Windstream Energy LLC (USA) v The Government of Canada (2016), Award, 2013-22 at para 510 (PCA); See
also Procedural Order No 1, 2013-22 at para 19 (PCA) [Windstream Energy]. See also Detroit International Bridge
Company v Government of Canada (2015), Procedural Order No 1, 2012-25 at Section B paras 3–4 (PCA) [Detroit
International].
877
Melvin J Howard, Centurion Health Corp & Howard Family Trust v The Government of Canada (2010), Order
for the Termination of the Proceedings and Award on Costs and Correction, 2009-21 at paras 67, and 70 (PCA)
[Howard].
878
Ibid, at para 67.
879
Windstream Energy, supra note 876.
880
Detroit International, supra note 876.
881
Mesa Power Group, LLC V Government of Canada (2016), Procedural Order No 1, 2012-17 at para 23.1 (PCA).
882
William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware v
Government of Canada (___), Procedural Order No 1, 2009-04 at para 12 (PCA): following ICSID, Administrative
and Financial Regulations, reg 14, and Memorandum on the Fees and Expenses, supra note 855.
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4,400;883 in Bermuda v Bolivia884 the hourly rate was US$ 600 totaling in US$ 4,800 per 8 hours
of work; similarly in Philip Morris v Australia,885 the hourly rate was EUR 500, an equivalent of
about US$ 600 per hour.886 Yet fees, including totals, are not always available because the case
documents are not published or have been redacted like the totals in Philip Morris v Australia.887
In 2014, a study that analyzed the available data found that average tribunal costs in past cases are
10 percent lower at ICSID than under the UNCITRAL Rules and suggested that the reason for
such a difference was due to the ICSID’s fee cap of US$ 3,000 per day.888

The length of proceedings is also a key element in arbitrators’ fees. For illustration, in Howard v
Canada, the fee was calculated in hours. Since proceedings were terminated, Professor Florestal
was paid only for two days of work (US$ 6,000 in total).889 In contrast, in National Grid v
Argentina, each of the three arbitrators received in fees and expenses over 300,000 US dollars.890
Since proceedings are usually lengthy, unless terminated, the fees arbitrators get are typically high.
Despite these high or, as some regard, excessive fees, the ad hoc method depends on a variety of
factors and, thus, is unstable, unpredictable and might cause considerable pressure on those who

883

The total for 8 hours of work of this hourly rate is US$ 4,400.
South American Silver Limited (Bermuda) v The Plurinational State of Bolivia (2018), Terms of Appointment,
2013-15 at para 13 (PCA).
885
Philip Morris Asia Limited (Hong Kong) v The Commonwealth of Australia (___), Procedural Order No 1, 201212 at para 5 (PCA) [Philip Morris].
886
The amount was converted at the time of the Procedural Order.
887
Philip Morris, supra note 885 at 95.
888
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rely on this type of income. Further, instead of providing security, the ad hoc appointing system
creates inequality by dividing arbitrators to those with frequent, rare or no appointments.

Table 41: PCA-UNCITRAL - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
•
No
PCA

Only an
indicative
database

•
•
•
•

Remuneration
(Variably publicly available)*
Ad hoc fees and expenses - linked to cases the arbitrator adjudicates - fixed by
arbitrators after considering a range of prescribed factors**
No prescribed fees, no cap on fees
Daily or hourly rate must be reasonable***
No pension
The appointing authority or the Secretary-General of the PCA has power to
review such costs

Peculiarities of
proceedings

The length
affects the
arbitrator’s fees.

(The Court administers payments after the parties’ contributions.)
*Total income of individual arbitrators unavailable, except some fees in final awards etc. **The amount in dispute, the complexity of the subject
matter, the time spent by the arbitrators, and any other relevant circumstances of the case. ***US$ 375 per hour (or US$ 3,000 per day) found
reasonable but also higher hourly rates US$ 550 and US$ 600.

c) ICC Court
Members of the ICC International Court of Arbitration are appointed for a three-year term.891 Yet,
the Court itself does not decide disputes.892 Arbitrators to disputes are appointed ad hoc and, thus,
they are not protected by security of tenure. Since arbitrators are not the Court’s employees, they
do not enjoy benefits typically linked to employment, such as a pension. Also, within a prescribed
time limit, a party can challenge appointed arbitrators for an alleged lack of impartiality,
independence, or otherwise.893 If necessary, the Court decides on the merits of these challenges.894
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ICC Arbitration Rules (2017), Appendix I, art 3(5). The last election took place on 30 June 2018. See note 658 at
para 7. See also Commission on Arbitration and ADR , supra note 666 at para 57: Members of the Court are usually
“private practitioners of international arbitration.”
892
ICC Arbitration Rules, art 1(2).
893
Ibid, art 14(1).
894
Ibid, art 14(3).
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Since there is no security of tenure, there is also a lack of financial security. Arbitrators are paid,
fees and expenses, only if appointed.895 As reported, the ICC arbitrators in comparison to ICSID
are paid more as their fees are calculated as a proportion of the amount in dispute.896 The Court
has an indicative scale for ordinary as well as expedited procedures.897 In each case, the Court sets
the fees following the appropriate scale that is calibrated according to the claimed amount plus
time spent, rapidity and complexity of the dispute.898 Yet, if necessary due to exceptional
circumstances of the case, the Court may fix the fees higher or lower than the scale prescribes.899
If the amount in dispute is not known, then the Court fixes the fee at its discretion.900

The ICC scales prescribe ranges and for them the minimum and the maximum fee for the initial
amount plus an assigned percentage for the amount that gets over it.901 For illustration, in ordinary
arbitration, in cases with the amount up to US$ 50,000, the lowest fee of US$ 3,000 can go up to
US$ 9,010.902 In contrast, the minimum fee in a US$ 10 million dispute starts on US$ 39,167,
whereas the maximum amount begins on US$ 187,400; in a US$ 100 million case, the minimum
pay starts on US$ 77,867, whereas the maximum begins on US$ 351,300.903 Accordingly, the
higher the amount in dispute, the more an arbitrator gets paid. Similarly, since the time spent on
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Ibid, art 38(1).
Puig, supra note 859 at 398 (note 61); Diana Rosert, The Stakes Are High: A review of the financial costs of
investment treaty arbitration (Geneva: IISD, 2014) at para 5.3.
897
ICC Arbitration Rules, art 30, and Appendix III, art 3(3). See “Costs and payments” (last visited 27 February
2019), online: ICC - International Chamber of Commerce <iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/costsand-payments/>; “Cost calculator” (last visited 27 February 2019), online: ICC - International Chamber of
Commerce <iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/costs-and-payments/cost-calculator/>.
898
ICC Arbitration Rules, art 38(1), and Appendix III, arts 2–3: Fees for the expedited procedure are always lower
than fees for the same amount in dispute in the ordinary arbitration.
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900
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the case also affects the fees, the lengthier proceedings are, the higher fees arbitrators receive. Fees
are administered by the Court from deposits made up front by parties to the dispute.904 For
calculation of these deposits, the ICC uses arbitrator’s average fees. For illustration, in a case of
US$ 100,000, the average fee per arbitrator is US$ 10,060.905 Since the ICC cases are frequently
confidential, total lengths of proceedings, as well as final arbitrators’ fees, are unknown. Despite
the commonly high-income that one may earn, the ad hoc remuneration, just like in cases of ICSID
and the PCA, is unstable, unpredictable and might cause considerable pressure on those who rely
on it.

Table 42: ICC - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
•
No
ICC

Only an
indicative
database

•
•

Remuneration
(Frequently confidential)
Ad hoc - linked to cases the arbitrator adjudicates - indicative hourly fees
plus expenses fixed by the Court
Calculated following a scale calibrated according to the claimed amount plus
time spent, rapidity and complexity of the dispute**
No pension

Peculiarities of
proceedings

The length affects
the arbitrator’s
fees.

(Fees paid by the Court after parties paid their contributions to the Court.)
*Lowest scale fee is US$ 3,000 in cases of amount up to US$ 50,000; Highest scale fee is US$ 583,300 plus 0.0400% in cases of amount over

d) Analysis
None of the ISDS arbitral bodies - ICSID, the PCA and the ICC - provide sufficient personal
security to arbitrators. Due to the ad hoc nature of their appointments, there is no security of tenure
for any of the arbitrators. This is so even though some have been put on formal lists of arbitrators
or fulfill other institutional roles for which they receive the security of tenure. Yet in their capacity
as arbitrators they have no link to such tenure.

904
905

“Cost calculator”, supra note 897.
Ibid.
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From this lack of security of tenure comes inadequate financial security in terms of guaranteed,
regular, and stable remuneration over the term of office. Arbitrators are remunerated only when
appointed in a specific case, for the time spent and expenditure. Thus, remuneration is calculated
and paid on ad hoc basis with no pension or other employment benefits. It depends, first, on
whether the individual gets appointed and on frequency of the appointments. Frequent reappointments of a small number of arbitrators implies less frequent appointments for others.
Second, the amount of remuneration depends on the rules of individual institutions. The amount
varies substantially among the examined bodies and depends on such factors as whether there is a
fees cap or not, whether the amount is based on a fixed hourly rate or is calculated based on a
scale, the length of proceedings, the amount in dispute, etc.

According to a 2016 study, ISDS brought substantial benefits to the legal industry in arbitrators’
fees and other litigation costs.906 Another study reported average fees for three-arbitrator tribunals
of US$ 1.28 million per case making for an average fee per arbitrator of about US$ 426,500.907
Not all fees are public, however, such that this figure accounts for only about two-thirds of
surveyed cases.908 Notably, this average fee exceeds the annual base salary of, for instance, judges
at the ICJ and the UK Supreme Court.909 Without further information on the length of proceedings
for which the amount is paid and on the number of cases in which each arbitrator sat, it is not
possible to determine the effective salary of individual arbitrators.

Gus Van Harten & Pavel Malysheuski, “Who Has Benefited Financially from Investment Treaty Arbitration? An
Evaluation of the Size and Wealth of Claimants” (2016) 12:3 Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No 14 at 2, and 12–13.
907
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 737 at 19; Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Brauch, supra note 328 at 3.
908
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 737 at 19 (note 23): 62 out of 143 surveyed cases provided no information
about the arbitrators’ fee.
909
In 2017, the base salary of the ICJ judges was set at US$ 174,742 while for UK Supreme Justices it was set for
period 2017-2018 at GBP 217,409 (after the exchange rate it is approximately US$ 308,000 (calculated 11 April
2018)).
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The significance of arbitrator remuneration is relative since it depends on whether the arbitrator
has other sources of income. In some cases, the arbitrator’s fee is a question of one’s livelihood.
In others, it will be additional income beyond one’s regular salary from work in the private sector,
as a judge, as a government official, or as an academic. Salaries in these other occupations
obviously differ substantially. For example, arbitrators who work in private practice and receive
high levels of remuneration there may see work for some arbitral bodies as effectively pro-bono,
while others may see it as generous additional income.910 These facts suggest that the existence of
additional sources of income may play a key role in whether the remuneration is a significant
incentive or not.

Despite the potential considerable amounts that an arbitrator may receive, it remains the case that
such remuneration is insecure due to its ad hoc nature. First, the lack of tenure creates pressure for
arbitrators to secure and compete for appointments. Second, the workload among arbitrators
cannot be allocated evenly. Instead, the system creates groups of arbitrators according to the
frequency of their appointments: those appointed often, seldom, and never at all. Third, the lack
of tenure means that arbitrators have no financial security. The scheme offers no financial
protection to cover subsistence during a term of service or beyond. Fourth, insecurity may lead to
fear and make arbitrators vulnerable to pressure to secure sufficient income in creative ways. Fifth,
arbitrators have a personal stake in the cases that they adjudicate based on the incentive to secure
more ad hoc income. This financial stake in disputes can create conflicts of interest. Sixth, all of
the examined contexts for ISDS, albeit to different degrees, allow arbitrators to participate in the
calculation of their fees. Seventh, without stability and predictability of income, arbitrators may
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have financial incentives to prolong proceedings to increase their immediate income. Eighth, the
fact that fees are paid by, and some time negotiated with the parties, creates a close proximity
between arbitrators and the parties whose interests are adjudicated, with a potential for
inappropriate influence. For these reasons, it is questionable whether these arrangements for
remuneration satisfy basic principles of protection at the heart of adjudicative independence and
impartiality.

Table 43: ISDS - Adjudicative Security
Tenure
No
ICSID

Only an
indicative
database

•
•
•
•

No
PCA

Only an
indicative
database

•
•
•
•

•
No
ICC

Only an
indicative
database

•
•
•

Remuneration
(Except ICSID frequently confidential)
Ad hoc - linked to cases the arbitrator adjudicates - indicative hourly fees plus
expenses fixed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Chairman
Prescribed daily rate US$ 3,000 or hourly rate US$ 375
No pension
(Fees paid by the Centre after parties paid their contributions to the Centre.)
Ad hoc fees and expenses - linked to cases the arbitrator adjudicates - fixed by
arbitrators after considering a range of prescribed factors**
No prescribed fees, no cap on fees
Daily or hourly rate must be reasonable - rates applied: US$ 375 per hour (or
US$ 3,000 per day) US$ 550 and US$ 600
No pension
The appointing authority or the Secretary-General of the PCA has the power
to review such costs
(The Court administers payments after the parties’ contributions.)
Ad hoc - linked to cases the arbitrator adjudicates - indicative hourly fees plus
expenses fixed by the Court
Calculated following a scale calibrated according to the claimed amount plus
time spent, rapidity and complexity of the dispute
Lowest scale fee is US$ 3,000 in cases of amount up to US$ 50,000; Highest
scale fee is US$ 583,300 plus 0.0400% in cases of amount over US$ 500
million
No pension

Peculiarities of
proceedings
The length
affects the
arbitrator’s fees.

The length
affects the
arbitrator’s fees.

The length
affects the
arbitrator’s fees.

(Fees paid by the Court after parties paid their contributions to the Court.)
*Considering the amount in dispute, the complexity of the subject matter, the time spent by the arbitrators, and any other relevant circumstances
of the case.
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6. Comparative Remarks

In this chapter, I mapped the use of the personal security of adjudicators - security of tenure and
remuneration (both elements of financial security) - as values of adjudicative independence and
impartiality. Considering remuneration, I focused on the extent to which different methods provide
financial stability without the need to rely on the peculiarities of cases. In surveying the
characteristics of the used salary schemes and the way individual organizations calculate
remuneration, I focused on: whether an adjudicator’s base salary is fixed or depends on
performance; whether the salary is protected from reduction; and whether financial security
beyond the terms of present service exists.

My findings show that secure tenure is granted in all domestic, European, and international courts.
The only differences lie in the term of office and whether it is renewable. The examined courts
apply periods of tenure ranging from 6 years (CJEU; renewable) to 9 years (ICJ; renewable, and
ECHR; non-renewable) to a prescribed retirement age (UK and US courts). Security of tenure goes
hand in hand with financial security. In the examined courts, remuneration is prescribed by law or
resolution with the amount in general made public. Typically, the amount is a combination of base
salary and other emoluments. Judges receive a set of monthly salary that is reviewed annually. It
is common that annual adjustments cannot lead to a reduction of salary. As a default, base salary
does not depend on performance and does not rely on the particularities in proceedings or their
length or the amounts in dispute. In turn, there is no risk that judges will have an incentive to
prolong proceedings artificially. Further, this arrangement insulates adjudicators from an improper
influence by a party - disputing parties cannot influence the amount of remuneration to which
judges are entitled, thus avoiding any inappropriate proximity between them and their adjudicator.
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The amount received, age of retirement, and years of service differ for individual courts, but all
provide remunerative schemes that include a pension. The pension provides financial security
beyond the term of present service. Judges are in general precluded from engaging in external
work. Yet until recently, at the ICJ some judges frequently sat in ISDS cases. Since this side work
weakens safeguards of adjudicative independence and impartiality, it was appropriate to terminate
it.911

International and domestic tribunals - the WTO, WIPO and FINRA - use remuneration schemes
that differ from courts. This distinction, however, can be explained by the difference in the work
settings of these adjudicative bodies. Only the WTO Appellate Body incorporates security of
tenure (four-year; renewable), although different from courts, and financial security in a monthly
retainer. It is typical that Appellate Body members, as non-permanent employees, do external work
in the private sector, academia, etc. Also, the length of Appellate Body and panel proceedings have
some impact on daily fees but, for Appellate Body members, this impact is limited by caps on the
length of proceedings. For panelists, who lack tenure, the WTO sets moderate daily fees and caps
remuneration for expenses. Panel proceedings can be lengthier than the Appellate proceedings
with more impact on the panelists’ remuneration. Further, as both panelists and Appellate Body
members are non-employees, they are not covered by the WTO pension scheme.

Both WIPO and FINRA have lists of potential arbitrators without granting security of tenure. In
both cases, being on the list merely creates a possibility of selection to arbitrate. The remunerative
schemes at both bodies is based on the cases that an adjudicator decides. WIPO uses schedules of
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fees with caps and indicative hourly fees. FINRA has fixed fees per session or based on special
tasks. As there is no tenure, there is no permanent employment and corresponding benefits
including a pension scheme. The length of proceedings for both bodies has some impact on the
amount of remuneration. Both the WTO and FINRA provide remuneration from their budgets with
no option for arbitrators to negotiate higher fees with the disputing parties. WIPO is an exception
in that final fees are fixed by the relevant administrative body after consultation with the arbitrators
and parties. Based on these findings, WIPO affords the weakest personal protections for
adjudicative independence and impartiality, but for ISDS.

Like WIPO and FINRA, ISDS administering bodies do not provide security of tenure. Since there
is no tenure, there is no financial security. All ISDS bodies have indicative lists. Some arbitrators
act as permanent members of these bodies but their status on the list does not bring any personal
security. This ad hoc arrangement creates inequality in the allocation of cases. Even in the event
of an appointment, remuneration may depend on the hourly rate, the amount in dispute, the length
and complexity of the case, or a mix of these factors. The ICSID daily fee is capped and the lowest
among the examined bodies. The PCA requires the fee to be reasonable; as such, the fee can be
the same as at ICSID or higher. The ICC uses an elaborate indicative fees schedule that reflects
the amount in the dispute. Other than at ICSID, the remuneration of individual arbitrators is
frequently confidential. From available data, average fees per case can be substantial. Fees are
typically fixed in consultation with the disputing parties and appointing authorities. In addition to
ISDS fees, it is common for ISDS arbitrators to engage in outside work. The lack of tenure and
financial stability puts more pressure on arbitrators to secure income to cover their daily expenses
and subsistence unless they enjoy such benefits from other work.
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Although the high level of remuneration might be a way to compensate for these uncertainties, it
remains that only those appointed can benefit in this way. This fact underscores the gap between
the most frequently-appointed individuals and those who are not or hardly ever appointed. The
resulting pressure to find ways to make more money altogether with their vested interest in
proceedings, may seriously undermine public confidence in the arbitrators’ independence and
impartiality.912 ISDS arbitrators are more vulnerable to the whims of the ‘market’ for appointments
and more vulnerable to incentives to encourage the boom of the industry, compete with other
arbitrators for appointments, and work on longer and more complex proceedings. All of these
factors affect how much, if anything, the person can expect to be paid. Consequently, the
mechanisms for personal security of tenure and remuneration vary greatly between ISDS and
courts, with the courts at one end of the spectrum and the ISDS at its other.
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Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 5 at 7–8, and 35; Raja, supra note 619.
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Chapter 6: Participatory Rights

Introduction
One of the core concerns of this study is the role of values linked to procedural fairness in legal
proceedings. According to Solum, procedural fairness has two main principles, “participation” and
“accuracy”, and is concerned with questions related to “ordering of the principles and provisos”,
and “balancing costs and benefits”.913 While both principles and the strive to answer these
questions all have their place in studies of procedural fairness, in my research I focus on one facet
of procedural fairness, the principle of participation.914

Why participation? Participation is not merely a part of procedural fairness915 it is “the very core
of adjudication.”916 Participation for those affected is crucial as “no one shall be personally bound
until he has had his day in court.”917 This “principle is as old as the law, and is of universal
justice.”918 According to the participation principle, each interested party must be provided with a
right to adequate participation.919 Participation has various forms and ranges from the full right of
standing to a limited access at the discretion of the tribunal. Only procedures that include at least
the minimum right of participation - notice and an opportunity to be heard - to those with legal
interest in proceedings can be considered fair.920 This participation is a direct one. Since under
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Solum, supra note 215 at 242–305.
Ibid at 273–305.
915
Ibid. See also Sternlight, supra note 55 at 81.
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Solum, supra note 215 at 309 referring to Mason v Eldred, 73 US 231 at 239 (1868), 18 L Ed 783; See also
Galpin v Page, 85 US 350 at 368–369 (1874), 21 L Ed 959 350.
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920
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914

191

certain circumstances notice or an opportunity to be heard are impracticable, 921 then indirect
participation - through an adequate legal representation - will suffice.922

In this paper, I focus on forms of direct participation (to be heard and to observe) - ranging from
the full right of standing to limited discretionary participation in a form of a mere assistance - thus
leaving forms of indirect participation through representation aside. Further, because my focus is
on the general provisions governing the right of standing for those with legal interest, I am not
concerned with procedures related to access to documents and its technicalities (whom, under what
conditions has access to what).

Legal disputes can arise out of various forms of agreements between parties with horizontal or
vertical relations. For every legal relationship, there must be some sort of understanding, such as
legislative intent, an agreement or a premise. For example, the right to judicial review can be
premised on a legislative intent or grounded in the common law, other legal relations can arise
from consensual agreements, be granted by treaties, or out of a premise that people are liable for
their actions (as in tort). Each form of understanding defines the range of parties allowed to
participate either fully or in limited forms. For full participation, an individual must have standing
also known as locus standi translated as “a place to stand”923 - typically granted to those with a
legal interest in the lawsuit. The right of standing is “[t]he legally protectible stake or interest that
an individual has in a dispute that entitles him to bring the controversy before the court to obtain

921

Ibid at 279 and 305–306.
Ibid: refering to Martin H Redish, “Procedural Due Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation”
(1996) 63 Def Couns J 18 at 22–25.
923
Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 413.
922
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judicial relief.”924 The term “is essentially synonymous with being a party to a proceeding”925 with
all of the rights and duties attached to it.

The parties to proceedings are known as a claimant and a respondent. In complex disputes, there
are multiple claimants, multiple respondents or both. In addition to the original parties, there might
be other parties whose legal rights and interests are affected. These other parties will typically want
to intervene in pending proceedings in order to protect these rights. It is a common practice that
legal systems facilitate various types of intervention. Other parties are frequently called a “nonparty”, a “third party”, or an “intervenor”. However, the use of these terms is not always consistent.
Intervention can be granted as a matter of right with full rights attached to it or with limited rights
for example as amicus curiae. Generally, a person intervening as a matter of right, also known as
a joining party, has the same rights as the original parties and is equally bound by the judgment.
In contrast, individuals intervening as amici are not bound by the judgment as they do not become
parties to proceedings.

In judicial reviews, lawsuit is typically initiated by natural or legal persons whose interest has been
affected. In contrast, intergovernmental organizations (the ICJ and the WTO) that deal with purely
state-state relations do not allow private parties to initiate disputes. Arbitral tribunals - domestic
and international - have different remits according to their sources of authority - legislation,
contract, treaty, etc. These sources usually define and limit right of standing - who can initiate

Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps, “Standing” in West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, 2nd ed (Detroit:
Thomson/Gale, 2005): “Standing, or locus standi, is capacity of a party to bring suit in court.”
925
Angela Del Vecchio, “International Courts and Tribunals, Standing” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (last updated November 2010), online: Oxford Public International Law <opil-ouplawcom.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e79?rskey=VymYDY&result=4&prd=EPIL> at para 1.
924
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dispute and against whom. Tribunals may specialize in consensual (purely private or state-state
disputes), treaty-based (party-state disputes e.g. ISDS) or administer more than one. Standing is
governed by the arbitral agreement (consensual arbitration), legislation (domestic arbitration),
treaties926 (ISDS) and procedural rules of the relevant arbitral administering body. Considering
ISDS, foreign investors and their host states have right of standing. Yet only investors can initiate
disputes before one of the international arbitration bodies specified by the governing IIA.

In the following five sections, I examine the spectrum of participatory rights afforded by the
selected comparators with a special focus on the rights of third parties personally affected by
proceedings. In my analysis, I define the primary parties with the full right of standing and the type
of interest they ought to have in the aim to bring the suit. I map varieties of forms other parties
have in order to protect their rights and interests - ranging from the full right of standing to a mere
assistance. I conclude this chapter by analyzing the findings of all sections.

1. Domestic Courts

a) UK Superior Courts (laws specific to England and Wales)
An application for judicial review to the Senior Courts can be brought by natural or legal persons
whose interests have been affected. These applicants must fulfill the requirement of standing
which, in an ordinary claim, requires having “reasonable grounds for bringing … the claim”

926

International Investment Agreements (IIAs), also called Investment Guarantee Agreements (IGA), are for
example: Bilateral Investments Treaties (BITs), Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Regional Investment Agreements
(RIAs) and Multilateral Investment Agreements (MITs). See OECD, Evolution of International Investment
Agreements (IIAs) in the MENA Region, Paper prepared in the context of the MENA-OECD Working Group on
Investment Policies and Promotion (December 2010), online: OECD
<www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/46581917.pdf> at 2.
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otherwise the application can be struck out.927 Also, the claimant must assert a right to have a
remedy.928 In contrast, in judicial review governed by the Senior Courts Act 1981, an individual
or organization must have a “sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates”929
but “the claimant does not need to assert a right to remedy.”930 Thus, if there is no standing the
claimant cannot proceed to a trial.

The “sufficient interest”, introduced by the Rules Committee in the aim to simplify complexities
of the pre-existing test, came into operation in 1978.931 Since the Senior Courts Act 1981 does not
say what “sufficient interest” means, it is up to the court to decide the test.932 Soon after its
introduction, the sufficient interest requirement was considered by the Supreme Court in R v Inland
Revenue Commissioners.933 According to Lord Wilberforce, “the question of sufficient interest can
not … be considered in the abstract, or as an isolated point: it must be taken together with the legal
and factual context. The rule requires sufficient interest in the matter to which the application
relates.”934 Similarly, Lord Reed in the Supreme Court decision in AXA General Insurance
maintains that the sufficient interest “depends … upon the context, and in particular upon what
will best serve the purposes of judicial review in that context.”935 Additionally, according to a
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broad formulation, sufficient interest requires a test of proportionality, that in this context is “a
relation between the value of hearing a claim for judicial review and the process cost,” resulting
in court’s control over own processes.936 The interest may be direct to the individual or indirect as
a matter of public interest in which case an application for judicial review may be brought by
charities, NGOs, pressure groups, representational groups, public interest groups or campaigning
organizations.937 A concerned person with a direct interest must be distinguished from a busybody,
a person who interferes in things which do not concern the person.938 Thus, the former has standing
while the latter does not.

In legal disputes, the rights and interests of third parties may also become affected. In the domestic
court settings, the procedural law generally authorizes persons directly or indirectly affected by a
lawsuit “to intervene in the pending lawsuit if their own claim has a sufficiently close connection
in law or fact.”939 Likewise, the UK system allows the third party’s participation in the High
Courts’ judicial reviews that is governed by the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR).940 Notably, albeit
there is no formal route for this type of interventions before the Court of Appeal, they are also
common.941 According to the CPR, any person may apply for permission to file evidence or make
representations at the judicial review hearings.942 Third parties may seek to intervene to support
their private interests or public ones,943 each having its own implications and specificities.
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Interested persons directly affected by the claim (natural and legal persons, and public bodies)944
can reasonably expect to get permission to intervene by joining proceedings.945 To enable
intervention, the CPR obliges claimants to identify and serve their claims to all interested
parties.946 Any person so served may file an acknowledgment of service,947 contest or support the
claim,948 can be party to any consent order as well as may seek a leave to appeal. This type of
participation, despite the word intervention, is “akin in all material respects to being an actual party
to the proceedings, rather than an intervenor.”949 Put differently, by joining proceeding the
intervenor has full right of standing.

In contrast, a third-party intervenor, organization or person, seeking to assist the court in cases of
public interest,950 does not become a party to proceedings. In the US and elsewhere a third-party
intervenor is typically called amicus curiae, translated as a friend of the court. Yet in the UK,
amicus curiae refers to “a largely non-partisan figure, appointed by the Attorney General at the
request of the court,”951 thus, the use of the term: third-party intervenor. In the UK adversarial
system, judges do not have resources to make further investigation but rely on arguments brought
by parties.952 Intervention in issues of public importance may bring arguments of broader public
concerns and, thus, it is a helpful source of vital information that helps to decide the case fairly.953

944

The Administrative Court Guide, supra note 313 at para 2.2.1.
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The fact that judges interpret the law and set the precedence that applies to all citizens makes it
even more invaluable.954 Since it is in the power of the High Courts to decide whether to grant this
permission, no parties’ consent is required.955

Third parties are also allowed to intervene in issues of public importance raised before the Supreme
Court.956 Intervention can be sought during the process of application for permission to appeal957
as well as after it has been already granted.958 This intervention can be granted to any individual
with interest in proceedings, any official body or non-governmental organization that seeks to
make submissions in the public interest959 or anyone who intervened in the court below.960 These
persons may seek to intervene on their motion, or the Court may invite them. According to Justice
Hale, the more important the issue is, the more the Court needs help to get the right answer.961
Justice Hale admits that the invitation is very open but maintains that it is not being abused.962
Since there are no specific requirements, it is at the Court’s discretion to allow the sought
intervention. For the Court, it is more likely to grant permission if the intervenor does not repeat
points brought by the parties but instead brings something new to consider.963
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Table 44: The UK Superior Courts*
UK domestic courts

Test

Status

Implications

Full right of Standing

A “sufficient” interest test

Parties to proceedings

Bound by proceedings

Intervention as of right

Anyone directly affected

The same rights as parties
(right of standing)

Bound by proceedings

Limited participation
known as amicus

Granted at the discretion of
the court

A non-party that intervenes in cases
of public interest

Not bound

*Applicable to the Senior Courts and the Supreme Court.

b) US Supreme Court
Standing in the US context is “a personal, legally protectable interest in the outcome of the
dispute”964 governed by Article III of the US Constitution. Thus, standing does not focus on the
issue the party wants to adjudicate but on whether the party can bring the claim or not.965 Since
parties have the power to burden other litigants and non-parties in day-to-day procedural and
litigation tasks, and by obtaining their final judgment, another purpose of standing is to limit the
range of litigants only to those who have a personal stake in the lawsuit.966

Under Article III, a person must have a “substantial” interest in the lawsuit. To satisfy the
“substantial interest” test, a person must demonstrate three requirements: injury-in-fact, causation,
and redressability.967 Thus, the injury must be concrete and particularized, fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct and with the likelihood that it will be redressed by a favorable decision.968 In
turn, there is no standing if there is a generalized injury, which is an injury “shared by all members

Terese A West, “A Primer on Standing in Federal Court” (2 March 2017), online: American Bar Association
<www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/woman-advocate/articles/2017/primer-on-standing-in-federalcourt/>.
965
“Substantial Interest: Standing” (last visited 20 May 2019), online: Justia US Law
<law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-3/20-substantial-interest-standing.html> see note 394.
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Howard M Wasserman, “Argument preview: Standing for intervention” (10 April 2017), online (blog):
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of the public.”969 Yet if a person can claim an injury in a “concrete and personal way,” then the
number of the other injured does not matter.970 Due to this personal interest requirement, likewise,
organizations have no standing to represent their particular concept unless they assert their
members’ rights.971

The US federal civil law system recognizes that a third party, also called a non-party, may have
rights and interests affected by legal proceedings and, thus, should be able to intervene. This nonparties’ intervention, governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP),972 may be
unconditional as a matter of right973 or conditional and granted at the discretion of the court.974 In
both cases, there is no need for permission of the original parties.

The court must permit intervention of right to anyone who is given an unconditional right to
intervene by a federal statute975 or to anyone with an interest or property in a lawsuit, whose ability
to protect this interest may be impeded, and there is no adequate protection of this interest by the
existing parties.976 Since the latter rule mirrors the elements of Article III standing,977 persons who
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want to bring a new issue before the court must, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Town of
Chester v Laroe Estates, Inc, also satisfy the same requirement of Article III standing.978 They, in
turn, become parties to proceedings known as party-intervenors, intervenors-of-right or intervenorplaintiffs that enjoy full party status,979 and are equally bound by these proceedings. If, however,
an intervenor only seeks to support existing parties’ claims without gaining the full party status
then no standing is required.980

Permissive intervention, always granted at the discretion of the court and governed by Rule 24(b)
of the FRCP, generally applies to a person who is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal
statute981 or has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or
fact.982 This type of intervention, designed “primarily to allow litigants in the federal courts to
clear up in a single suit, questions which would ordinarily arise in separate federal suits,” 983 may
be used by parties that do not meet the above requirements of standing. 984 Yet persons seeking to
intervene under this head should still have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of
the litigation.985 However, if this permissive intervention should cause undue delay or prejudice to
the original parties’ rights, the court may deny it.986
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Non-parties that have not suffered concrete injury may express their interest or become involved
in the lawsuit through amicus curiae briefs.987 This type of intervention is limited - the intervenor
cannot raise new issues but may only support one of the parties’ existing claims.988 Permission to
file amicus curiae briefs may be granted at the discretion of the Court or if all parties consent.989
Amicus curiae briefs are regarded as helpful if they bring a relevant matter not already brought
before the court.990 Thus, a mere repetition of already stated points is not seen favorably. Albeit
amici curiae are not legally bound, they may still be affected by the court’s decision.991

Table 45: The US Supreme Court
US Supreme Court
Full right of Standing
Unconditional
(as of right)
Intervention

With a condition
(at the discretion of
the court)

Limited participation
known as amicus

Test
Anyone with a “substantial” interest
in the lawsuit*
Guaranteed by federal statute or
having an interest in the subject
matter of the action
Granted by a federal statute or having
a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of
law or fact
•
At the discretion of the court; or
•
If all parties consent

Status

Implications

Parties to proceedings

Bound by
proceedings

For full party status
standing must be satisfied
Otherwise, the participation
is limited - the non-party
supports one of the existing
parties’ claims
Non-parties

Bound by
proceedings

Not bound

*Must demonstrate three requirements: injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability (not applicable to generalized injuries).
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c) Analysis
Both the UK and US domestic courts employ similar procedures. They provide the right of
standing to those with interest in the judicial review. In the UK superior courts, parties must have
“sufficient” interest, whereas the US Supreme Court applies narrowly formulated “substantial”
interest test. Both jurisdictions require a personal stake in the action. Yet in the UK, the interest
may be direct as well as indirect (brought by NGOs, etc.) interest.

Domestic laws of both countries in anticipation that non-parties might be affected by proceedings
and seek protection of their rights make their intervention in ongoing disputes possible.
Intervention refers to the full right of standing (personally affected individuals) or a limited right
of assistance to persons intervening in the public interest. In all UK superior courts, the full party
status applies to those directly affected, in the US, intervenors who want to bring a personal claim
or raise new issues must satisfy the Article III standing requirement to become parties to
proceedings. Otherwise, only limited participatory rights apply. Intervention to support the original
parties’ claims, known as amicus curiae, is granted, in both jurisdictions, at the discretion of the
court if this assistance helps the court to decide the case.

2. European Courts

a) ECHR
The ECHR specializing in human rights breaches has strict rules of standing according to which
only a “victim” - a natural person, NGO, or group of individuals who are victims of violation
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committed by a State Party - qualifies for standing.992 Before applying to the Court, an applicant
must exhaust all domestic remedies.993 The Court interprets the notion of victim autonomously
and irrespective of domestic rules.994 Thus, even if lacking the victim status at domestic law the
applicant can still qualify under the Human Rights Convention.995 Any successful applicant,
however, may lose the victim status if the State Party responsible for violation acknowledges the
violation and provides sufficient redress.996

A victim may be direct, indirect or under some circumstances even potential.997 A direct victim is
a person against whom a violating measure is directed and who directly suffers from this violation.
Further, an action or omission directed at one individual may have a substantial impact on another
person so-called an indirect victim.998 An indirect victim must be a person with a personal and
specific link with the applicant usually a family member who personally suffers because of the
violation targeted at the original applicant.999 Yet not all kinds of suffering qualify since the
indirect victim must suffer “beyond what is normal or unavoidable in a case in which a family
member is subjected to human rights violations.”1000 Finally, a potential victim is a person that has
not been affected yet, but for whom the impact is imminent or who albeit lacking clear proof is
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very likely affected.1001 Thus, all these victims have standing due to the personal nature of the
impact of a violation.

Under limited circumstances, not only the personally affected applicants but also third parties may
have standing before the court. This situation may happen when the original claimant died, and a
third party pursues the claim on behalf of the affected party.1002 There are two different scenarios:
the applicant died after a claim was initiated, or before. If after, heirs or close relatives with a
sufficient interest in so doing may be allowed to pursue the application on behalf of the deceased
applicant.1003 If before, the capacity to pursue the claim depends upon the violated right the third
party (usually, a next-of-kin)1004 seeks to redress.1005 Yet rights that are strictly personal are not
transferable.1006 Interestingly, in exceptional circumstances, even the “general exclusion of NGOs
from having standing in individual claims” may not apply. In Centre for Legal Resources on Behalf
of Valentin Câmpeanu v Romania, the Court allowed the NGO to bring a claim on behalf of the
deceased.1007
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Due to this personal impact requirement, no “actio popularis” - an action of a member brought in
the interest of public order - is allowed,1008 meaning that organizations cannot bring public interest
claims where they are not directly affected.1009 The only route through which an unaffected party
can participate is amicus curiae.1010 This third-party intervenor does not obtain victim status and,
thus, is not considered as a party to proceedings.1011 The intervenor can be a State Party whose
national is an applicant, any other State Party, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Rights and any person concerned that is not an applicant.1012 A State Party whose national is an
applicant and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights have right to intervene upon
notifying the Registrar that they wish to exercise this right.1013 Otherwise, intervention is done by
an invitation of the Court1014 or by request for permission.1015 Applications must be duly
reasoned,1016 but consent of parties is not needed. Permission is granted at the discretion of the
Court when such intervention is “in the interest of the proper administration of justice.”1017 These
interventions are limited to written or oral submissions.1018
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Table 46: ECHR
ECHR
Full right of Standing*
Other parties
Limited
intervention
(known as
amicus)

Test

Status

Implications

Direct, indirect or potential “victim” of a violating
measure
Must have a “sufficient” interest to pursue the claim on
behalf of a deceased

Parties to
proceedings
Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings
Bound by
proceedings

Non-parties

Not bound

As of right

A State Party whose national is an applicant and the
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights

At the
discretion of the
court

Any other State Party
Any person concerned that is not an applicant

*No actio popularis.

b) CJEU
The Court deals with a variety of types of violations and inactions of EU institutions brought in by
complaints from individuals, companies, EU organizations and the Member States.1019 The scope
of participation ranges between the full right of standing to limited interventions in the form of
amicus curiae briefs. Applicants for judicial review are privileged, semi-privileged or nonprivileged. The privileged ones - the Member States, the Council, the Commission, and the
European Parliament - have always standing.1020 Semi-privileged applicants - the Court of
Auditors, the European Central Bank and by the Committee of the Regions - have the right to
initiate proceedings if their prerogatives are at stake.1021 Finally, non-privileged applicants - natural
and legal persons harmed by action or inaction of EU institutions - must satisfy requirements set
in the Treaty on European Union (TFEU).1022 In my assessment, I focus on claims brought by
natural and legal persons.
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According to the TFEU, there are two main actions non-privileged applicants may initiate: a
review of the legality of an act of EU bodies,1023 and failure to act when the body was called upon
to act.1024 Considering the former, the Court has jurisdiction to review actions for lack of
competence, misuse of powers or infringement of essential procedures, Treaties or the rule of
law.1025 Natural and legal persons may bring direct actions against EU bodies under one of the
following three heads: (1) the person must be “an addressee” of an act; (2) the act is of “direct and
individual concern” to that person; or (3) the person is “directly concerned” by a “regulatory act”
that “does not entail implementing measures.”1026 Thus, a person who wants to bring an action
must be an addressee of the act in question or have a “direct and individual concern.” The direct
concern element requires a direct link between the act and harm,1027 whereas the individual concern
element requires that the applicant must be able to distinguish himself from all other persons.1028
However, these two heads are quite difficult to satisfy.1029 The third head added under the Lisbon
Treaty extends standing for direct actions in regulatory actions. Yet, since this head is still very
restrictive, not many applicants have been able to satisfy it.1030 Similarly, because of these
requirements, trade associations or associations representing collective interests have no standing
unless they represent persons who are direct and individual addressees of the act.1031 Standing in
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judicial review for claims for failure to act is admissible only after the appropriate EU body1032
was called upon to act but failed to address it in infringement of the Treaties.1033 Any act, except
recommendations or opinions, can be reviewed.1034 Yet if there is no obligation to act, a claim will
fail.1035 Further, any party (a Member State, an institution of the Union or any other person) that
has not been heard may contest any Court’s judgment that is prejudicial to that party. 1036 In doing
so, the contestant must indicate how the contested decision is prejudicial to his rights as well as
why he was unable to participate in the original case.1037

Another form of participation is a limited intervention by a third party, also called amicus curiae,
in direct actions (actions for annulment,1038 actions for failure to act1039), in indirect actions (pleas
for illegality,1040 references for preliminary rulings1041) or appeals.1042 Parties that may intervene
in direct actions are the Member States and institutions of the Union;1043 and parties that must
establish an interest in the result of the case - the bodies, offices, and agencies of the Union and
any other persons (called non-state intervenors).1044 The non-state intervenors may seek to
represent their private or public interests1045 but are further limited in that they cannot intervene in
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cases between the Member States, between institutions of the Union or between the Member States
and institutions of the Union.1046 Since intervention is ancillary to the main proceedings,
intervenors cannot bring new issues but must support the claim as submitted by one of the
parties.1047 Intervenors as non-parties (do not enjoy full parties’ rights) are not bound by
proceedings. In their submissions, intervenors should not repeat pleas already made by the party
they seek to support.1048 This type of standing granted at the discretion of the court, as claimed, is
quite restrictive. Additionally, non-state intervenors along with any unsuccessful parties, the
Member States, and the institutions of the Union may appeal the General Court’s decision.1049 Yet
the non-state intervenors may bring this claim only if they are “directly affected” by that
decision.1050

In indirect actions, interventions are even more restrictive, since, they are not permitted in
preliminary rulings unless the intervenor is a specified institution, agency or a Member State.1051
In line with these rules, the Courts’ registry while maintaining its inability to accept amicus curiae
briefs from third parties rejected the submission of an amicus curiae brief from the Foundation for
a Free Information Infrastructure in the Opinion procedure related to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA).1052 Interestingly, albeit indirectly, under limited circumstances, even non-
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Statute of the CofJ, art 40.
Ibid, art 40(4); Rules of Procedure of the CofJ, art 129; Rules of procedure of the GC, art 142.
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Ibid, art 56.
1051
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note 1015 at para 5.1.
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Ante Wessels, “FFII asks EU Court to accept amicus curiae briefs on ACTA” (22 November 2012), online
(blog): BlogFFII.org <blog.ffii.org/ffii-asks-eu-court-to-accept-amicus-curiae-briefs-on-acta/>; Ante Wessels, “EU
Court refuses FFII amicus curiae brief on ACTA” (14 November 2012), online (blog): BlogFFII.org
<blog.ffii.org/eu-court-refuses-ffii-amicus-curiae-brief-on-acta/>. The FFII is abbreviation for the Foundation for a
Free Information Infrastructure that filed amicus curiae about the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).
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state parties’ intervention is possible, for instance, a submission from a non-state party that was
granted rights to intervene in domestic proceedings passes to the CJEU.1053

The CJEU’s approach to third-party intervention faces criticisms as being too restrictive in that
only very few applicants can participate. Since that restriction, third parties, as well as the general
public, have no means “to inform the court of their knowledge, perspectives, or interests, or ... to
demonstrate how a decision would affect them or their communities and societies.”1054
Consequently, the court by lacking insight from those affected cannot assess all potential
implications and balance all relevant interests. 1055 One view maintains that, since the CJEU’s
decisions have binding effects on all EU citizens its decisions are of concern of every EU
citizen and not only the parties involved 1056 and, thus, interpretation of participatory rights by
the CJEU should be more open. Another view maintains that third-party intervention could
“prolong the proceedings, leading to a backlog of cases”1057 or hinder the CJEU effectiveness1058
and suggests balancing this hindering effect with the adequate protection of individuals.1059
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Carrera, De Somer & Petkova, supra note 1015 at para 5.1.
Sabine Devins, “European Justice: Befriending the European Court of Justice” (19 April 2017), online:
Handelsblatt Today <www.handelsblatt.com/today/opinion/european-justice-befriending-the-european-court-ofjustice/23568966.html>.
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Table 47: CJEU
CJEU

Full right of Standing

Test
Privileged - have always standing
Semi-privileged - if their prerogatives are at stake
Non-privileged - either:
An addressee of an act
The act is of direct and individual concern
Directly concerned by a regulatory act that does not
entail implementing measures

Other parties

Intervention
(known as amicus)

Status

Parties to
proceedings

Implications

Bound by
proceedings

Can contest the Court’s decision - if they were not heard, and the
judgment is prejudicial to their rights.

Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings

•
•

Non-parties

Not bound

The Member States and institutions of the Union*
Non-state intervenors and the bodies, offices, and agencies of
the Union - must establish an interest in the case to intervene
in a private or public interest.

*Intervention should be typically allowed by the decision of the President, except where parties identified confidential information of which
revelation to the intervenor could be prejudicial to these parties.

c) Analysis
Jurisdiction of the ECHR and the CJEU varies. Yet, considering natural or legal persons, standing
in these courts is similar and typically granted to persons with direct or personal interest or harm.
Other parties’ standing is also anticipated albeit to different degrees. The ECHR limits standing to
harmed parties with a direct link to the original but deceased applicant, whereas the CJEU allows
third parties that have not been heard and to whom the Court’s judgment is prejudicial to contest
the Court’s decisions.

Both courts accept limited third parties’ intervention known as amici. Intervention as of right is
typically granted to a State Party whose national is an applicant (the ECHR) or to a Member State
and some qualified institutions by a decision of the President of the Court (the CJEU). Others,
including natural and legal persons, may intervene only at the discretion of the respective court.
The ECHR does not require third parties to have an interest in the result of the case, whereas parties
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intervening before the CJEU must establish having interest that is private or public. Yet
intervention before the CJEU is still criticized as too restrictive.

3. International Judicial and Quasi-judicial Bodies

a) ICJ
Standing before the ICJ in contentious cases is reserved for states to the exclusion of NGOs,
intergovernmental organizations, and natural or legal persons.1060 Harmed natural and legal
persons, thus, may have a redress before the Court only through diplomatic protections exercised
by states.1061 Albeit the Court may request information relevant to the case from intergovernmental
organizations, these organizations do not become parties to proceedings.1062 States entitled to
standing are all Member States of the United Nations (UN);1063 non-Member States of the UN
which adhere to the ICJ Statute; 1064 and a range of other non-states.1065 Conditions for the latter
are “subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, … laid down by the Security
Council.”1066 In general, for the ICJ to have jurisdiction, the state must consent or otherwise accept

See “How the Court Works” (last visited 23 May 2019), online: International Court of Justice <www.icjcij.org/en/how-the-court-works>; Del Vecchio, supra note 925 at para 13.
1061
Phebe Okowa, “Issues of admissibility and the Law on International Responsibility” in Malcolm D Evans, ed,
International Law, 4th ed (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014) 477 at 479–480. In general, at the
international level, individuals have locus standi through diplomatic protections unless the right on persons is
directly granted by a specific treaty such as BITs, etc.
1062
Statute of the International Court of Justice, (1945) ICJ Acts & Doc 6, art 34 [Statute of the ICJ]. See also Del
Vecchio, supra note 925 at para 13.
1063
UN Charter, supra note 325, art 93; Statute of the ICJ, art 34.
1064
UN Charter, art 93(2): Under this category used to fall Liechtenstein, Japan, San Marino, Switzerland, and
Nauru, However, all these states are now members of the UN. See also Del Vecchio, supra note 925 at para 9.
1065
Statute of the ICJ, art 35(2).
1066
Ibid. See also Del Vecchio, supra note 925 at para 10.
1060
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it.1067 States can consent to a compulsory jurisdiction in all disputes with other signatory states by
signing a declaration or ad hoc jurisdiction through treaties or agreements.1068

A state may bring a claim where it has proved injury to its direct or indirect interest. 1069 Direct
interest is that which affects the state and its sovereign rights, for instance, damage to the state’s
property, state’s warship, diplomatic missions, etc.; whereas indirect interest is usually an injury
to natural or legal persons of the state.1070 There is a presumption that any state has the right to
protect its direct interests,1071 for protecting its indirect interest the state must typically first
establish the right to do so.1072 Thus, a state may usually bring a claim on behalf of a natural person
who is its citizen,1073 if the link between the person and the state is genuine.1074 Yet these persons
cannot compel the state to do it.

Protection of legal persons’ rights may become more complicated. For instance, in cases that
involve multiple countries (the company’s place of incorporation differs from its place of primary
operation and nationality of shareholders), the right of standing revolves around the question of
which state among them has the right to represent the company. For instance, the Court in
Barcelona Traction, a company that was incorporated in Canada having shareholders of Belgian

International Court of Justice, supra 786 at 58–68. See also Tiffany M Lin, “Chinese Attitudes toward ThirdParty Dispute Resolution in International Law Notes” (2016) 48:2 NYUJ Intl L & Pol 581 at 606–608.
1068
Lin, supra note 1067 at 606.
1069
Okowa, supra note 1061 at 480, and 495.
1070
Ibid at 480.
1071
Ibid.
1072
Evan J Criddle, “Standing for Human Rights Abroad” (2015) 100:2 Cornell L Rev 269 at 282.
1073
Okowa, supra note 1061 at 484.
1074
Ibid at 485–487.
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nationality but operated in Spain,1075 held that the state of incorporation (Canada) is the one that
has standing.1076 The Court noted that two requirements must be satisfied: (1) the defendant state
has broken an obligation towards the national state in respect of its nationals; (2) only the party to
whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach. 1077 Since, the
obligation was held by Spain to the company incorporated in Canada and Belgium did not have
the legal right in the interest of its shareholders it consequently did not have standing.1078 Thus, in
this case, the shareholders’ nationality did not suffice for Belgium to establish the right to bring
the case.

In contrast to the special interests and diplomatic protections so far discussed are requirements for
standing in obligations that are owed to all parties, known as erga omnes partes.1079 States Parties
owe these obligations to all their citizens or the “international community as a whole.”1080 Erga
omnes partes the Court considered in the Belgium v Senegal case where Belgium claimed that
Senegal violated its obligations under the UN Convention against Torture to prosecute or extradite
Mr. Habré, the former President of the Republic of Chad.1081 The Court held that there is a common
interest in compliance with the relevant obligations of the Convention,1082 and, thus, any State
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Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (New Application: 1962), [1970]
ICJ Rep 3 [Barcelona Traction]. See also, International Court of Justice, Handbook (The Hague: International Court
of Justice, 2014) at para 1.32.
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Criddle, supra note 1072 at 282.
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Ibid; Barcelona Traction, supra note 1075 at para 35.
1078
D W Greig, “Third Party Rights and Intervention before the International Court” (1992) 32:2 Va J Int’l L 285 at
297.
1079
Joseph William Davids, “Argentina v USA?” (9 August 2014), online (blog): The {New} International Law
<thenewinternationallaw.wordpress.com/tag/icj/>.
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Okowa, supra note 1061 at 495.
1081
Questions Relating to The Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), [2012] ICJ Rep 422 at para
12 [Belgium v Senegal].
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Such as these under arts 6(2), and 7(1) of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984 (entered into force 26 June 1987).
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Party to the Convention can bring a claim to cease the breach. Since no special interest is
required,1083 Belgium seeking compliance with these obligations was found to have standing.

Also, other parties may seek protection of their legal rights in cases before the Court. One option
they have is to become a full party to proceedings1084 bound by the judgment.1085 Joinder may be
one route to become a party.1086 Yet as joinder is typically only initiated by the original parties
plus all parties must consent, it has its limits.1087 If joinder is impossible for the lack of consent,
the additional party’s alternative option is to initiate the Court’s ordinary compulsory
proceedings.1088 But since the responding party must still accept the Court’s jurisdiction this other
option has, just like joinder, the same limits. In other words, and as Greig maintains, if all original
parties are amenable then the other party could be already joined to the original proceedings.1089

Another option that is at the behest of third parties is an intervention governed by articles 62 and
63 of the Statute of the Court.1090 Yet intervention under these two articles has an incidental
character to the main proceedings in that it must relate to the subject matter of the pending case.1091
Thus, the other party cannot raise new issues. Under article 62 it is possible to become either a
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Belgium v Senegal, supra note 1081 at para 669.
Beatrice I Bonafé, “Interests of a Legal Nature Justifying Intervention before the ICJ” (2012) 25:3 Leiden J Intl
L 739 at 740.
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respect of that particular case. Greig, supra note 1078, maintains that article 59 has been used to limit intervention.
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party or a non-party to proceedings.1092 Yet under both scenarios, the intervenor must prove to
have an “interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case.” 1093 In
practice, the scope of article 62 is unclear and largely depends upon the kind of legal interest
claimed.1094 Intervention as a party is not elaborated on in the Statute but was considered by the
Court.1095 The Court opined that it could not grant the party status to an intervening party on its
motion but can only be granted with parties’ consent.1096 Albeit possible, the Court has never
granted permission to intervene as a party. In contrast, for non-party intervention, there is no need
for parties’ consent as the Court grants the status at its discretion.1097 Non-party intervenors have
limited rights without being bound by the Court’s decision. The Court has scarcely granted nonparty interventions, which some claim is due to the restrictive interpretation of article 62.1098

In contrast, a party to a multilateral convention, according to article 63, can intervene as of right
whenever construction of this convention is in question.1099 This view is supported by travaux
preparatoires, subsequent practice, as well as accepted in the literature.1100 Any party to a
convention has the right to be notified and to intervene.1101 Yet the intervenor cannot add a new
provision but may only intervene in the construction of provisions disputed by the original
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parties.1102 Despite having a non-party status, the judgment rendered under this article is equally
binding on parties as well as the intervenor. This article is rarely used, albeit for the right to
intervene the party does not need to prove an interest.1103 The use and protection afforded to third
parties by these two articles are criticized as being close to nothing.1104

Table 48: ICJ
ICJ

Test

Status

Implications

Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings

Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings

Parties**

Bound

Non-parties

Not bound

•
Full right of Standing

Other parties
Intervention
(known as
amicus)

As of right
At the
discretion of
the Court

States* must prove injury to their direct or indirect
interests; but
•
In erga omnes partes cases - no special interest is
needed
May use joinder or initiate new ordinary compulsory
proceedings - all parties must consent
To states that are parties in multilateral treaties of which
construction is questioned
An intervenor must prove having an interest of a legal nature
that may be affected by the decision in the case.

*Member States of the United Nations (UN), non-Member States of the UN which adhere to the ICJ Statute and other non-states; Claims of
natural and legal persons can be brought by states only. It is done through diplomatic protections - the state must first establish the right to do so.
**Have limited right as they cannot raise new issues.

b) WTO
The WTO dispute settlement is reserved for governments of the Member States.1105 Since nongovernmental bodies have no direct access,1106 if interested in the WTO dispute settlement, they
must persuade or pressure a government of the WTO Member State to trigger a dispute.1107 A state
that makes a complaint which was not resolved amicably can bring the case to the panel. To initiate
panel proceedings against a state that in violation of agreements covered by the WTO Dispute
1102
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1107
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Settlement Understanding (DSU) nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to it, a State Party must
request an establishment of a panel that is typically automatically approved at the Dispute
Settlement Board (DSB) meeting.1108 Thus, it is usually the panel that considers the legal basis for
the complaint.1109 A question of standing arose in EC—Bananas III in a complaint brought by the
United States1110 where the panel held that there is no requirement of a legal interest test.1111 The
Appellate Body subsequently upheld the panel’s view that all Members have an interest in
enforcing the WTO rules due to the possible direct or indirect economic effects of a WTO
violation.1112 The Appellate Body in upholding the complainant’s standing was satisfied that the
claimant was a producer and a potential exporter of a product in question. Arguably on a similar
basis but without raising the issue of standing, several states were allowed to bring complaints
against violations of the WTO Agreement on behalf of other member states.1113

Parties to a dispute are the complaining and the responding Member States.1114 Other member
states may become co-complainants (may initiate proceedings in parallel or jointly), corespondents or participate as third parties. In practice, states with large exports that are directly
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affected tend to more likely become co-complainants while those indirectly affected more likely
seek to intervene as third parties.1115 Third parties are not obliged to participate but if they decide
to do so disputing parties have no right to prevent them from becoming a third party.1116 Further,
if a third party considers that a matter previously decided before a panel nullifies or impairs its
benefits, this party may initiate proceedings against respondent regarding these matters before the
original panel.1117

For participation as a third party, a state must have “a substantial interest in a matter before a
panel.”1118 Third states may reserve the right to participate by notifying the DSB.1119 Alternatively,
Member States can cite a “systemic interest” in a dispute. The WTO maintains that in practice
since there is no scrutiny whether the interest is “substantial” any Member State that invokes
systemic interest can participate in panel proceedings.1120 The systemic interest, as argued, is not
a way to circumvent the substantial interest test but a way for the Member States to signal their
deep interest in the case.1121 Third parties’ rights are limited to the opportunity to be heard (active
submissions or a passive presence), to make written submissions, and receive the submissions from
the disputing parties.1122 After consulting disputing parties and if the case so requires, panels may
at their discretion grant enhanced third-party rights.1123 As reported, they have exercised this option

Marc L Busch & Eric Reinhardt, “Three’s a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement” (2006) 58:3
World Pol 446 at 454.
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cautiously on a case by case basis.1124 Since third parties are not directly affected by the
decision,1125 the panel reports do not include conclusions and recommendations with respect to
them.1126 States that participated as third parties in panel proceedings cannot appeal the panel
report, the right is reserved for parties to the dispute,1127 but may only participate in the Appellate
Body review as “third participants”.1128

The Appellate Body distinguishes between a “third party” - a Member State that notified the DSB
about its substantial interest in the matter and the one that may make written submissions and
participate orally in panel proceedings; and a “third participant” - any party that either filed a
written submission or appeared at oral hearings (including a passive appearance). 1129 Member
States that did not participate as third parties cannot participate in the Appellate review1130 unless
they get permission granted at the discretion of the Appellate Body to submit amicus curiae
briefs.1131 In contrast, states that participated as third parties at the panel stage may also do so in
the appeal as the so-called “third participant”.1132 In the current practice, for being a third
participant, third parties have several options with varying degrees of involvement limited to oral
and written submissions.1133 If exercised within prescribed time limits, states may request: to file
third-party submissions and appear at the oral hearing and make an oral statement,1134 or just seek
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the two latter options.1135 After the prescribed time limit, there are options granted at the discretion
of the Appellate Body: the Member States that did not file their submissions may request
permission to appear at the oral hearing and make an oral statement or to be passive observers.1136

Non-governmental bodies, trade association and interested individuals, can only participate before
the panel and the Appellate Body through amicus curiae briefs.1137 This participation is possible
despite the fact, that both the DSU and the Working Procedures for Appellate Review lack specific
provisions about amici for both - panels and the Appellate Body.1138 Amici is, thus, based on that
panels are entitled to seek information,1139 and the Appellate Body may elaborate its working
procedures.1140 Along these lines, the Appellate Body in US—Shrimp held that panels could seek
submissions from NGOs as well as accept non-requested briefs,1141 and in US—Lead and Bismuth
II the Appellate Body argued that if it finds “pertinent and useful to do so” it has the legal authority
to accept amicus curiae briefs.1142 Since these non-governmental bodies and individuals have no
legal right to be heard,1143 panels and the Appellate Body have discretion but no obligation whether
to accept them.1144 The question of amicus briefs and especially unsolicited ones is a controversial
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one,1145 albeit the fact that out of the Appellate Body numerous accepted submissions,1146 none
was unsolicited.1147 Some states oppose this practice by arguing that there is no place for nonparties and especially NGO briefs as disputes are between the Member States only,1148 whereas
other commentators claim that the presence of NGOs before the WTO may impede democracy.1149
Those who support amici briefs maintain that they bring views of those who are not represented
in the dispute - public interests as well as those of industry.1150

Table 49: WTO
WTO

Test

Full right of Standing*

Other parties directly affected

Intervention
As of right
Panel
At the discretion of
the panel
As of right
Appellate Body

At the discretion of
the Appellate Body

Member States that complain about violations of
the WTO Agreement, do not need a “legal
interest”
•
Can become co-complainants in panel
proceedings.
•
Can initiate proceedings against respondent
regarding matters already decided at
previous panel proceedings before the
original panel.
Indirectly affected states must prove:
•
A substantial interest in the matter before a
panel; or
•
A systemic interest
Panels may seek briefs as well as accept nonrequested briefs from NGOs, trade associations
and interested individuals.
States that participated as a third party at the
panel stage.
•
States that did not participate in panel
proceedings
•
Briefs from NGOs, trade associations and
interested individuals

Status

Implications

Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings

Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings

Non-parties

Not bound**

Non-parties

Not bound

*Panels & the Appellate Body. **Cannot appeal a panel report.

Ibid, s 9.3. See also Steve Charnovitz, “WTO Cosmopolitics” (2002) 34:2 NYU J Intl L & Pol 299 at 344–352.
de Chazournes, supra note 1138 at 334. See, for example, US—Lead and Bismuth II, supra note 1142. See also
Del Vecchio, supra note 925 at para 22.
1147
“Dispute Settlement System Training Module”, supra note 529 s 9.3.
1148
Ibid.
1149
Jeffery Atik, “Democratizing the WTO” (2001) 33:3 & 4 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 451 at 459.
1150
de Chazournes, supra note 1138 at 334–335.
1145
1146
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c) Analysis
Standing under the ICJ and the WTO is reserved for states to the exclusion of other non-state
parties. The complaining state: in the ICJ - must prove direct or indirect injury to its interest with
the exception in erga omnes partes cases; in the WTO, for initiating a dispute for violation of the
WTO agreements that nullifies or impairs the party’s benefits, does not need to prove a legal
interest. The only route for non-state parties (NGOs, natural or legal persons, etc.) is to persuade
the Member States: to use diplomatic protection avenue (the ICJ) or persuade or pressure them to
initiate a lawsuit (the WTO).

The Member States of the ICJ with direct or indirect interest that want to participate as additional
parties may do so by using joinder. They become parties to proceedings bound by the judgment.
Yet joinder is typically initiated by the original parties. Alternatively, the additional party may
initiate new proceedings before the Court. Under both scenarios, however, all parties must give
their consent. Similarly, at the WTO panel stage, states that are directly affected may become cocomplainants - proceedings initiated in parallel or jointly. Also, if needed, a third-party state may
initiate proceedings against a respondent regarding matters already decided at previous panel
proceedings before the original panel. At the Appellate Body stage, only states that intervened as
third parties at the panel stage, although they cannot appeal the panel report, may participate as
third participants.

Another option the additional parties have is an intervention - a limited form of participation
known as amicus curiae briefs where intervenors are typically not bound by the judgment. Under
the rules of both bodies, this intervention is granted at the discretion of the hearing court, panel or
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the Appellate Body, except where states intervene as of right as parties to multilateral treaties of
which construction is questioned (the ICJ). The intervening parties must prove that they have an
interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case (the ICJ) or having a
substantial or a systemic interest (the WTO). Despite the inability to appeal the panel decision, the
WTO intervening parties may act as third participants in the appellate stage, whereas third-party
states that did not participate in panel proceedings may only seek permission to submit amicus
curiae briefs. The WTO panels and the Appellate Body may also seek and accept briefs from
NGOs, trade associations and other interested individuals.

4. Domestic and International Tribunals

a) FINRA
FINRA administers compulsory and voluntary arbitration between private parties - customers,
providers of financial services, etc. For FINRA members1151 and associated persons,1152 the
FINRA arbitration is compulsory, whereas for the US customers (also called investors)1153 and
non-member organizations, arbitration before FINRA is optional.1154 FINRA distinguishes
between industry and customer related disputes and, thus, has two sets of arbitral rules that govern
standing - the Customer Code and the Industry Code. The Customer Code governs the relationship
between broker-dealers and their customers,1155 whereas the Industry Code applies to intraindustry disputes that arise out of the business activities of FINRA members - brokerage firms,

1151

Customer Code, supra note 335, r 12100(q); Industry Code, supra note 335, r 13100(q).
Customer Code, r 12100(b)(u); and Industry Code, r 13100(b)(u).
1153
FINRA, Regulatory Notice 16-25 (2016) at para 1, online: FINRA <www.finra.org/industry/notices>
[Regulatory Notice 16-25].
1154
“Guidance on Disputes between Investors and Investment Advisers that are Not FINRA Members” (last visited
28 May 2019), online: FINRA <www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/investment_advisers>.
1155
Customer Code, r 12200.
1152
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brokers and their associated persons.1156 Employment issues are exempted from arbitration unless
parties agree to arbitrate.1157 Yet, if they do, employees of FINRA members have the right to
request FINRA arbitration even if they “agreed to a forum selection clause specifying a venue
other than a FINRA arbitration forum.”1158 Similarly, under the Customer Code,1159 parties must
arbitrate before the FINRA arbitral forum if their written arbitration agreements so require or if
customers of FINRA members so request.1160

Since its compulsory nature, FINRA members cannot override the requirement to arbitrate before
FINRA by any pre-dispute agreement.1161 FINRA, opposing the court’s decision in Credit
Suisse1162 that its members could add agreements requiring customers or employees to arbitrate in
other forums and, thus, bypass the FINRA arbitration, issued a Regulatory Notice that puts
members exercising this practice on notice as violating FINRA rules.1163 In doing so, FINRA
asserts that its “rules are not mere contracts that member firms and associated persons can modify”
noting that their importance lies in protecting rights of customers and employees to choose
arbitration if they wish so.1164 Accordingly, bypassing FINRA arbitration for members is barred
meaning that members that fail to submit its dispute to FINRA violate its rules and may face
disciplinary action.1165

Industry Code, rs 13200, and 13100(b)(u), and (q). See also “Arbitration Overview” (last visited 28 May 2019),
online: <www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/arbitration-overview> [“Arbitration Overview”].
1157
Industry Code, r 13201. See also “Arbitration Overview”, supra note 1156.
1158
Daniel LeGaye, “Forum Selection Involving Customers & Associated Persons” (8 November 2016), online:
LeGaye Law Firm <www.legayelaw.com/forum-selection-provisions-involving-customers-associated-persons/>.
1159
Customer Code, r 12200.
1160
Regulatory Notice 16-25, supra note 1153 at 6–7.
1161
Ibid.
1162
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v Tracy, et al, 812 F (3d) 249 at 254–56 (2d Cir 2016).
1163
Regulatory Notice 16-25, supra note 1153.
1164
Ibid, at 3: considering FINRA rules 12200 and 13200.
1165
Ibid, at 6–7.
1156
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The terms “employees” and “associated persons” seem to cause no difficulty. On the other hand,
the interpretation of the term “customer” gets complicated. A customer (not a broker or dealer),1166
is defined in Citigroup1167 as one who, “either (1) purchases a good or service from a FINRA
member, or (2) has an account with a FINRA member.”1168 Similarly in Lee v AXA Advisors, a
widow - suing a company for her deceased husband’s individual retirement account (IRA) on her
own behalf - was found lacking standing since she was neither customer, nor had she purchased
goods or services from the respondent.1169 Yet the customer in Citigroup was broadly interpreted
when compared to the court’s narrow interpretation in Berthel.1170 Berthel, a managing brokerdealer, provided services to other broker-dealers who sold securities to investors. Despite the
requirement that FINRA members and associated persons (includes Berthel) must arbitrate
disputes with customers in connection with their business activities, the court found that Berthel
did not have to arbitrate as these investors were not his customers noting that there was no direct
relationship between Berthel and the investors.1171 For this lack of common understanding of the
term customer, the US courts face criticism.1172

1166

Customer Code, r 12100(k); and Industry Code, r 13100(k).
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc v Abbar, 761 F (3d) 268 (2d Cir 2014).
1168
Ibid, at 275. See also “Who Qualifies as a ‘Customer’ to Bring a FINRA Arbitration Case?” (16 December
2014), online: Maya Murphy, PC <www.mayalaw.com/tag/finra-rule-12200/>; Brent A Burns, “Second Circuit
defines ‘Customer’ under FINRA Rule 12200 Narrowly” (5 August 2014), online (blog): New York State Bar
Association <nysbar.com/blogs/SecuritiesLitigation/2014/08/second_ciruit_defines_customer.html>. “Chris
Lazarini Discusses Definition of ‘Customer’ under FINRA Rule 12200”, (1 June 2017), online: JD Supra
<www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/chris-lazarini-discusses-definition-of-31096/>.
1169
Mary C Lee vs AXA Advisors, LLC, Larry Dan George, and William Paul Evans (2017), Award, at 3 Case NO
16-03173 (FINRA Arbitration). See also “Widow Lacks Standing In FINRA Arbitration Involving Husband’s IRA”,
(8 December 2017), online: Broke and Broker <www.brokeandbroker.com/3711/widow-ira-finra/>.
1170
Berthel Fisher & Co Fin Servs, Inc v Larmon, 695 F (3d) 749 (8th Cir 2012).
1171
Liz Kramer, “Rule 12200” (5 November 2018), online (blog): Arbitration Nation
<www.arbitrationnation.com/tag/rule-12200/>.
1172
Ibid.
1167

227

Both Customer and Industry Codes provide for the resolution of complex disputes in forms of
multi-party proceedings and, thus, a possibility to initiate actions with multiple complainants,
multiple respondents or both;1173 consolidate separate but related claims;1174 or join an additional
party to proceedings.1175 Since FINRA arbitration is consensual, the rights of third parties are
limited. Albeit they may join proceedings, joinder is only initiated by existing parties, though the
additional parties must provide their consent,1176 and decided by the hearing panel.1177 Otherwise,
FINRA rules do not contain any other provision third parties may use to join proceedings on their
motion and as of right. The only other option third parties have is limited intervention as nonparties in the form of amicus curiae generally accepted in appeals of FINRA disciplinary and
membership proceedings before FINRA’s National Adjudicatory Council (NAC).1178 Before the
NAC, these other parties with the consent of all parties or granted at the discretion of the Council
may submit written amicus curiae briefs to the exclusion of oral arguments or replies.1179

1173

Customer Code, rs 12312–12313; and Industry Code, rs 13312–13313.
Customer Code, rs 12100(m), and 12314; and Industry Code, rs 13100(m), and 13314: This power is within the
authority of the Director of the Office of Dispute Resolution.
1175
Customer Code, rs 12309(c), and 12404; and Industry Code, rs 13309(c), and 13407.
1176
W Reece Bader, Securities Arbitration: Practice and Forms, Release 19 (Huntington: JurisNet, 2013) at 4–10.
1177
Customer Code, r 12404; and Industry Code, r 13407.
1178
“Amicus Brief Guidelines” (last visited 28 May 2019), online: FINRA <www.finra.org/industry/amicus-briefguidelines>. See, for example, Department of Enforcement v Charles Schwab & Company, Inc, (2014), Disciplinary
Decision, at 7 (note 9) (The Board of Governors Financial Industry Regulatory Authority): The FINRA NAC
received: “Amicus Curiae brief of the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc” (May 8, 2013),
online: <www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Amicus-Curiae_Schwab.pdf>; and “Brief of Amici Professors
Barbara Black and Jill Gross in Support of FINRA’s Opening Brief” (May 6, 2013), online:
<lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/amicus-brief-final.pdf>; See also “NASAA Files Amicus Brief Supporting
FINRA’s Efforts to Reverse Ruling that Allows Schwab to Deny Customer Rights” (8 May 2013), online: NASAA
<www.nasaa.org/23053/nasaa-files-amicus-brief-supporting-finras-efforts-to-reverse-ruling-that-allows-schwab-todeny-customer-rights/>.
1179
“Amicus Brief Guidelines” (last visited 28 May 2019), online: FINRA <www.finra.org/industry/amicus-briefguidelines>.
1174
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Table 50: FINRA
FINRA

Test

Status

Implications

Full right of
Standing Consensual

Private parties* with the agreement to arbitrate:
•
Industry disputes - all members compulsory
•
Customer disputes - a person that purchased a good or service from a
FINRA member, or (2) has an account with a FINRA member.

Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings

Other parties

Joinder on request made by one of the parties. All parties must consent.

Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings

Non-parties

Not bound

Intervention
(known as
amicus)

Only written submissions
•
With the consent of parties; or
•
At the discretion of the Tribunal

*Between two or more parties.

b) WIPO
A party to WIPO arbitration may be “any person or entity, regardless of nationality or domicile”1180
- individuals, enterprises as well as public entities (governments, intergovernmental organizations,
industry groups, civil society, etc.).1181 The parties’ relationship in WIPO is consensual: parties
must agree to arbitrate either in contract clauses before a dispute arises, or use submission
agreements for existing disputes.1182 In practice, most disputes are based on contract clauses.1183

The main attributes of international commercial arbitration applicable to WIPO are
confidentiality,1184 privacy,1185 and party autonomy.1186 Under the party autonomy principle,
parties may choose the place of arbitration, the governing law as well as procedures of the

“Frequently Asked Questions” (last visited 29 May 2019), online:
<www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/faq/index.html>.
1181
Consultation with the WIPO via email (13 May 2015, 20:38:21): Parties involved in WIPO cases have also
included public entities, for instance, in the context of R&D disputes.
1182
WIPO Handbook, supra note 331, at para 4.143.
1183
“WIPO Caseload Summary” (last visited 29 May 2019), online: <www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/caseload.html>.
1184
WIPO Arbitration Rules (2014), arts 75–78; WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, arts 68–71. See also WIPO
Handbook, supra note 331 at 4.144; Katia Fach Gómez, “Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International
Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest” (2012) 35:2 Fordham Intl LJ 510 at
526.
1185
WIPO Arbitration Rules, art 55(c); WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, art 49(c).
1186
“Frequently Asked Questions”, supra note 1180.
1180
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dispute.1187 Due to the consensual nature, only parties to an arbitration agreement have been
defined as parties that have standing.1188 All hearings should be in private unless disputing parties
agree otherwise.1189 WIPO rules contain no provision that allows third parties to join proceedings
on their motion and as of right. Joinder of an additional party, initiated only at a request of a
disputing party, may be granted if all parties including the additional one agree. 1190 Likewise,
consolidation of a new case with a subject matter substantially related to a pending one requires
parties consent.1191 Amicus curiae briefs are generally not allowed in private arbitration unless all
disputing parties agree.1192 The role of third parties allowed to participate as amici is ancillary to
the main proceedings, with no adequate opportunity for these parties to present their own cases.
Consequently, they are not bound by decisions rendered by WIPO.1193

Third parties’ participation is further restricted by the strict confidentiality principle that narrows
the range of situations when parties may disclose the existence of arbitration, its details, including
documentary or other evidence, and the award to other parties.1194 In general, all parties must
typically agree before disclosure is made unless the WIPO arbitration rules authorize otherwise,
for instance, where a party wants to challenge the arbitration before a court, enforce the award, or
the disclosure is required by law or a regulatory body, the award falls into public domain, etc.1195
The only time WIPO rules authorize disputing parties to make a unilateral disclosure that directly

1187

Ibid.
WIPO Arbitration Rules, art 59; WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, art 53.
1189
WIPO Arbitration Rules, art 55(c); WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, art 49.
1190
WIPO Arbitration Rules, art 46; WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, art 40.
1191
WIPO Arbitration Rules, art 47; WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, art 41.
1192
Gómez, supra note 1184 at 527.
1193
Guide to WIPO Arbitration, supra note 583 at 11.
1194
WIPO Arbitration Rules, arts 75–77.
1195
Ibid; WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, art 70.
1188
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relates to the rights of a third party is where they owe the obligation of good faith or candor to this
third party.1196

Table 51: WIPO
WIPO

Test

Full right of Standing
- Consensual

Private parties* with the agreement to arbitrate

Other parties
Intervention
(known as amicus)

Joinder on request made by one of the parties. All parties must
consent.
•
With the consent of parties; or
•
At the discretion of the Tribunal

Status

Implications

Parties to
proceedings
Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings
Bound by
proceedings

Non-parties

Not bound

*Between two or more usually private parties.

c) Analysis
In terms of standing, FINRA and WIPO, both administering consensual dispute resolution, have
similar rules. Disputes are typically between two or more private parties with an agreement to
arbitrate. Both forums have provisions related to joinder and the consolidation of proceedings.
Albeit under rules of both forums other parties may be added, the utility of these provisions is
restricted, due to the anticipation that no third parties should become affected. None of them gives
third parties the right to join proceedings at their behest - only an original party may initiate joinder
plus the WIPO rules require consent from all original parties. Equally applicable for both forums
is the general requirement that additional parties cannot be joined against their will but must
consent to joinder. Third parties’ intervention as of right, just like joinder, is not available. This
restriction is in line with international arbitral disputes where third parties’ interventions are
typically only possible with parties’ consent or at the tribunal’s discretion.

1196

WIPO Arbitration Rules, art 75(b); WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, art 68(b).
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5. ISDS Administering Bodies

a) ICSID
Parties to the ICSID vertical disputes are a national of a Contracting State and any relevant
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to
the Centre by that State).1197 Arbitration before ICSID is consensual - disputing parties must
consent to the jurisdiction in writing.1198 Consent may be given through an investment treaty,
national law or stipulated in a clause of an investment contract.1199 In ISDS, states typically consent
to the ICSID jurisdiction through IIAs - they may or may not explicitly mention the Centre1200 that allow investors to choose from among several forums (applicable to all each examined ISDS
forum). Some of these IIAs extend the range of states that may bring their dispute to the Centre to
those that are non-parties to ICSID - for instance, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Poland, and
Tajikistan.1201 If a state grants its consent through an investment treaty, an investor must consent
separately by accepting the state’s offer by writing to the Centre.1202 Albeit there are two parties
to a dispute, only the investor may initiate a claim meaning that states are always respondents. A
state cannot unilaterally revoke once granted consent,1203 yet it may require that all domestic

1197

ICSID Convention, art 25.
Ibid, art 25(1). See also Board of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
“Report Of The Executive Directors On The Convention On The Settlement Of Investment Disputes Between States
And Nationals Of Other States” (March 18, 1965) reprinted in Antonio R Parra, ed, The History of ICSID (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2012) 410 at para 23.
1199
Board of Governors of the IBRD, supra note 1198 at para 24. See also Del Vecchio, supra note 925 at para 55.
1200
See, for instance, North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government
of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, art 1122 (2)(a) (entered into force 1 January
1994) [NAFTA]; Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, art 26(4) (entered into force 16 April 1998) [ECT].
1201
These states are all parties to the ECT. See “The Energy Charter Treaty” (last visited 30 May 2019), online:
Energy Charter <energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-charter-treaty/>.
1202
Board of Governors of the IBRD, supra note 1198 at para 24.
1203
ICSID Convention, art 25(1).
1198
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administrative or judicial remedies must be exhausted first1204 in which case the investor has no
standing until this condition has been fulfilled.

To qualify as a foreign investor the person must be a national - natural or juridical person also
known as a legal person1205 - of one of the ICSID Contracting States.1206 If a natural person has
dual nationality one of which is the nationality of the responding state this person cannot bring the
suit before ICSID.1207 Considering the legal person, the Convention is more flexible in that a legal
person with dual nationality may initiate a dispute if the responding state agrees to treat that person
as a national of another Contracting State.1208 Since the right to access the Centre under the
Convention covers only a limited number of investors, to overcome these limits, the Centre
introduced the Additional Facility Rules (AFR). Accordingly, the AFR extends the scope of the
Convention1209 by applying to investment disputes between parties where one of them is not a
Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State.1210

It is not uncommon that the rights and interests of other parties may become affected.1211
Considering complex disputes that involve multiple parties, ICSID has already accepted a mass
claim,1212 yet both the Convention and the AFR are silent about joinder, third-party intervention

1204

Ibid, art 26.
Ibid, art 25.
1206
“Database of ICSID Member States” (last visited 29 May 2019), online: ICSID
<icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx>: There are 154 Member States.
1207
Board of Governors of the IBRD, supra note 1198 at para 29. See also Del Vecchio, supra note 925 at para 54.
1208
Board of Governors of the IBRD, supra note 1198 at para 30.
1209
ICSID AFR, art 5.
1210
Ibid, art 2(1).
1211
See Bernhard von Pezold and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe, Case No ARB/10/15 (ICSID); Border Timbers
Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co (Private) Limited v
Republic of Zimbabwe (2012), Procedural order No 2, Case No ARB/10/25 at para 18 (ICSID).
1212
Abaclat and Others v Argentine Republic (formerly Giovanna a Beccara and Others v The Argentine Republic)
(2011), Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Case No ARB/07/5 (ICSID) [Abaclat]. See also Susan L
Karamanian, “Introductory Note to Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic: Decision on Jurisdiction and
1205
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as of right1213 and consolidation of cases. As argued, tribunals retain broad discretionary rights
and, thus, they may use joinder and consolidation in cases where just one party objects or where
contracts do not include these points.1214 Since ICSID does not cover consolidation in a strict sense
- meaning consolidation of pending proceedings (covered only by the NAFTA1215 and some
BITs1216), the only one that the Centre may perform is to appoint one tribunal to decide two
formally separate claims.1217 ICSID is equally silent about the rights of affected third parties to the
full standing. These other persons since they are typically domestic citizens that do not qualify as
foreign investors cannot initiate ISDS disputes. Also, since ISDS is a vertical dispute, and ICSID
does not administer horizontal disputes, even foreign nationals may not initiate or join the host
state in its claim against a foreign investor.

The only alternative these persons, called non-disputing parties, have is participation granted at
the discretion of a tribunal. Non-disputing parties may submit written briefs (given after
consultation with parties)1218 or attend or observe all or part of the hearings (unless parties
object).1219 For written submissions, third persons must have a significant interest in the

Admissibility (ICSID)” (2013) 52:3 ILM 667 at 667. See also Jessica Beess und Chrostin, “Sovereign Debt
Restructuring and Mass Claims Arbitration before the ICSID, the Abaclat Case Recent Developments” (2012) 53:2
Harv Intl LJ 505: A suit initially filed by 180,000 Italian bondholders resulted in a case with 60,000 claimants.
1213
S I Strong, “Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An Infringement of Individual
Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?” (1998) 31:4 Vand J Transnat’l L 915. See also Rodrigo Polanco
Lazo, “International Arbitration in Times of Change: Fairness and Transparency in Investor-State Disputes” (2010)
104 Am Soc’y Intl L Proc 591 at 594.
1214
Lazo, supra note 1213 at 594.
1215
NAFTA, art 1126.
1216
Yulia Gabidulina, Multi-Party Proceedings, Mass Claims and Consolidation in Investment Arbitration:
Establishing Consent and Other Prerequisites for Joint Adjudication of Claims (PhD Dissertation Exposé,
University of Vienna, 2016) [unpublished], online: Universität Wien <sscrechtswissenschaften.univie.ac.at/suche/?q=investment+arbitration+expose&id=83984> at para 2.3 (note 14).
1217
Ibid, at 4.
1218
ICSID Arbitration Rules, r 37(2); ICSID AFR, art 41(2).
1219
ICSID Arbitration Rules, r 32(2); ICSID AFR, art 39(2). See also Bennaim-Selvi, supra note 105.
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proceedings.1220 Since they are ancillary to the main proceedings, they must not disrupt them or
unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party.1221 Also, the tribunal must consider whether and
to what extent these submissions will assist in deliberation by bringing some new knowledge or
insight and the extent it would address a matter within the scope of the dispute.1222 ICSID in 2006,
by removing the previous requirement of parties’ consent, gave tribunals greater powers to grant
amici.1223 Before the 2006 change,1224 amicus was granted in Aguas Argentinas since the subject
matter of the dispute involved public interest - water distribution and sewage system.1225 Since
2006, the amicus curiae was considered in Biwater v Tanzania1226 also a case in the realm of the
public domain.1227 This decision that confirmed that amici submissions “do not give third parties
any rights, status or privileges in the proceedings” is, according to Ishikawa, in line with decisions
of previous tribunals.1228

Despite the principle that non-parties to a dispute should not be bound or legally affected by a
decision, in ISDS various non-disputing parties have been affected, for example, Chevron v

1220

ICSID Arbitration Rules, r 37 (2); ICSID AFR, art 41(2).
Ibid.
1222
Ibid.
1223
ICSID Arbitration Rules, r 32 (2); ICSID AFR, art 39(2). The change was proposed in 2005: See “Suggested
Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations” (2005) Working Paper of the ICSID Secretariat at 11, online: ICSID
<icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Suggested%20Changes%20to%20the%20ICSID%20Rules%20and%
20Regulations.pdf>.
1224
ICSID Convention, art 44: Tribunals are required to use rules in effect at the time the parties provided their
consent to arbitration. See also Ishikawa, supra note 249 at 386.
1225
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and Vivendi Universal, SA v Argentine Republic (formerly
Aguas Argentinas, SA, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and Vivendi Universal, SA v Argentine
Re) (2005), Order in response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, Case No
ARB/03/19 at para 19 (ICSID).
1226
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania (2007), Procedural Order No 5 (Amicus Curiae),
Case No ARB/05/22 (ICSID).
1227
Ishikawa, supra note 249 at 387.
1228
Ibid.
1221
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Ecuador1229 and the case filed by Gabriel Resources against Romania,1230 discussed in Chapter 2.
By removing the previous requirement of parties’ consent, ICSID gave tribunals greater powers to
grant amici. Yet their rights to have their day at court continue unchanged. Intervention as a matter
of right remains lacking meaning that amicus curiae briefs are the only existing option for nondisputing parties, thus instead of having standing, these parties’ participation have serious limits restricted as well as based on someone’s discretion. Consequently, since these other persons may
not bring their claims or join pending proceedings, and having no alternative to intervene as of
right, are effectively precluded from protecting their rights and interests.

Table 52: ICSID
ICSID

Test

Full right of Standing
- Consensual

Parties* that agreed to arbitrate

Other parties

No joinder, but tribunals have broad discretionary powers.

Status

Implications

Parties to
proceedings
Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings
Bound by
proceedings

Non-parties

Not bound

Applicant must have a significant interest in the proceedings.
Intervention
(known as amicus)

At the tribunal’s discretion, (no need for parties’ consent):
•
Written submissions after consultation with parties
•
Access to hearings can be blocked if one party objects

*Between a foreign national and a Contracting State - in ISDS granted in IIAs.

b) PCA-UNCITRAL
PCA Arbitration Rules
The 2012 version of the PCA Arbitration Rules, updated following the 2010 revision of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, consolidates four prior sets of the PCA rules that still remain
valid.1231 Standing under the consolidated version is granted to parties that agreed to the PCA’s

1229

Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador (___), Case No 2009-23
(PCA).
1230
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Romania says Gabriel Resources $4.4bn lawsuit over halted project can’t be heard by
arbitrators” (14 June 2018), online: I$D$ Platform <isds.bilaterals.org/?romania-says-gabriel-resources-4>.
1231
See “PCA Arbitration Rules” (last visited 30 May 2019), online: PCA <pca-cpa.org/en/services/arbitrationservices/pca-arbitration-rules-2012/>.
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jurisdiction through investment treaties, contracts or other agreements.1232 Tribunals may deal with
horizontal, vertical as well as multiparty disputes.1233 Former disputes are between two states or
state-controlled entities or between two private parties, vertical ones are, just like ISDS, between
a private party and a state entity, whereas multiparty disputes may have a variety of combinations
involving states, state-controlled entities, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and private
parties.

Typical tools for multi-party proceedings are joinder, consolidation, and intervention.1234 The PCA
rules and the Hague Conventions provide some provisions for joinder and intervention but none
for consolidation. Albeit tribunals may permit joinder of a third person or persons at the request of
an original party,1235 these joining persons must be parties to the arbitration agreement and the
joinder must not be prejudicial to any of the original parties. Given that the PCA rules stress the
party autonomy principle, confidentiality, and privity,1236 it is more likely that for consolidation of
cases parties’ consent would also be required. Regarding intervention, the Centre distinguishes
between intervention by non-disputing parties and third persons. The rights of non-disputing
parties - states that are parties to multilateral agreements - have been contemplated by the Hague
Conventions.1237 These non-disputing states that are parties to multilateral treaties have the right
to intervene in disputes that are related to the interpretation of these multilateral treaties and are

1232

PCA Arbitration Rules, art 1.
Ibid. See also PCA Arbitration Rules at 4. According to the Hague Convention 1899, art 26; and the Hague
Convention 1907, art 47, the Court’s jurisdiction may extend to non-Signatory Powers/ non-Contracting Powers,
respectively.
1234
Klas Laitinen, Multi-party and multi-contract arbitration mechanisms in international commercial arbitration
(Master Thesis, University of Helsinki Faculty of Law, 2014) [unpublished] at para 1.2.
1235
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 17(5).
1236
UNCTAD, “Dispute Settlement: General Topics: 1.3 Permanent Court of Arbitration” (2003), online: UNCTAD
<unctad.org> at paras 5.9, and 5.12.
1237
Hague Convention 1899, art 56; Hague Convention 1907, art 84.
1233
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bound by the reached decision. Yet there are no procedures that govern this intervention in the
Hague Conventions or the PCA rules.1238 Similarly, there are no procedures that cover the rights
of other parties, that includes right to standing, right to limited intervention including amicus
curiae briefs, that are not parties to an agreement but their rights and interests have been
affected.1239 Since hearings are conducted in camera unless parties agree otherwise1240 and, thus,
in private, all non-disputing parties, who are not permitted to intervene as of right or at the
discretion (including the public), are excluded. Along confidential proceedings also the publication
of awards is restricted since parties’ consent is needed.1241 Accordingly, other parties have no right
to intervene, whereas, regarding amici, it is more likely that this intervention may ensue with the
parties’ consent1242 or at the tribunal’s discretion under the general rules.

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
The PCA administers the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules1243 in horizontal (between private parties)
and vertical (investor-state) disputes. As noted, standing in ISDS is governed by the relevant treaty
and is granted by the host state to foreign investors of the other signatory state or states. Since
2010 the UNCITRAL rules permit joinder of third parties at the request of any disputing party.1244

1238

UNCTAD, supra note 1236 at para 5.12.
Similarly, the PCA model law contains no provisions for either consolidation, joinder or intervention. See
“Model Clauses and Submission Agreements” (last visited 30 May 2019), online: PCA <pca-cpa.org/model-clausesand-submission-agreements/>.
1240
PCA Arbitration Rules, art 28(3); PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of Which
Only One is a State, art 25(4).
1241
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Diana Rosert, Investment Treaty Arbitration: Opportunities to reform
arbitral rules and processes, IISD Report (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2014) at para 4.1.
1242
UNCTAD, supra note 1236 at para 5.12. See also Richard Allen & Leng Sun Chan, “Comparative Chart of
International Investment Arbitration Rules” (29 May 2018), online: Global Arbitration News
<globalarbitrationnews.com/comparative-chart-of-international-investment-arbitration-rules/>.
1243
UNCITRAL Rules are also administered by other arbitral institutions, for instance, ICSID and the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC).
1244
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 17(5); The UNCITRAL rules 1976 were silent about joinder of additional
parties. See also Lazo, supra note 1213 at 594.
1239
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Yet a joining third party must be a party to the arbitration agreement, and the joinder must not be
prejudicial to any existing party. Despite the UNCITRAL rules being silent about consolidation,
consolidation is possible if parties agree.1245 For the purposes of ISDS, in 2013, the UNCITRAL
rules were extended by the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration.1246

Intervention is a form of participation typically granted either as a matter of right or at the
discretion of the court. The UNCITRAL rules that applied prior to the Rules on Transparency are
silent about intervention as of right or at the discretion and provide for hearings to be in camera,1247
a procedure that effectively blocks participation by any other party except parties to the dispute.1248
In contrast, the Rules on Transparency contain provisions related to interventions granted at the
discretion of the tribunal.1249 These Rules on Transparency while considering other parties’
interests, distinguish between non-disputing parties to a treaty (other signatory states), and other
persons called third persons.1250 Under these Rules, hearings should be public except for
confidentiality reasons or to preserve the integrity of the process.1251 If there is a conflict between

1245

UNCTAD, supra note 888 at 183.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), art 1(4): For ISDS these rules include UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency
in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, art 1 [Rules on Transparency]. These adopted rules apply to treaties
concluded before 1 April 2014 if Parties to a treaty, or disputing parties, agree to their application, or they apply to
treaties concluded on or after 1 April 2014 unless parties agree otherwise. United Nations Convention on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, 17 March 2015, known as Mauritius Convention on
Transparency (entered into force 18 October 2017) provides a mechanism through which states can extends the
application of these rules retrospectively. See also Maria Beatrice Deli, “Transparency in the Arbitral Procedure” in
Andrea Gattini, Attila Tanzi & Filippo Fontanelli, eds, General Principles of Law and International Investment
Arbitration (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2018) 45 at 49. See also Bart Wasiak, “The Mauritius Convention on
Transparency Enters into Force | Publications and Presentations” (19 October 2017), online: Arnold & Porter
<www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/10/the-mauritius-convention-on-transparency>.
1247
See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), art 25(4); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), art 28(3); UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (2013), art 28(3).
1248
Bennaim-Selvi, supra note 105 at 790.
1249
Rules on Transparency, arts 1(5), and 4–5.
1250
Ibid, arts 4–5.
1251
Ibid, art 6.
1246
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the applicable arbitral rules and the Rules on Transparency, the latter should prevail.1252 Tribunals
should allow or after consulting disputing parties may invite submissions from non-disputing
parties to a treaty related to the interpretation of this treaty.1253 After consulting disputing parties,
tribunals may also accept submissions from non-disputing parties that relate to other issues within
the scope of the dispute.1254 Any of these submissions should not be prejudicial to any party or
disrupt or unduly burden proceedings,1255 and disputing parties should have sufficient opportunity
to present their observation on these submissions.1256 Similarly, after consultation with disputing
parties, a tribunal may allow submissions regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute made
by a third person.1257 By allowing submissions, called amici briefs,1258 tribunals do not grant any
substantive rights.1259
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Ibid, art 7.
Ibid, art 5.
1254
Ibid.
1255
Ibid, art 5(4).
1256
Ibid, art 5(5).
1257
Ibid, art 4. See also Mariel Dimsey, “Article 4. Submission by a Third Person” in Dimitrij Euler et al, eds,
Transparency in International Investment Arbitration: A Guide to the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in TreatyBased Investor-State Arbitration (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 128. See also Fernando Dias
Simoes, “A Guardian and a Friend: The European Commission’s Participation in Investment Arbitration” (2017)
25:2 Mich St Intl L Rev 233 at 243.
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For example, in Methanex, supra note 107: The Tribunal made clear that it is in its authority to allow written
submissions (ibid paras 24, 47, and 49) but declined authority to grant attendance to oral hearings (ibid paras 41, and
47); In United Parcel Service of America Inc v Government of Canada (2007), Decision on Petitions for
Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae of 17 October 2001, Case No UNCT/02/1 (ICSID): The tribunal
decided that it is its discretion to grant amici (ibid para 61) yet declined its authority to grant access to hearings
without parties’ consent. In Glamis Gold, Ltd v The United States of America (2009), Award, at para 286, and
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Kyla Tienhaara, “Third Party Participation in Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent Developments” (2007)
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Table 53: PCA-UNCITRAL
PCA

Test

Status

Implications

Full right of Standing Consensual**

Parties that agreed to arbitrate*

Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings

Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings

Non-parties

Not bound

Non-parties

Not bound

Non-parties

Not bound

Non-parties

Not bound

Other parties**
Intervention
(known as amicus)
As of right
PCA Rules
At the
discretion
As of right
UNCITRAL
Rules

At the
discretion

Joinder at the request of a party.
Joining persons must be parties to the arbitration agreement and
the joinder must not be prejudicial to any of original parties
Contemplated under the Hague Convention to non-disputing
parties in disputes related to the interpretation of multilateral
treaties.
Most likely with parties’ consent.
Tribunals shall allow or invite submissions from non-disputing
parties to a treaty related to the interpretation of this treaty
•
Submissions from non-disputing parties that relate to
other issues within the scope of the dispute, or
•
Submissions made by a third person

*In ISDS a foreign national and a Contracting State - granted in IIAs and accepted by the investor. **The PCA and the UNCITRAL rules since
2010.

c) ICC Court
The ICC Court deals with both types of relationships, horizontal (between private parties) and
vertical (investor-state) - each governed by different types of binding agreements. ISDS, as noted,
is typically governed by IIAs - about 18 percent of them all allow the ICC as a potential forum.1260
By March 2018, the Court has administered 39 ISDS cases based on BITs. 1261 These cases were
governed by several versions of the ICC Arbitration Rules.1262 Rules prior to 2012 had a narrowly
formulated scope - they referred to disputes as “business disputes”1263 - yet under these rules, the

Rocío Digón & Marek Krasula, “The ICC’s Role in Administering Investment Arbitration Disputes” in Arthur
W Rovine, ed, Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2014,
Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2015) 58 at 59. See also Jean Kalicki, “The Prospects for Amicus Submissions, Outside the ICSID Rules” (14
September 2012), online (blog): Kluwer Arbitration Blog <arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/09/14/theprospects-for-amicus-submissions-outside-the-icsid-rules/>.
1261
“ICC announces 2017 figures confirming global reach and leading position for complex, high-value disputes” (7
March 2018), online: ICC - International Chamber of Commerce <iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/iccannounces-2017-figures-confirming-global-reach-leading-position-complex-high-value-disputes/>.
1262
The ICC Arbitration Rules (2017) are current rules. Previous versions are from 1988, 1998 and 2012. See Digón
& Krasula, supra note 1260 at 60.
1263
ICC Arbitration Rules (1998), art 1(1). See also Commission on Arbitration and ADR, supra note 666 at para
26.
1260
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Court had administered 9 ISDS cases.1264 Since 2012, the ICC Arbitration Rules no longer contain
the word “business” instead they refer to “disputes” only - an amendment that extended the scope
to ISDS.1265 This extension is reflected in more than a doubled the number of administered ISDS
cases since then.1266

Disputing parties do not have to be members of the ICC to have their disputes administered by the
Court, but all parties must agree to the ICC arbitration. The ICC Rules stress the need for a binding
agreement between parties.1267 Thus, there must be an arbitration agreement or a presumption of
agreement to arbitrate to have standing, meaning that non-parties to the arbitration agreement
cannot bring a dispute nor be forced to arbitrate.1268 Since disputes may arise between more than
two parties as well as become complex, the ICC Arbitration Rules provide for multi-parties’
proceedings1269 and affords tools like consolidation1270 and joinder.1271

The Court will not consolidate pending proceedings on its motion1272 but only at the request of an
existing party.1273 Consolidation is possible under one of the three following scenarios: (1) all
parties agree; (2) all claims are made under the same arbitration agreement; or (3) claims may be
made under multiple arbitration agreements if “the arbitrations are between the same parties, the
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Digón & Krasula, supra note 1260 at 60–62.
See ICC Arbitration Rules (2012), art 1(2). See also Nathalie Voser, “Overview of the Most Important Changes
in the Revised ICC Arbitration Rules” (2011) 29:4 ASA Bulletin 783 at para 2.
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ICC Arbitration Rules (2017), art 6(4). See also Commission on Arbitration and ADR, supra note 666 at para
31. See also Voser, supra note 1265 at para 4.2.2. See also Strong, supra note 1213 at 966.
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Voser, supra note 1265 at para 4.2.2.
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The Arbitration Rules (2017), art 8. About a third of all ICC arbitrations are multi-party arbitrations See Ibid at
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<library.iccwbo.org/dr-statisticalreports.htm>.
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1265

242

disputes in the arbitrations arise in connection with the same legal relationship,” and these multiple
agreements are compatible.1274 The final decision of whether to consolidate is for the Court.1275

Values of privity and party autonomy are also present in the requirements surrounding joinder, a
tool that allows a limited range of additional interested parties to join and intervene in proceedings.
Successfully joined parties become parties to proceedings with all rights and responsibilities
attached to it. A joining party, just as with consolidation, must be a party to the same arbitration
agreement as between the original parties1276 or to another arbitration agreement between the
joining party and the one that seeks to join the party.1277 Thus, non-parties to the arbitration
agreement cannot join proceedings, the only route for those wishing to participate, even if affected
by the decision, is to get consent from all disputing parties, nor be forced to do it.1278 Since
claimants that need more respondents may, at the beginning of the proceedings, file a claim against
multiple respondents (albeit they may use joinder too), joinder is in practice most often used by
respondents.1279 Joinder must be initiated by one of the existing parties before confirmation or
appointment of an arbitrator since after then no joinder is possible unless all parties including the
joining one agree.1280 As Bennaim-Selvi claims “third-party standing would imply significant
procedural changes and a different approach to disputes.”1281 Joinder, as argued, is “the first step”
toward third parties’ right to intervene in the ICC arbitration.1282 Yet joinder does not give these
third parties the right to join proceedings on their behest since only original parties wishing to
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Ibid.
Voser, supra note 1265 at para 5.4.
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ICC Arbitration Rules (2017), art 6(4)(i).
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ICC Arbitration Rules (2017), art 6(4)(ii). See also Voser, supra note 1265 at para 5.1.
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submit arbitration against another party may initiate it1283 giving the other parties to the arbitration
agreement minimal opportunity to have their say.

The ICC rules are silent about the rights of third parties to intervene as amici.1284 This lack stems
from the general practice in the realm of international private law that does not permit intervention
without the parties’ consent. Accordingly, additional parties may only intervene if original parties
agree to it. A similar restriction similarly applies in procedures governing hearings.1285 While all
parties to proceedings are entitled to attend, “persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be
admitted,” unless parties or tribunal agree.1286As argued, ISDS is not a private dispute because of
the presence of a state and its role in resolving matters that are frequently of public interest. Yet
the IIAs’ typical silence about third parties submission does not assist these amici briefs.1287 Since
amicus in ISDS is regarded as an important tool, the ICC announced it would research this area.1288
However, the ICC task force behind the 2012 Rules revision declined to incorporate provisions
allowing amici briefs as believing that tribunals could allow them if parties consented.1289
Recently, the ICC confirmed that in treaty-based arbitration tribunals may, after consulting the
parties, allow amici.1290 In essence, because of the above requirements, the legal rights of third
parties have been treated as exceptions rather than the rule.1291
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Voser, supra note 1265 at para 5.1.
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Table 54: ICC Court
ICC Court

Test

Full right of Standing
- Consensual

Parties* that agreed to arbitrate

Other parties

Joinder of a non-disputing party only on a request of a party**

Intervention
(known as amicus)

•
•

If all parties consent, or
At the tribunal’s discretion after consulting parties

Status

Implications

Parties to
proceedings
Parties to
proceedings

Bound by
proceedings
Bound by
proceedings

Non-parties

Not bound

*In ISDS a foreign national and a Contracting State - granted in IIAs. **The joining party must be either a party to the same arbitration
agreement as between the original parties or to another arbitration agreement between the joining party and the one that seeks to join the party.

d) Analysis
Among the ISDS administering bodies, ICSID is the only one that deals with purely vertical
disputes, whereas the PCA-UNCITRAL and the ICC ordinarily deal with a variety of combinations
involving horizontal and vertical disputes based on private agreements as well as treaties. The
broader reach of the latter two forums stems from their commercial origin - they incorporate
provisions related to private arbitration as well as rules modified or newly introduced to encompass
ISDS cases. Standing in private disputes is guaranteed to parties with an arbitration agreement,
whereas in ISDS participatory rights are governed by IIAs and limited to a foreign investor and a
host state meaning that they do not authorize disputes to be initiated against a home state or another
private party. In both these types of arbitration, procedural rules of the arbitration administering
organization supplement the original governing legal document (a contract or a Treaty). The
typically vague character of IIAs underscores the importance of these supplemental procedures. In
principle, besides the right to initiate disputes, disputing parties have a range of other rights - the
right to choose the governing law, procedures, etc.

In contrast, the rights of other interested parties are limited. Since IIAs are typically silent about
other parties’ rights - they do not authorize or prohibit their participation, it is up to the arbitration
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administering bodies to accommodate third parties’ rights by letting them participate. Yet these
forums generally do not grant the right to standing or intervene as of right to anyone except the
disputing parties, meaning that the rights of other interested parties (non-disputing parties, third
parties or non-parties to the arbitral agreement) have been typically pretty limited. ICSID does not
have any provision governing joinder, except that tribunals have broad discretionary powers that
make it potentially possible. The other forums - the PCA and the ICC - allow joinder of an
additional party only if that party is a party to the same arbitration agreement or have another
arbitration agreement with the party that seeks to join them (the ICC Court) and only at the request
of an original party. Further and along the fact that they cannot join proceedings on their motion,
other interested parties that are without the agreement to arbitrate may only possibly join
proceedings if all parties agree. Similar organizational limitations apply to consolidation: ICSID
allows tribunals to consolidate related cases at their discretion, whereas the PCA and the ICC make
it possible only at the request of disputing parties. Although in principle it is possible to consolidate
cases between the same as well as different parties, its use is confined to claims that fall under the
same arbitration agreement. This requirement leaves no alternative to non-parties to private
arbitration as well as other parties that qualify as domestic parties or have their rights violated by
another private party in ISDS.

The last remaining alternative other interested parties may have at their behest is amicus curiae.
As argued, even if IIAs and procedural rules of these forums are silent about amici, arbitral
tribunals may also act on their initiative.1292 This participation is from its nature very restrictive.
Among all forums, only non-disputing parties - states to treaties which interpretation is questioned
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Simoes, supra note 1257 at 245 (note 64).
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- have the right to intervene (the PCA-UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency). Otherwise, amicus is
typically granted if the disputing parties consent (the PCA Rules) or at the discretion of the tribunal
after consulting parties (the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency and the ICC). ICSID is an
exception to this trend as its rules require that amici must have a significant interest in the
proceedings and assist the proceedings. Parties’ consent is not needed but must be consulted and
if one party objects application for amicus can be blocked. Amici participation is ancillary to the
main proceedings; thus, the intervening abilities are limited. Parties participating as amici are
typically not bound by the judgment, except when non-disputing states intervene in the
interpretation of a treaty. In sum, IIAs restrict the range of persons able to invoke arbitration.
States, the signatories of these IIAs, gave to these arbitral forums a power to draft their rules (states
are not represented in these processes), but all treat third parties’ participation as an exception.
Since these arbitration houses compete among themselves, the more they are beneficial to those
who may initiate dispute - foreign investors - the more appealing to investors they are. Thus, having
unfair rules by placing a further hurdle on participatory rights of other affected parties, these
arbitral forums increase benefits granted to investors.

6. Comparative Remarks

In this chapter, I presented a series of procedural rules related to participatory rights. The rules
spanned domestic courts, supranational and international courts, a quasi-judicial body, and
domestic and international tribunals. This range of adjudicative bodies provided a spectrum of
approaches to the participation principle and, as such, to the right to protect one’s rights and
interests in adjudicative proceedings. Each of the examined bodies has different rules yet each of
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them typically guarantees the full right of standing to all parties to the dispute that have a
sufficiently strong legal interest.

The participatory rights of other affected non-parties stand in contrast to the full right of standing.
While states traditionally recognize that third parties might have an interest in other parties’ legal
disputes, this recognition is not universal. Moreover, there is a difference between other parties
that are directly and personally affected by a decision and those that seek to intervene in the public
interest. While the former should be entitled to a full right of standing to the extent of their interest,
the latter’s participation is typically limited because the interest is not direct or personal.

For parties that are affected directly by a lawsuit, the fairest representation out of examined forums
is afforded by domestic courts, which require all interested parties to be notified and have their
day before the court. Standing is also anticipated for third parties at the CJEU as implied by the
fact that third parties that have not been heard, where a judgment is prejudicial to their rights, can
contest the Court’s decisions. In addition, the ECHR can hear claims by directly-affected third
parties, yet since the Court is resolving disputes that relate to a violation of human rights, the scope
of this alternative is rather narrow - only possible on behalf of a deceased claimant whose human
rights were violated if this third person is closely related to the deceased claimant.

The next in the spectrum of representation of other affected parties are the two bodies that
specialize in state-state disputes: the ICJ and the WTO. Unlike the domestic courts, the ICJ requires
that all the parties must have consented to its jurisdiction in all proceedings, including joinder
proceedings. The ICJ guarantees the right to intervene to third parties that are parties to a
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multilateral convention in cases where the convention has been invoked. Although such
intervention is guaranteed and the third party is bound by the judgment, the party’s right is also
limited in that the party cannot raise new issues. In other types of cases, intervention is
discretionary, and the intervening state must prove that it has a legal interest that may be affected
by the ICJ’s decision. Similarly, the WTO, allows directly affected states to be co-complainants.
Further, the WTO allows third parties to participate as amici before WTO panels and to be third
participants in Appellate Body proceedings.

The remaining arbitration tribunals are at the other end of the spectrum due to the limited
representation they allow for third parties. Even so, there are two groups of arbitral tribunals that
must be distinguished. The first group, consisting of FINRA and WIPO, deals with purely private
disputes, whereby all parties must generally agree to arbitrate. In the case of FINRA, its arbitration
is compulsory for members such that they violate the FINRA rules if they choose any other private
arbitral forum. In contrast, consumers and employees of FINRA members are free to refer their
disputes to another private arbitral body. Unlike FINRA, WIPO does not limit its authority to any
particular membership. Also, while WIPO specializes in intellectual property rights, it can accept
any type of commercial dispute.

In these private arbitral forums, the rules define the parties that have a full right of standing but
are silent on the rights of third parties affected by the dispute. Although other parties may join the
proceedings, this can be done only at the request of an original party. The only option for a third
party at its own behest is an application to intervene as amici. However, this type of intervention
is only granted where the original parties consent or at the discretion of the tribunal. This limitation
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on the participatory rights of third parties stems from the fact that disputes decided by these bodies
are characterized as part of a discretely private realm, where it is anticipated that third parties are
not affected and where party autonomy is constituted as the substitute foundational principle.

By contrast, ISDS deals far less, if at all, with purely private disputes in the resolution of claims
by private parties against sovereign states. Yet the full right of standing in ISDS cases is limited
to the foreign investor and the host state. Although third parties may be able to join proceedings,
under the PCA-UNCITRAL and the ICC rules this joinder can be initiated only by one of the
original parties and not at the third party’s behest or under the ICSID rules it can come at the
discretion of the tribunal. Moreover, according to the PCA-UNCITRAL and the ICC rules, the
joining party must be part of a mutual arbitration agreement with original parties, which indicates
how joinder stems from a commercial spirit of the arbitration rules that is hardly applicable in
treaty-based arbitration. Limited participation as of right is contemplated only under the PCA and
the UNCITRAL rules; it applies to non-disputing States under the treaty only if the disputing
parties question the treaty’s interpretation. For other issues and other interested parties, the last
opportunity to participate is discretionary intervention. Under the ICSID rules parties must show
that they have a significant interest in proceedings. Although this discretionary intervention is
available under the ICSID, the UNCITRAL and the ICC rules without parties’ consent (except
under the PCA Arbitration Rules where the consent might be required), the original parties must
be consulted, and if one party under the ICSID rules objects, such intervention can be blocked.

In contrast to FINRA and WIPO, ISDS arbitral bodies frequently deal with issues of far-reaching
implications for sovereign states, their regulatory space, and their citizens. Yet their rules do not
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reflect this fact. The system as it stands is ill-suited for claims that involve the legal rights of other
parties. Although proponents of ISDS claim that it is superior to domestic courts, including in
terms of fairness, domestic courts are superior when it comes to representation and, more broadly,
fairness (see Table 55). That is, domestic courts recognize that other parties may have legal rights
that need protection and they provide them with the right to standing. In contrast, ISDS gives
preferential treatment in general to foreign investors, in comparison to any other group, and,
moreover, it disregards the rights of other affected parties in individual proceedings.

FORUM

Table 55: Domestic Courts versus ISDS

Domestic courts
(the UK and the US)

ISDS Arbitral Forums
(ICSID, PCA-UNCITRAL and ICC)

Disputing parties*
Anyone directly affected or having an
interest**
In the US, anyone who shares with the main
action a common question of law or fact***
In the US, anyone who shares with the main
action a common question of law or fact***
Yes
Busybodies

A foreign investor and host state

THE FORM OF PARTICIPATION
Full right of Standing
Right to intervene**
Discretionary intervention with the
full party status
Amicus as of right - limited to support
existing parties
Discretionary Amicus****
No participation

No
Joinder only at parties’ request
Only the PCA-UNCITRAL to nondisputing states
Yes
All other parties

*Possibly multiple parties, other parties may join proceedings. **Parties gain the full party status. ***The right may be granted by a statute or to
parties with an interest in the matter. ****Granted to support one of the parties, or in cases of public interest.

Because of ISDS’s broad implications, the rules of ISDS administering bodies should embrace
provisions that guarantee the right to participate, as in domestic private litigation such as tort
proceedings, for those who are negatively affected by the lawsuit. On this note, the view that thirdparty standing needs a different approach to disputes and is impossible without significant
procedural changes points to the fundamental gap between ISDS proceedings and fair
representation. Although the achievement of fairness in ISDS might seem overwhelming, it is
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clearly within the powers of ISDS arbitral bodies and inevitable, in a fair proceeding, that the right
to participate will be guaranteed for all of those potentially wronged by an ISDS lawsuit.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation was to assess whether concerns that ISDS is an unfair or biased
system due to a lack of institutional safeguards are substantiated. In this study, I focused on
safeguards that are linked to the control of the use and prevention of abuse of powers and that are
recognized as attributes of a fair trial: values of fairness and adjudicative independence and
impartiality. I based my research on the assumption that these values are universal. This
assumption stems from the fact that the values are protected by private and public law, and in a
wide range of domestic and international legal systems, despite the existence of competing values.
The protection of different competing values requires balancing. Since not all forums seek to
protect the same set of values, it is natural that the safeguards of shared values afforded by different
adjudicative bodies vary to some extent in their form and degree.

The protection of these values is typically provided by legislative and adjudicative bodies,
respectively through legislative acts, treaties, etc. or through institutional design, internal
procedures, and procedural rules. An essential part of the control of the use and the prevention of
misuse of powers is in most cases done by primary law (legislative acts, treaties, etc.), although
the same is not true for ISDS since IIAs are generally vague and do not deal with values and their
safeguards. Consequently, protection of the values is left in the hands of ISDS administering
bodies that are empowered to draft their own working procedures and procedural rules.
Accordingly, although I examined all relevant legislative acts, the core focus of my research was
on the institutional design of adjudicative bodies and their governing procedures.
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ISDS is controversial and has proponents and critics. It is relatively young and faces difficulties in
areas where other adjudicative systems, after centuries of development, have found solutions. For
ISDS, since it is an adjudicative regime claimed to be based on the rule of law, fair rules and
procedures are of the essence. The request for complex and carefully drafted rules is underscored
by the fact that ISDS covers a broad array of parties and interests and because it encroaches on the
powers of sovereign states affecting their citizens.

Some of the controversies about ISDS relate to its existence and some relate to its assigned
qualities. A common argument for the existence of ISDS is that it is an adjudicative system that
is, for its neutrality and freedom from bias, superior to domestic courts and that it provides
safeguards at least equal to these courts. Yet this view is not universally shared. Some
commentators see ISDS as a form of protection of foreign investment that is outright absurd others
argue that ISDS is biased in favor of industry and others criticize its institutional design as
inadequate or as having serious flaws relating to a lack of institutional safeguards and, thus, they
question its neutrality and fairness. Among the debated safeguards are those that guarantee
adjudicative independence and impartiality. Fairness, on the other hand, is questioned from the
point of view of whether all of those affected by ISDS decisions can adequately participate in the
process. Some critics seek systemic reforms, whereas others argue for its entire removal. Since
these views about the core - independence, impartiality, and fairness - of adjudication in ISDS are
so contradictory, I decided not only to assess the protections of these shared values afforded by
ISDS but also to compare ISDS with a variety of adjudicative regimes in other contexts. This
strategy was intended to give a more robust picture of whether ISDS is effective in controlling the
use and preventing the abuse of powers as well as to show whether systemic reform is warranted.
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Shared values can be safeguarded at different stages of the adjudicative process using a variety of
techniques. To keep the project manageable, I decided to examine a few essential safeguards:
adjudicative independence (and impartiality) and fairness. Considering the former, I examined
methods of adjudicative appointment, methods of case assignments, separation of these two
processes, and personal security in the form of tenure and guaranteed remuneration. All of these
safeguards are typically used well before disputes have commenced and deal with mechanisms of
separation of powers. They seek the same end: guaranteed adjudicative independence and
impartiality as protection against unfair, politically motivated decisions. From the perspective of
fairness, I examined another core feature of adjudication: the right to standing, with a particular
focus on affected parties that have a legal interest (since any adjudicative system that limits the
access of the aggrieved is unfair and selective in its intake of relevant information). An
adjudication based on inadequate information cannot reach a fair outcome including for those
already wronged, who are then hurt both by the original conduct or omission that is in dispute and
by the adjudicative process itself.

The enlisted safeguards suggest that different mechanisms have been devised for various stages of
the adjudicative process to cover a variety of risks from a variety of sources with the same goal in
mind: adjudicative independence and impartiality. These risks may come from external sources,
like executive or legislative bodies, parties to a dispute, friends, etc., or they may arise internally
from the adjudicative branch. Since each has its own unique purpose, no mechanism should be
treated as redundant or discarded as irrelevant.
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I embarked on this comparative study by examining methods, checks, and balances of the
separation of powers. I dealt with safeguards of values of adjudicative independence and
impartiality in two separate phases. First, I examined two typically distinct processes employed
before the commencement of proceedings: the process of adjudicative appointment and the process
of case assignment. Separation of powers in these processes helps to prevent politically or other
ill-motivated adjudicative appointments and case assignments. Second, I examined the use of the
two most essential personal security mechanisms, also established before the commencement of
proceedings: security of tenure and financial security. These tools safeguard against inappropriate
influences, incentives or threats, and potential conflicts of interest. Each of these processes and
securities can use robust methods and integrate multiple tools to cover all facets of the process, or
weak ones that use a limited number of devices and leave parts of the process open to abuse. Lastly,
I dealt with safeguards of procedural fairness focusing on whether all stakeholders have been
treated fairly in terms of participatory rights. In doing so, I mapped the right to standing and
assessed whether other parties have the right to participate to the extent of their legal interests.

I presented and analyzed the dataset that served as the basis for my analysis in chapters 4-6. The
data show a spectrum of approaches among all selected adjudicative bodies ranging from forums
that use robust multi-level protections to organizations that use, if any at all, weak or scarce
safeguards. My findings show that the pattern in all the three segments covered in chapters 4, 5
and 6 remains consistent.

After analyzing all the findings, the outcome is as follows. First, domestic, European, and
international courts use similar and the most robust institutional safeguards of all of the examined
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values among all comparators. These safeguards differ in, for instance, the number of appointing
authorities, the length and a possibility of a repetition of the tenure term, the amount of guaranteed
remuneration, allowances and terms of pension, the exact type of allocative method of case
assignment, etc. However, the relevance of these differences is marginal since the focus of the
study is on whether the individual comparators employ the safeguards or some other alternatives.
Until recently, the ICJ differentiated itself from the other courts in allowing its judges to do
external professional work. Practices such as these undermine other protections afforded to
safeguard adjudicative independence and impartiality since they create a room for a potential
conflict of interest. Yet, the ICJ recognized that this practice was problematic and reconsidered it
such that its judges are no longer allowed to participate in ISDS.

Concerning fairness, typically all of these courts anticipate that third parties may need to protect
their interests and thus guarantee some form of right to standing as opposed to mere discretionary
intervention. In this respect, the most accessible are domestic courts followed by the CJEU. The
next is the ECHR which, due to the personal nature of the rights it protects, provides more limited
access to other parties. For the ICJ, the Court always requires the consent of all parties involved,
a practice that restricts another state party that seeks to protect its interest and its right to join or
initiate new proceedings. Further, a discretionary type of intervention that typically seeks to
support issues raised by one of the parties or some higher public interest is possible at all of the
courts. These facts suggest that, among all of the courts, the ECHR and the ICJ provide the most
restrictive participatory rights.
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Second, there are domestic and international bodies - the WTO and FINRA - that use a mixture of
safeguarding techniques but skip some others. Despite being placed in the same group, their use
of safeguards is not identical. For appointments and case assignments, the WTO Appellate Body
has characteristics similar to courts but WTO panels, like FINRA panels, are constituted ad hoc
and influenced by parties. The WTO affords tenure and some financial security to its Appellate
Body members (but not panelists), whereas FINRA provides none. Both bodies prescribe the fees
such that adjudicators are paid for individual tasks performed and both remunerate them internally.
Since the disputing parties are excluded from this remunerative process, they cannot use
remuneration to influence their adjudicators’ decision-making. Both bodies use mechanisms,
including caps or limits to the length of proceedings that curb the level of income that their
adjudicators may receive. These mechanisms, without questioning the integrity of individual
adjudicators, help to speed up the decision-making process and boost public confidence that
adjudicators cannot artificially drag on proceedings to increase their income. Both bodies use an
objective case assignment mechanism: rotation by the WTO Appellate Body (excluding panels)
and a neutral allocative system by FINRA. The WTO Appellate Body’s allocative method based
on rotation guarantees evenly spread appointments, workload, and reasonably similar income for
all its permanent members. Panel members are excluded from these guarantees; their compensation
for WTO work is a supplement to their income from primary employment elsewhere. In turn,
FINRA’s allocative method is not designed to guarantee appointments, evenly spread workload,
or secured remuneration since it has more than 7000 enlisted adjudicators and allows disputing
parties to indicate their preferences. The remuneration that FINRA adjudicators receive, like WTO
panelists, is only a supplement to their income from their primary employment. Despite this lack
of personal guarantees FINRA uses strong safeguards in that it divides powers to nominate, select,
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and appoint among various actors; it separates the appointment process from the case assignment
process; it precludes direct relations between parties and adjudicators by (1) using a neutral
allocative system and (2) excluding parties from the negotiation of arbitrators’ income; and it limits
conflicts of interest by capping fees.

At the WTO, standing for other directly affected parties is possible to some degree. They can
become co-complainants, or they can initiate a new proceeding against the respondent regarding
matters already decided at previous panel proceedings. However, indirectly affected states may
only participate in a limited form - as amicus curiae - and must have a substantial interest in the
matter or invoke a systemic interest. Only these other parties that participated in panel proceedings
may participate as of right at the appellate stage; the other non-participating parties may join only
as passive observers. FINRA allows joinder, but only on request of one of the original parties, as
well as discretionary intervention as amicus. Since amicus is designed to support one of the
existing parties or some other public interest, it is an insufficient tool to protect one’s own interests.

Finally, all international arbitral bodies - WIPO and all ISDS administering bodies - are at the other
end of the spectrum in that none of them provides personal protections in the form of security of
tenure or financial security. Instead, they maintain indicative lists only. Adjudicators joining these
lists may go through several stages - nomination, selection, and appointment - but the methods to
assign an arbitrator to a case allow the parties to skip these lists entirely by choosing their
arbitrators from whatever sources they prefer. This direct selection of one’s adjudicator impedes
the objectivity and neutrality of the process. There is a prospect that parties will select arbitrators
with favorable views; also, arbitrators have incentives to interpret the law in favor of investors in
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order to get appointed. Further, it creates improper proximity between the disputing parties and
their adjudicators with a potential risk that the former may inappropriately influence the latter.
These potential risks arise because there are no adequate safeguards and, in turn, they undermine
public confidence in the system. While most of these bodies may use a list-procedure to assign
arbitrators to a case, the list’s use is confined to situations when parties fail to agree or to appoint
or when they request use of it. Moreover, even under the list-procedure parties may choose their
arbitrators from among pre-selected ones. These allocative processes, like at FINRA, are not
designed to guarantee appointments or evenly spread workload. Instead, they have a propensity to
create two distinct groups of arbitrators: those frequently appointed (ISDS is criticized for its
number of elite arbitrators and the difficulty to join their club) and the others.

At these international arbitral bodies, there is also no financial security since income depends on
appointments. The level of remuneration is uncertain and based on a variety of factors (typically
on peculiarities of proceedings) and calculated ad hoc. Each examined body has schedules of fees
that are in some instances capped. Several of the institutions allow tribunals to set their fees and
allow parties to get involved in negotiation of arbitrators’ remuneration. These arrangements are
at odds with values of independence and impartiality because they give rise to a potential conflict
of interest. Arbitrators have a personal interest in the level of fees and the length of proceedings
and in close relations between parties and their adjudicators. Capped fees and final fees typically
are fixed and paid by these arbitral bodies from the parties’ contributions and seem to be the only
safeguarding features that these adjudicative bodies use. Further, the remuneration that arbitrators
receive is, as argued, excessive and thus problematic for its corrupting potential. Even if high
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incomes may be the way to compensate arbitrators for their otherwise uncertain remuneration, only
those appointed can benefit in this way.

These methods of remuneration, instead of personal security, create a conflict of interest and an
environment where arbitrators must compete to get appointed. Even if the integrity of individual
adjudicators is not disputed and there is no actual conflict of interest or ill-thought motivation, the
context of inadequate safeguards leaves too many opportunities for inappropriate pressure or
behavior, thus undermining the perception of the neutrality and public confidence in the system.

Considering participation as the basis for fairness, all arbitral forums - ISDS, WIPO, and FINRA
- typically anticipate the right to standing of the parties to the dispute. At the same time, they limit
the rights of other parties having a legal interest. None of these forums guarantees the right to
standing to other parties. The only potential option they provide is joinder (ICSID does not say so
explicitly but gives tribunals broad discretionary powers under which joinder may potentially be
possible). Except for ICSID, all other arbitral bodies, FINRA, WIPO, the PCA-UNCITRAL and
the ICC, provide for joinder at the discretion of a tribunal or the original parties albeit typically
only if all parties agree to it. The joining parties must be parties to the arbitration agreement and
the joinder must not be prejudicial to any of the original parties. While this arrangement may be
appropriate in purely private disputes of FINRA and WIPO, in treaty-based ISDS disputes, it is
inadequate since there are no such arbitration agreements available. Its inadequacy is also due to
the complexity of ISDS disputes and the nature of its stakeholders. ISDS typically deals with issues
of a public nature where the number of these stakeholders is typically unknown. This arrangement
hinders all other parties with legal rights (but no arbitration agreement) from joining proceedings

261

to protect their interests. Since all parties must typically agree to joinder, it is enough for one party
that deems the additional party’s legal interest as potentially threatening to block it from
participating unless the adjudicative panel steps in, as happened in Chevron, Bernhard von Pezold
and others v Zimbabwe, as discussed in chapter 2. All bodies allow discretionary participation in
the form of amicus, but this option is inadequate for those with a legal interest.

One may point out that these distinguishing features (from courts) arise from the inherited
characteristics of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Yet this argument does not stand when one
looks at FINRA, an arbitral body dealing with consensual dispute settlement, that consistently
evinces stronger safeguards than treaty-based ISDS in order to encapsulate stakeholders that have
no option to consent (such as property owners whose rights have been encroached). FINRA has
powers to shape industry yet its powers, unlike ISDS, are limited by higher laws of the land and
overseen by its authorities. The only potentially similar approach at FINRA and in ISDS relates to
joinder.

ISDS proponents themselves compare its systemic safeguards to those of the courts and claim that,
between the two, ISDS is superior. From the dataset, these claims are far from substantiated since
ISDS - for its selective preferential treatment of some stakeholders and restrictive treatment of
others (who have a legal interest) - does not exhibit itself as an unbiased system. Its neutrality and,
thus, systemic superiority are not proven for the lack of adequate institutional safeguards. Instead,
protection of its neutrality is sporadic, somewhat simplistic, and seriously flawed. Even though
domestic courts, as some argue, may be biased, they easily surpass ISDS since they have the
strongest safeguards and robust approach to other stakeholders, whereas ISDS, placed at the other
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end of the spectrum, has the least institutional safeguards and the most restrictive access for
adversely affected parties.

In comparison to ISDS administering bodies (ICSID, the PCA-UNCITRAL, and the ICC), WIPO
follows similar rules and exhibits a similar lack of institutional safeguards, yet it also displays a
few important distinctions. WIPO, like FINRA, is a different species of adjudication because it is
based on consensual agreements as opposed to the treaty-based ISDS. Access to WIPO is open to
anyone, domestically or across borders, who agrees to arbitrate a dispute of a private and
commercial nature, whereas access to ISDS is open to treaty-qualified foreign investors but noone else. This latter restriction applies despite the fact that ISDS, unlike WIPO, has the power to
review acts and inaction of states and frequently deals with issues that have far-reaching effects
on other parties, the general public, and the state’s ability to act or regulate. Thus, ISDS is
unquestionably unique in its lack of institutional safeguards. This lack is not marginal but
substantial, as exposed in my analysis of adjudicative appointments, methods of case assignment,
tenure and remuneration, and fairness via participation. Accordingly, the institutional design of
ISDS proves the weakest and does not serve all its stakeholders. This conclusion stands even if
one attempts to brand ISDS as purely private arbitration (although it is not) since it provides weaker
protections than FINRA, a private arbitral body.

In this research, I examined a few essential safeguards. One must acknowledge the poor quality of
ISDS institutional design across the whole ISDS group. While adjudicative independence and
impartiality have already received plenty of attention, the protection of third parties’ rights has
been wrongly neglected. ISDS, as a system that sought to level the playing field for disadvantaged

263

foreign investors, de facto swung the equilibrium in the opposite direction by omitting appropriate
safeguards. ISDS contributes to another unfairness by creating victims of its measures, providing
preferential treatment to foreign investors while discriminating against other stakeholders.
Equally, because of ISDS’s unique and substantial lack of the essential safeguards, one might infer
that ISDS is equally lacking safeguards in other vital areas: transparency in the form of
accessibility to information, accountability of adjudicators, equality in terms of rights and
responsibilities of parties to the dispute, etc. However, even if these three areas are the only lacunas
in ISDS, they are substantial enough to warrant a significant systemic redesign.

Based on these findings, one can no longer talk about mere appearances of bias but systemic flaws
and failures. Rejection of ISDS in its current form for the lack of safeguards of essential values
seems inevitable. If the ISDS industry wishes to achieve neutrality, it should adhere to values of
fair, independent, and impartial adjudication and thus create a dispute settlement regime that works
for the betterment of all stakeholders.

This idea to reform ISDS is not new. My research comes in an era when ISDS is contested by
scholars and practitioners and by the general public based on a call for fair and transparent
adjudication that ISDS currently cannot provide. Due to its systemic flaws and under public
pressure, various reform initiatives have been launched. Some states withdrew from ICSID others
are re-negotiating treaties or seeking to apply newer versions with more contemporary terms to
protect their regulatory space others seek to insert corporate social responsibility (CSR) clauses or
provisions establishing a binding code of conduct on conflicts of interest of arbitrators.1293 Further,

1293

For instance, the US-South Korea FTA, see supra note 16, includes a clause regarding regulatory space. The
recently drafted USMCA is phasing out ISDS between the United States and Canada, see supra note 15. The Model
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the EU launched major initiatives to include a permanent Investment Court System (ICS) in its
treaties and create a multilateral investment court. The UNCITRAL revised arbitration rules on
transparency and had set up a working group to strengthen independence and impartiality of ISDS
arbitrators. However, these reforms do not address the issues I have examined: the protection of
essential values through institutional safeguards and the assurance of full standing for other parties
with a legal interest in the proceeding.

Further, all of the examined arbitral bodies, ICSID, the PCA-UNCITRAL, and the ICC, have
introduced various changes to respond to some concerns, such as transparency and, in some cases,
rules governing non-party participation. Yet, considering fairness and safeguards of adjudicative
independence and impartiality, these changes are too modest to make ISDS comparable to the
courts. Since the gap between ISDS and courts is substantial, to level the playing field with them,
ISDS likely requires a change so significant that a more feasible option than the reform may be to
start anew.

The situation is uncertain as reforms may face difficulties. Only the future will show the successes
or failures of various initiatives, such as the ICS or the multilateral court, and the strengths and
weaknesses of their institutional design. The creation of a multilateral court, like every project, has
been an ongoing process that has to resolve a variety of issues and overcome a series of hurdles.

Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty (2016), the Netherlands model BIT (2018), and the BelgiumLuxembourg Economic Union model BIT (2019) exemplify new versions of IIAs. Considering CSR, Canada
included such a clause in recent investment treaties like the 2013 Benin-Canada BIT, art 4; the 2014 CameroonCanada BIT, art 15; the 2014 Canada-Nigeria BIT, art 16; the 2014 Canada-Serbia BIT, art 16; the 2014 CanadaRepublic of Korea FTA, art 8.16; the 2014 Canada-Mali BIT and the 2015 Burkina Faso-Canada BIT. In 2011, the
EU decided to include CSR language in all its FTAs: see EC, European Parliament Resolution of 6 April 2011 on
the Future European International Investment Policy, [2012] OJ, C 296/34 at para 28. As an example of a treaty
with language on an arbitrator’s code of conduct, see the EU-Canada CETA, supra note 3, Annex 29 – B.
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The purpose of my study was not to provide answers to the question of how to resolve pressing
concerns about ISDS but to inform and contribute to the discussion of the basis for strengthening
the methods for protecting fundamental values in ISDS by understanding how other adjudicative
regimes achieve this goal. Further, the designers of the ICS and multilateral treaties, reformers,
IIAs negotiators, and re-designers can all learn from other time-tested systems. Since I looked at
shared values across many contexts, decision-makers in all these processes can benefit from the
compiled dataset. My work may be helpful in various ways: to open minds, inspire, and encourage
thinking, to show examples to recreate or avoid, to help adjust existing processes or contribute
entirely new projects. In other words, my study can assist in ongoing reforms and in designing
projects from scratch.
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